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PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR 
NEW TECHNOLOGY BASED FIRMS 
ElMS Policy Workshop Foreword 
The  design,  implementation  and  evaluation  of  policies  promoting 
innovation and technology transfer have undergone a series of changes. In 
the 1970s policy was to a large extent an ad-hoc and judgmental process. 
However, during the 1980s policy changes have been more informed and 
professional in outlook. 
In  order to  continue  this  development,  SPRINT/ElMS  has  launched  a 
series of state-of-the-art reviews in the field of innovation and technology 
transfer support. These so called  "policy workshops"  are mainly directed 
to  public  sector  scheme  managers  and  the  aim  is  to  discuss  recent 
developments  in  innovation  policy,  to  exchange  experience  of  best 
practice, to  assess existing as  well as  future  Community action in these 
fields and to discuss options for concerted actions. 
One of SPRINT objectives is to help improve the effectiveness of national 
and  regional  innovation  policies  and  to  tune  Community  and  Member 
State actions.  As  such these workshops provide important inputs as  well 
.  as  providing  an  opportunity  to  exchange  information  among  scheme 
managers in the Member States. 
This report summarises the proceedings from  the  first  workshop  in the 
series  titled,  Public  measures  supporting  new  technology  based firms. 
Lately policies throughout Europe have been directed to  new technology 
based  firms(NTBF),  based  on  the  belief  in  their  superior  innovating 
potential  and  positive  employment  effects.  The  conference  aimed  at 
identifying  policies  directed  to  new  technology  based  firms  in  Member 
countries  and  discuss  their  rationale,  implementation  and  effectiveness. 
Over 30 European schemes have been identified and are described in the 
proceedings. This information, we think, is quite  uniq~e since it provides 
an up-to-date picture of the various efforts in Member States. 
R. Miege 
Head of Unit 
DG XIII- European Innovation Monitoring System ... 
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SUMMARY OF PRESENTATIONS AND DEBATE 
II ,  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The SPRINT/ElMS workshop  on public policies to support  New Technology 
Based Firms was one of the first in a series of workshops aimed at the exchange 
of experience between the Member States on innovation related public policies. 
SETTING THE SCENE 
The  first  session  set  out to  describe  what  New  Technology  Based  Firms 
(NTBFs) are and which government actions could support them. The papers that 
introduced  the debate are included in this report and hence will not be discussed 
here. 
Summarizing it was argued that SMEs play an increasingly important role in the 
technological key sectors.  The number of companies and employees is growing 
fast.  The nominal value added of SMEs in some sectors is growing even faster  _ 
than value added by large companies. SMEs, compared to large finns, also have 
become the provider of the largest proportion of innovations. This justifies why 
public administrationS should be interested in this group of firms.  Defined in a 
broad sense,  including all finns who exploit new technologies,  their number is 
estimated at a few thousand in the Community. In a more narrow sense, including 
only those NTBFs that develop new technologies,  their number may  be a few 
hundred. 
In the past two decennia, public policy instruments to support NTBFs have been 
developed in all EC countries. The inventory of these instruments, also included 
in this report, shows a great variety. This diversity would probably support the 
idea that there i.s  not one single and simple 'best practice' to support NTBFs. 
In the  EC one  can  identify  two  basic  types  of instruments.  First,  the  most 
dominant fonn of support, direct financial aid (grants, loans participation or tax 
1 reduction),  either given directly  to enterprises  for support,  or indirectly  via 
intenned.iaries.  Second,  indirect financial  aid  to reduce  the  risk of financial 
institutions.  In many  countries  however,  support for  NTBFs  is  integrated  in 
schemes to aid SMEs in general.  The overview of the policy actions in ~urope 
which fall  in each category  is  given in one of the papers  which  follow  this 
summary of the wo~op. 
In the discussion which followed the presentations the question was raised  how 
one could  justify actions  to support  NTBFs  given the fact that numerically 
NTBFs are not very significant. Some of the arguments mentioned to support this 
fonn of intervention were their flexibility  (first to market),  their capability to 
provide R&D more cost effectively in comparison with large companies, their 
contribution to development of human capital and improving the dynamics of 
markets, and finally industrial policy arguments of supporting key sectors. 
The presentations  which followed  during the  first  day  of the  workshop  were 
illustrations of different types of schemes in the Member States. 
INDIRECT SCHEMES 
The first two schemes presented, - the Dutch PPM scheme and the Gennan BJTU 
pilot scheme are indirect policies,  designed to reduce the risk of the financial 
institutions  which invest in NTBFs.  The long-tenn goal is to create a  mature 
venture capital market which is less risk averse towards the NTBFs. 
· The PPM programme which provides guarantees for risk capital suppliers is the 
most specific instrument addressing the financial needs of NTBFs. This scheme, 
established  in  1981,  is  aimed  at stimulating  private  venture  capital  firms  to 
provide equity investment in SMEs. Essence of the programme is that the Dutch 
government guarantees a recovery of 50% of eventuallosses·of investors. It has 
allowed in a period of 12 years to establish a stable group of approximately 100 
VCCs. 
At the federal level in Gennany we can find the BJTU pilot programme, which 
supports NTBFs indirectly by providing better investment capital conditions. The 
programme has two lines of action. The 'refinancing model',  carried out by the 
Kreditanstalt fiir Wiederaufbau, makes loans available to investment companies, 
with up to 90% release from  liability.  The  'co-investment model'  allows  the 
government (BMFf through the Technologie Beteiligungsgesellschaft) to place a 
dormant holding in a NTBF to which another investor must be committed with at 
least the same amount. 
2  . The subsequent discussion ·concentrated on the relation between government and 
the private capital market. The question was asked if the private venture market 
was made even more risk averse by government financed safety nets. In the view 
of most participants this did not seem the case. Moreover the Gennan and the 
Dutch  experience showed that it created a  financial  infrastructure for NTBFs 
which did not exist before. However participants also stressed that investment tisk 
for venture capitalists must remain in place to allow investment decisions based 
on objective risk assessments. The aim  of a scheme should be to make the risk 
acceptable. In order to limit the failure rate of the schemes it was argued that 
good selection criteria were essential.  Both Dutch and Gennan representatives 
agreed that the selection should be  made at 'two-anns'  length of government, 
assuming that the financial  institutions themselves are  best  suited to make the 
selection. 
It  was  further  suggested  that it is  important for governments  to  remove  the 
structural impediments for venture capital investments, for instance in taxation 
rules.  At European  Community  level  this  means  a  further  hannonisation  of 
regulation on capital markets.  Policy schemes operators should not forget that 
management quality should be the most important selection criteria to support 
NTBFs.  Finally it was argued that the main· bottleneck at the moment seems to 
be the availability of risk capital in many countries. 
THE DIRECT AND SPECIFIC SCHEMES 
Two examples of instruments that directly support the finns were presented during 
this session: the SMART and SPUR schemes in the UK and the Spanish CDTI-
loan scheme. ·These schemes are strictly financial support instruments, they do not 
offer any other support services. 
The  Small  Finns  Merit  Awards  for  Research  and  Technology  (SMART) 
programme is  a  national competition established in 1986  which provides non 
repayable grants for NTBFs.  It provides up to 150 grants per year for feasibility 
studies  (stage  I)  and  75  grants  to continue  with the  development  of pre-
production  prototypes  (stage  ll).  The  Support for  Products  under Research 
(SPUR)  programme  started  in 1991  and  is  aimed  at  encouraging  SMEs  to 
increase R&D expenditure and to develop new products and processes. 
The CDTI loan scheme for research collaboration projects, aims at more mature 
finns,  not specifically in the seed and start-up stage.  This  makes  the  idea of 
providing management-support less  obvious.  In Spain this type of government 
funding is essential to finns because there are hardly any other sources of finance 
3 for technology based projects. Unlike the UK there is no venture capital market. 
During the debate it was said that one should not forget that the 'labelling effect' 
also  plays  an  important  role  in this  type  of schemes.  Access  to  additional 
financing is made much easier, for finns that receive this type of  grant or loan. 
This is certainly not the case for all types of grants. 
Furthermore it was  suggested that loans  which are  refundable only in case  of 
success of the project might put a premium on failure. The Spanish, representative 
argued that the fact that firms in Spain depend on CDTI for most of their finance, 
reduces this danger. 
THE DIRECT INTEGRATED APPROACH. 
One of the characteristics of the direct ·integrated approach is that direct financial 
support of an NTBF is supplemented with assistance for management,  network 
connections, marketing advice and so on.  This is based on the conviction that the 
combination of a sound financial base and good management are prerequisites for 
growth.  In  most  participants  experience,  technical  entrepreneurs  are  not 
necessarily good businessmen. The two examples of the integrated approach  were 
ANV  AR from France and IDA from Ireland.  Both organisations are concerned 
with  support  for  firms  in  general,  mainly  SMEs.  Nevertheless  in both  cases 
NTBFs constitute a significant part of the subsidised firms. 
The ANV  AR programme is a national programme managed through 24 regional 
offices  which  implement  the  scheme.  ANV ARs main target  are  SMEs  in  all 
sectors  of industry.  Innovation  assistance  is  given to projects of technological 
nature, via advances of up to 40% of the cost of the innovation programme, m 
the form  of interest free loans.  These loans  are  repayable in four instalments, 
depending on the failure or success of the project. The assistance is offered for 
the complete innovation trajectorY,  from feasibility studies to commercialisation 
of the project.  In addition to  the  financial  support  it also provides  innovation 
support services and consultancies. 
The Enterprise· Development Programme managed by he InduStrial Development 
Authority of Ireland  (IDA)  is also  an integrated approach to SMEs.  Important 
aspect  of this  programme  is  to  build  up  management  teams  in  firms  and 
subsequently help them  establish a network of strategic research partners,  key 
customers and financial experts. It is less explicitly focused on NTBFs. However 
NTBFs constitute about one third of the IDA projects. This programme includes 
mainly direct forms  of fmancial  aid and management support.  There is  a wide 
4 range of support services which include interesting features such as key customer 
introduction. 
Both schemes  are  examples of a  'hands-on'  approach,  operating  as  financier, 
dealing with the selection of projects themselves and in the Irish case acting as 
shareholder.  Personal  contact  and therefore  proximity  of the  agency  to their 
clients  is  important in this  hands-on  approach.  During the  discussion  it was 
noticed that a drawback of this approach is the danger of "falling in love"  with 
an NTBF.  Clear exit criteria,  and  regular evaluation of the  progress of their 
projects, are  therefo~ needed by IDA and ANVAR. 
Some participants argued that although integrated programmes had advantages, 
they were not applicable in all countries. 
THE FISCAL APPROACH. 
There are only a reduced number of tax related schemes available in the EC. Two 
examples illustrated this approach: the federal Belgian fiscal scheme  'Innovation 
Company'  (abandoned  in  1990)  and  the  Italian  law  317  (not  yet  fully 
implemented). 
The  'Innovation Company'  law is  a  scheme which exempted new technology 
based  finns  from  taxation.  To  apply  for  the  scheme  companies  had  to  be 
identified as innovating companies and once they were notified they were allowed 
tax reduction, either on profits or on income tax. The scheme, although seen as 
successful, was phased out in 1990 due to budgetary constraints. 
The Italian 'Law 317' is  a very comprehensive law which includes up to eight 
different  types  of  support  for  SMEs.  Some  of  them  operate  through  the 
mechanism of tax reduction.  However it has had some start up problems with 
oversubscription in the grants part of the scheme.  The scheme, also has some 
relatively novel mechanisms to increase expediency  0  Through a system of self-
certificatio~, the time to award the credit is reduced to 15 days so the scheme can 
handle many applications. 
During the debate it was argued that innovation related tax reduction schemes can 
be identified in many countries, however they vary greatly in their design and 
implementation.  A major advantage of the tax related schemes was seen in the 
fact that the dissemination of information on the schemes themselves is facilitated 
by the use of existing channels like accountants and lawyers. Drawbacks are the 
insufficient  feedback  from  the  recipients  and  poor  possibility  to  target  the 
5 schemes. 
It was further argued that double taxation of the investments constituted a problem 
in some member states. Harmonisation of tax rules was seen as an important task 
for the Commission.  , 
AN INTERMEZZO: THE CHANGES IN US POLICY 
Dluing the dinner session the participants had the opportunity to listen to and 
discuss with Mr Bradshaw, a former coordinator of science and technology issues 
during  the  Clinton  campaign.  He  presented  the  main  lines  of the  new  US 
administration. 
Under' the banner of  'Technology for America's Economic Growth', the Clinton 
administration  aims  to redirect  US  technology  policy.  This  means  a  shift  of 
emphasis from the large defense related research projects to more civilian and 
industry-led research and development, at the same time· recognising the import-
ance of basic science for technological development. New emphasis will be  pl~ced 
on the importance of education and training as means to improve American skills 
and upgrading  of the  infrastructure both to enhance  technological  capability. 
Commenting on the near future, Mr. Bradshaw argued that, given the pressures 
on the new team, there is the danger that they will concentrate on revitalising the 
American firms at the expense of openness towards its trade partners. This could 
counteract years of effort to open up the US, EC and Japanese economies to each 
other. This will need on all sides a period of very careful negotiation which takes 
into consideration the US poli~y making pressures of an incoming administration. 
ISSUES OF DESIGN, MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION. 
During the morning session of the second day of the workshop several issues of 
design,  management and evaluation of policy instruments  were discussed  and 
briefly introduced by different speakers. 
On the question how to cope  with failure  it was  argued that the definition of 
failure must be clearly recorded in the scheme from the beginning. One can use 
a narrow definition of failure,( eg. bankruptcy) or a broader one where the finn 
survives but doesn't live up to the expectations of a NTBF.  Working with tl}e 
narrow definition, scheme managers might end up supporting the 'living dead' just 
to avoid failure. 
Comparing the experiences of the different support schemes presented, the failure 
rates differ considerably, partly caused by different definitions of failure. 
6 On the topic of defining the target group it was argued that it clearly "depended 
on the  objectives  of the  programme,  ranging  from  regional  development  to. 
creating a venture capital market. No general recommendations  could be given 
on that. 
Another issue which has to be considered more explicitly before setting up these 
type of schemes  is  why  member  states  should  emphasise  so  much  on  high 
technology films as producers of new technologies? In the view of some of the 
participants dissemination of technologies is equally and possibly more important. 
Furthermore, public policy should· strongly aim at maintaining the market share 
of the more competitive European high-tech sectors, usually 'in the hands of large 
companies. 
On the question of why  and how  to evaluate  schemes  it was  argued that  the 
evaluation of a scheme should be held against its policy objectives.  By several 
participants it was stressed that the success of separate projects does not mean that 
the scheme as a whole is successful.  If the objective of a scheme is an intended 
change in attitude within the target group, this will be hard to evaluate. 
COMMUNITY ACTION AND SUPPORT SCHEMES 
This session gave an overview of Community schemes to promote NTBFs.  The 
schemes either involve financial  intermediaries,  innovation support services  or 
fums. During this session several individual Community schemes were presented: 
the EC Seed Capital Scheme, the Venture Consort and Eurotech Capital Scheme 
and finally the SPRINT- NTBF support measures, in particular the Technology 
Performance Financing scheme. 
Although the participants stressed the importance of the European schemes they 
also observed some difficulties for potential applicants due to the great diversity 
of actions. 
Another point of -debate was the regional disparity in the creation of NTBFs and 
in the provision of seed capital. In spite of numerous Community programmes the 
situation has not changed: the UK has still the strongest seed-capital market and 
Spain  /Portugal  the  weakest.  In many  participants'  view  this meant that each 
region needed a different approach and the regions lagging behind need a more 
'hands-on' policy.  · 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 
The  last session of the workshop started with a 'Tour de  Table'  on the  future 
7 perspectives of the different programmes and a~ons  in member states. In several 
countries  recent  or  forthcoming  changes  of  governments  make  future 
developments more difficult to define. 
In the  UK it was mentioned that the government was preparing a major revision 
of its S&T policy.  A White Paper on the issue was due to be published in May 
1993. DTI had just started reviewing their objectives and schemes. This process 
will  also be col))pleted in May. SMART and SPUR are due to run until 1994 and 
are both due for evaluation later this year.  UK representatives could hence not 
give a very detailed picture of the lines to the future. 
In Scotland a package of new  policies  will be launched in May,  aimed at the 
creation of new firms, including NTBFs. This will include financing, management 
'training  and  support  for  networking  of new  firms.  Starting  entrepreneurs  in 
Scotland have poor networks  and have to rely on formal  linkages  rather than 
informal ones. Therefore Scottish Enterprise will probably initiate a forum where 
new entrepreneurs can have informal contacts with experienced entrepreneurs or 
venture capitalists to discuss business plans. 
French representatives argued that the future priorities for ANV  AR, based on the 
principle of shared investment risks, are to be found along three lines. The first 
priority is to improve the services of ANV  AR to firms in general. The second is 
to help NTBFs to a capable management. A third development aims at mobilising 
capital  either by  transfonning  conditional loans  back  into their own  funds  or 
developing guarantee mechanisms. 
The representative for the Netherlands distinguished two events likely to affect 
science and technology policy. The first is a white paper on technology policy due 
in April, the second will be the elections next year. Dutch representatives expect 
a  considerable  increase  of  funds  for  R&D  policy  in  the  next  year.  The 
, Netherlands has had the lowest level of funding to industry in the EC in the recent 
years. In relation to  NTBFs more emphasis might be placed on networking, co-
makership,  clustering  and  collaboration  with  R&D  organisations.  Another 
initiative  under  discussion,  is  a scheme  to support  feasibility  studies,  - both 
technical and economic - for R&D based start-up companies. 
German participants argued that the experimental BJTU-programme is due to run 
until end of 1994.  It is likely to be extended.  The most important issue will be 
which  organisation will  be  assigned the  management of the  scheme once  it is 
established more permanently. 
The TOU scheme in the new German Under is due to run until 1995 and it will 
8 be  extended after that year.  In the third phase of the programme the aim is to 
improve the  capital  base  of NTBFs,  by  transforming  th~, loan  guarantee  into 
equity capital. Under discussion are a collaboration scheme for SMEs and R&D 
organisations and a tax reduction scheme for R&D expenses. It was argued that 
the  use  of regional  funds  to support  NTBFs  in  the  new  Linder would  be  a 
welcome  addition,  and  any  ideas  from  the Commission  to make  this possible 
would be appreciated. 
German participants suggested that the Commission act as coordinator of national 
efforts to support NTBFs. A follow-up of this workshop could be one instrument 
of coordination.  It  was  also  proposed that the EC  role in fiscal  hannonisation 
regarding risk capital should be strengthened. 
The Danish representative argued that a new government under social-democratic 
leadership has recently been installed and new  lines in industrial policy can be 
expected, unemployment being the main policy issue. Schemes that exist from the 
former government - a series of small  initiatives towards  entrepreneurs - will 
probably proceed.  There is however no indication of specific activities towards 
NTBFs in the future. Support for SMEs will be brought forward in the fonn of 
a guarantee scheme for loans with private banks. Furthennore the funding of the 
industrial and technological development agency will be doubled. 
Italian policy in this field will continue although due to budgetary constrains one 
-could expect a progressive reduction in funds.  At the moment the department of 
industry is preparing the annual report on Law 317.  The report will discuss the 
problems  arising  from  the  choice  between  grants  and  tax  reduction  given  to 
applicants. Another problem raised is the system of self-certification, checked by 
the banks.  Most banks cannot make the technical evaluation if funded projects 
involve high-technology innovations. 
In Ireland  participants expected some new initiatives on support to NTBFs.  The 
role of the state taking equities in NTBFs will be gradually replaced by a role of 
'silent partner'.  A new initiative, the Enterprise Preparation Programme, intends 
to bring together a small groups of highly motivated potential entrepreneurs with 
financial intermediaries and investors to prepare the start-up of new finns. A new 
guideline is also to fund firms with repayable grants. 
Greek policy is strongly dominated by the issues of privatisation and deregulation. 
This applies to R&D policy as well. New iriitiatives in Greece originate from the 
EC,  in particular from the Delors ll  package.  In a programme financed by DG 
XVI and DG V for technology transfer and innovation, still under discussion, the 
specific  needs  of Greece  will  be addressed.  The  schemes  are  not particularly 
9 focused on NTBFs, at most on spin-offs from universities and foreign companies. 
Belgian participants dit not expect at the federal level any new initiative or the 
revival of fiscal measures regarding NTBFs. In the three regions the only new 
policy initiative is  the  'Brustart'  fund  in the Brussels  region,  which has  only 
started and will probably have a SMART like formula. In the Flanders region job 
creation is the main policy objective and possibly NTBFs oriented policies will 
derive from that objective. 
Finally, to illustrate some of the initiatives being developed in the autonomous 
regions of Spain one participant described an ambitious plan  of the Valencia -
region, containing direct grants for competitive and pre-competitive research and 
agreements with. universities, technological institutes and finns. In a few months 
the regional government is  going to set up a  seed capital fund and a  specific 
programme for NTBFs to obtain managerial expertise and financial support for 
feasibility studies if done by consultants. 
Trying  to identify  common  tendencies  in policy  developments  in MEMBER 
STATES one can summarize them as follows: 
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10 At the REGIONAL LEVEL discussants argued that regions have more difficulties 
·in designing their own policies due to the fact that they are on the one hand under 
pressure of the regional issues and on the other hand constrained by national and 
EC regulation.  Their room of manoeuvre depends on their autonomy from the 
central government. The problem with NTBF schemes is that these are aimed at 
long-tenn results, whereas issues in the regions often need short.tenn effects, for 
instance in terms of employment. An advantage of policy at the regional level is 
that there is a closer relation to the infrastructure and finns and policies can be 
better fine tuned to local needs and characteristics. 
At the NATIONAL LEVEL  discussants argued that one should keep in mind the 
balance between the weight of NTBFs  and the problems that face the whole 
economy, unemployment being the most urgent one. One should not forget the 
large amount of traditional companies which are not innovative enough. Focusing 
on NTBFs at national level should not be considered as the 'magic bullet' to solve 
all problems. Large high technology based companies are still the main force in 
creating and diffusing technology in most countries. 
On the prospects for COMMUNITY action discussants argued that the Community 
faced  several  constraints.  Politically  the  Community  acts  according  to  the 
s~bsidiarity principle,  hence  any  direct  action on its  part is not likely unless 
required  by  member states.  A  second  (temporary) .constraint is  the recession 
which has  hit Europe.  This  has  meant that in terms of budget,  the increases 
proposed in the Delors n package,  were not approved.  Last  but not least the 
conflicting need for diversity and. cohesion strongly effected the result of policy 
actions. 
Three possible courses of action appear to be open to the European Commission 
level. The EC could: 
11 .. · ....  ·.· ... · 
-:--.-··:·  ·. 
-.  ··.::·."\. 
-:  ·:·.:· ..  '  ' 
.:·.::-
.  ..  ..  ......  ......  ·-:.-·:-·::-.--.::-.  __  ·. 
;:· .  .-·:·-:·:·:·/-· ·=·:···-·._  :  ':·-~:-:=.-:::-:.:  ... -:  -:  _::=::  .-.  ·.  -=:·  .·  :-... ·; 
• ;  :; .':.:., :.  :.  ~  , ..•  ,  . I  . , .  •  .  ,  .  ,  . 
Closing the workshop the chainnan said that  from  the point of view  of the 
Commission this first exchange of experience had been intenSe and in his  view 
successful. The active and open contribution of the participants had been essential 
for the success of the workshop.  He hoped other workshops would be able to 
continue this very fruitful exchange of experiences between member states and the 
EC. 
P.  Boekholt 
C. Selman 
G.  Fahrenkrog 
STB-TNO, April 1993 
12 ' 
SETIING· THE SCENE 
THIRD PARTY EQUITY SUPPORT FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY 
BASED FIRMS IN THE UK AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
Dr.  Gordon Mun-ay 
Warwick Business School,  U.K. • 
• 
THIRD PARTY EOUITY SUPPORT FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY BASED 
FIRMS IN THE UK AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
Dr.  Gordon Mu"ay, Warwick Business School,  University of  Warwick, 
Coventry CV4 7AL,  England. 
(tele 44 203 524622,  fax 44 203 524628) 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the subject of venture capital, equity 
finance and its particular role in the creation and support of new and developing 
businesses.  A number of practitioner and policy issues are raised concerning the 
objectives and  operation of New Technology  Based Finns (NTBFs)  and their 
relationship with early stage,  venture capital funds  in the UK and continental 
Europe.  Where  appropriate,  observations, are  illustrated  or referenced  with 
industry statistics and research findings from studies undertaken by Warwick and 
other researchers. 
B.  INDUSTRY STATISTICS AND TRENDS 
& 
Technology is defined throughout this paper as including the following sectors: 
communications,  computer related,  other electronic related, biotechnology and 
medical/health related.  Data on these categories are segregated in all three data 
sets produced by the UK, European and US venture capital industries  . 
Time series figures on the importance of technology investment as a specific focus 
of venture capital activity in the UK show a clear downward trend over the 1980s, 
particularly when measured by the total value of investments made each year. 
The UK and European figures (which include the UK) show a similar trend albeit 
that the European figures indicate a rather higher importance for technology in 
total investment.  These figures are in marked contrast to the US where· venture 
capital activity has been largely defined within a technology focus  (see Roberts 
1991 and By  grave & Timmons 1992).  UK interest in the potential of technology 
investment in the early 1980s was to result in a subsequently very high failure rate 
1 of supported technology entrepreneurs (MUITay 1991).  The considerable risks of 
backing  novel  technologies  and  commercially  inexperienced  technology 
entrepreneurs was to result in a large number of venture capital firms deciding to 
abandon a presence in this market.  Technology investment was left to a small 
number of specialist investors with staff able to appreciate the complex technical 
and market characteristics (Murray & Lott 1992).  At the same time as venture 
capital firms were abandoning technology investment, the UK's MBO market was 
starting to accele~te.  MBOs appeared to offer more substantial and less risky 
returns  than  earlier stage,  technology  investments.  Thus,  venture  capitalists 
substituted  funds  into  this  potentially  attractive  area,  starting  a  pattern  of 
investment which remains to the present day.  European funds developed later 
than  in the  UK.  They  were  thus  able  to  see  the  problems  of technology 
investment experienced in the UK.  In consequence,  the majority of emerging 
European  venture  capital  industries  followed  a  UK rather than  a  US  model 
devoting  the  majority  of  investment  activity  and  interest  to  later  stage, 
development capital activity. 
2 Table 1  Percentage Number and Value of Technology Investments in the 
UK, Europe and the US by Venture Capital F1rms 
Year  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
UK: 
Total No. UK Comp.  350  517  600  1174  1326  1302  1221  1196 
Financed 
Technology-% No.  36.3  30.9  26.5  25.6  21.4  23.7  23.6  20.8 
Tot. Invest. 
Total Value Invest.(£  140  278  384  934  1298.  1420  1106  989 
mill) 




Total No.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5078  5439  5362  6907 
Investments 
Technology-% No.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  32.0  30.4  29.0  25.5 
Tot. Invest 
Total Value  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3452  4271  4126  4632 
Investments (ECU 
million) 




Total Value  2760  2670  3242  3977  3847  3395  1922  1358 
Investments 
($million) 
Technology-%  82.0  77.0  70.9  63.5  60.5  67.4  72.8  80.0 
Value Total 
Investments 
Source: BVCA and EVCA Annual Statistics 1984-91, NVCA Annual Reports 1990 &1991 
However, the growth of MBO and MBI activity to a predominant position in the 
UK and the second· most popular investment activity  in Europe confounds an 
understanding of the changing trends in technology investment.  In both the UK, 
3 particularly,  but also in Europe several  funds  were established specifically  to 
invest in MBO/MBI activity.  These dedicated funds were not available for earlier 
stage investment nor technology start-ups.  Thus, aggregate figures that include 
the substantial volume of investment into the venture capital, industry to finance 
one particular product serve to reduce artificially the importance of technology 
investment. · In order to correct for this influence,· Table 2 adjusts the figures of 
table l  to remove MBO/MBI finance activity on the assumption that technology 
investment is not a real substitute for these bespoke funds. 
Table  2  'Adjusted'  Percentage  Numbers  and  Value  of  Technology 
Investments·  (ie.  Excluding  MBOs/MBis  in  the  UK  and  Europe  and 


































1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
33.9  31.4  24.4  31.8  32.7  27.4 
32.5  34.9  20.5  32.0  30.2  29.2 
n.a.  n.a.  38.9  38.1  36.6  31.4 
37.7  35.9  33.7  37.0  31.2  24.6 
79.3  75.8  75.9  77.3  81.3  80.0 
87.0  79.5  85.5  85.2  85.1  82.9 
Source: BVCA .and EVCA Annual Statistics 1984-91, NVCA ~ual  Reports 1990 &1991 
4 Table 2  shows that there is  still an  overall decline  in the level of technology 
investment by venture capital finns in bOth the UK and Europe.  However, the 
decline is less precipitant than the unadjusted figures in table 1 would suggest. 
In the UK, technology investment is still nearly a third of total non-MB0/1\ml 
investment  in  comparison  to  approximately  one  quarter  of  total  European 
investment by value.  That the percentage number of investments is higher than 
the equivalent value statistics in Europe suggests that technology investments are, 
overall, of lesser value than the average venture capital investment.  This is likely 
to  be  an indication  that technology  investors  are  biased  towards  early  stage 
investment.  This is logical because a technology investor necessarily has to invest 
early in the technology process.  Once a novel technology is shown to have a 
realisable benefit,  the discounted cash value of the NTBF is  too high for the 
venture capitalist to compete with commercial purchasers.  Again, the statistics 
in table 2 show the predominant technology focus of US venture capital investors 
and its relative stability over a six year period. 
Figures  presented  in table  3  describe  the  relative  importance  of early  stage 
investment, ie. seed capital, start-up and early stage development finance.  NTBF 
financing  can be seen  as  a  subset  of this  activity.  The  figures  indicate  the 
problems faced by young entrepreneurs seeking external equity in the UK and 
Europe.  The  majority  of  venture  capital  finns  have  become  incr:easingly 
disillusioned  with  the  difficulties  of  investing  in  start-up  and  early  stage 
enterprises.  While these investors admire the spirit of enterprise of these business 
owners, performance statistics indicate that it is an extremely difficult area for the 
venture capital finns to gain a sufficient return on their investments commensuate 
with the considerable risks of early stage activities.  Chief executives from twenty 
leading UK venture capital finns were unanimous in their view of the importanc~ 
of this  early  stage  activity  (Murray  1991).  They  just  preferred  that  these 
invesunents were undertaken by organisations other than their own. 
5 Table 3  'Adjusted' Percentage Value of Start-Up and Other Early Stage 
Investment in the UK, Europe and the US (ie. Excluding MBOs/MBis in the 
UK and Europe and LBOs/  Acquisitions in the US) by Venture Capital Firms 
Year  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
UK: 
% Investment  40.9  28.5  23.0  38.9  24.4  13.0 
I  in S-U &OE-S 
EUROPE: 
%Seed &  23.3  19.7  20.4  17.9  13.4  10.5 
Stan-Ups only* 
US: 
% Investment  43.0  36.0  38.5  35.9  33.6  32.5 
in S-U &OE-S 
*EVCA· figures do not segregate expansion finance into early or later stage investrnentSource: 
BVCA and EVCA Annual Statistics 1984-91, NV;CA Annual Reports 1990 &1991 
If start-up and early stage activity is considered unattractive to the· majority of UK 
and European venture  capital finns,  seed stage  activity  becomes  'beyond the 
pale'.  Seed capital may be defined as 'equity investment in  the earliest conceptual 
or  ideas  stage  of  a  new  product,  process  or service  in  order  to  test  the 
fundamental feasibility of a proposal'.  It is an activity that is characterised more 
by its absence than its existence in UK and European venture capital activity. 
With negligible exception,  commercial seed capital  activity  is  conducted by  a 
small  cadre of technology  investors  with  a  fierce  commitment to the  critical 
importance  of this  activity  to  the  future  economic  welfare  of an  advanced, 
industrial country.  Seed capital investors are the 'radical fundamentalists' of the 
venture capital industry.  They are fiercely critical of what they believe is the 
development capitalists' aversion to risk and to technology investment at large. 
Similar opprobrium is levelled at, in their view, the limited governmental efforts 
to support NTBFs.  It is this general disinclination by commercial investors to 
support seed capital which has encouraged a number of state and EC initiatives 
to encourage at least some minimum  level of seed capital activity.  the most 
commonly cited examples are the PPM scheme in Holland, the BJTU scheme in 
Germany and the Community wide European Seed Capital Fund scheme. 
6 Table 4  Seed capital Investment as a Percentage of Total Annual Investment 
in the UK, 
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Table 4  shows the rather erratic nature of seed capital activity' in the  UK  and 
E~pe. The British Venture Capital Association does not bother to segregate this 
category of investment in its annual statistics given its tiny size in relation to other 
investment categories.  The European statistics show an encouraging trend albeit 
from a low starting figure.  However,  EVCA figures,  particularly in the early 
years,  are best seen as  approximates given the difficulty of collecting accurate, 
pan-European  statistics.  Again,  the  US  is  distinctive  in  the  existence  of a 
relatively robust seed capital activity. 
7 C.  CLARIFICATIONS, DEFINITIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
1)  New Technology Based Firms (NTBFs) 
The  term,  NTBFs,  is  widely  used  by  both  policy  makers  an~ academics. 
However,  the  immediate  question  arises  whether one  is  talking  about  firms 
embracing new  technologies  or new firms  which have a  technology focus,  or 
indeed both categories.  Clearly,  a  number of appropriate policy  instruments 
regarding each category are likely  to be quite different.  The policy  debates 
around the role of the financial support mechanisms for NTBFs largely assume 
that  one  is  talking  about  new  or  young  firms  whose  activities  embrace  a 
significant technology  component.  Within this  category,  those  start-up firms 
which are attempting to develop and exploit leading edge technologies and their 
commercial applications are likely to be a relatively small subset.  This subset is 
most likely to be of interest to speculative equity investors because ()f the potential 
for exceptional economic  rewards in the event of success.  However,  policy 
makers and particularly regional development agencies outside established centres 
of excellence are likely to have a  more eclectic definition of what constitutes 
acceptable, technology based firms.  To define the focus of interest purely at the 
level  of  leading-edge  technology  would  dramatically  reduce  the  potential 
population of target firms. 
It  is  difficult  to  segregate  what  is  meant  by  the  degree  of  technological 
innovativeness.  The term  'high technology'  is  itself a  rather vague  concept. 
Definitions by the  OECD (1992) and Butchart (1987) refer to the level of R&D 
. expenditure as a percentage of the firm's sales.  Butchart also include a variable 
for the percentage of 'knowledge workers' as apposed to other types of employee 
within the enterprise.  However, the authors of these definitions acknowledge the 
difficulties of operationalising their definitions in any precise manner. 
As an illustration of the scate of NTBFs entering an economy, the 1990 V  ~ue 
Added Tax statistics for the UK 1990 are used.  A qualification is immediately 
necessary as new or small firms under an annual sales threshold of £27,500 in 
1990 did not need to register for VAT. . 
8 " 
.. 
Table 5  Technology and High Technology Births of New Companies 
in the UK 1990 Based on VAT Returns 
Sector:  Production, Technology Related  &timated Births 
Chemicals/ man made Fibres  463 
Mech. Engineering  3349 
Office Machinecy  197 
Electrical/Electronic Eng.  1436 
Instrument Eng.  356 
Total  5801 
Percentage of All 1990 Births  2.5%. 
Sector: Production, High Technology Related  Estimated Births 
Organic Chemicals  19  ... 
Synthetic Plastics etc.  81 
Phannaceuticals  50 
EDP Equipment  179 
El~c&ConttolSy~e~  146 
Total  475 
Percentage of All 1990 Births  0.2 
Sector: Services, High Technology Related  Estimated Births 
R&D Services  298 
Research Chemists etc.  124 
Computer Services  6785 
Total  '7878 
Percentage of All 1990 Births  3.4% 
*  Allocation of appropriate Standard Industrial Classification categories into technology or high 
technology were made by the author. 
Source:  Mumly & Francis for DGXIn. 1992 
Thus, figures from the UK would suggest that the population of firms of primary 
intere~ to  technology  investors. and  policy  makers  is  less  than  one  percent 
( < 1000 finns) of total births per annum if software and other computer services 
are excluded.  The small size of this population raises significant problems of 
identification and access. 
9 2)  The Importance of NTBFs 
Given the  small numbers of NTBF finns entering the economy each year,  the 
question  is  raised  as  to  why  these  finns  should  be  of special  important  and 
mterest.  The  response  is  invariably  couched  in the  potential  of these  finns 
regarding: 
(hlgh quality) employment 
value-added 
innovation 
creating tomorrow's corporate successes 
symbiosis between large and small finns 
Eurostat figures were compiled in an attempt to illustrate the potential of NTBFs. 
In the statistics below SMEs ( < 500 employees) in high technology industries are 
used as a surrogate for NTBFs. 
Table 6  Percentage Changes in SMF& and Large Firms for Four 
High-Technology Sectors in UK Germany, Franee &  Italy, 1981-89
1.2.3 
~  Vlly~  N!L. 
Enterprises  Added  Employees 
Pharmaceuticals (NACE 257) 
SMEs  -4  62  -3 
LFs  22  122  18 
Off. Mach. &DP (NACE 33) 
SMEs  152  273  100 
LFs  26  138  24 
Electrical (NACE 34) 
SMEs  '54  142  36 
LFs  6  84  -0.1 
Aerospace (NACE 364) 
SMEs  25  ,.·  80  25 
LFs  -1  48  -11 
1  Value-added figures  for UK are 19882  3~git  breakdown not available in 1981 
3  Aerospace figures do not include Germany 
Source: Eurostat (figures presented by the author at a European Commission (DGXIn) 
workshop on the Financing of NTBFs, Luxembourg, ·March 1993) 
10 .. 
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It is noteworthy that only in the pharmaceuticals sector (an industry with very 
high barriers to entry) are the statistics in Table 2 more favourable to large finns 
( > 500 employees) than small & medium enterprises.  The data indicate that over 
the 1980s, the changing relative contribution of small and large finDs· within the 
high technology sectors.  Smaller finDs  appear to be of increasing importance. 
However, the data do not show the relative sizes of the small and large .  finDs 
sectors.  This  disguises  the  continued  economic  dominance  of  the  larger 
companies within each sector  . 
Evidence of the increasing relative innovativeness of SMEs compared to larger 
finDs  has been indicated by Rothwell and Dodgson in their review of research 
findings  presented  to  the  European  Commission's  Industrial  Research  and 
Development Advisory Committee in 1989.  Studies of this nature usually use 
patent  applications  or  an  equivalent.  However,  it  is  dangerous  to  make 
categorical judgements regarding the nature of efficiency of innovation by finn 
size without extended discussion and clarification.  None the less, it can be stated 
with considerable confidence that NTBFs are an important source of both product 
and process innovations within Europe. 
The absence in Europe of those spectacularly successful, venture financed NTBFs 
which  have  become  the  icons  of US  technology  history  (eg.  DEC,  Apple, 
Genentech etc.) is frequently bemoaned.  However, Michael Porter in his  The 
Competitive  Advantage  of Nations  cites  the  critical  importance  for  future 
competitive  success  of an enabling  infrastructure,  world  class  suppliers  and 
remorselessly demanding buyers.  These conditions include an important role for 
technologically infonned and successful finDs of all sizes.  While the equivalent 
creation of European technology exemplars is important, it is the development of 
a heterogeneous mix of successful and growing, technology based finns which is 
constantly added to and renewed which is the more critical goal of policy. 
3)  The 'Equity Gap' and Capital Market Failure 
The existence of an equity gap, ie. the limited and insufficient provision of equity 
finance in small tranches ( < £250  ,000) to new and young finDs, has been debated 
regularly  since  the  Macmillan  Report  in  the  UK  in  1931.  Small  fmns' 
associations and interest groups are virtually unanimous in their belief that the 
available capital markets discriminate against the needs of new and yoWlg finns 
for small, third party equity investments (see, for example, Finance for Growth, 
the report of the Srnaller Firms CoWlcil of the Confederation of British Industry, 
1993).  Murray  in his  1992  study  of UK venture  capitalists  (Murray  1994 
forthcoming) could only identify sixteen, specialist, early stage equity providers 
from  among the ranks  of the UK  venture capital industry.  The twelve finns 
11 which were interviewed had funds under management of£ 76.3 million, or less 
than  1% of total UK venture capital funds under management (both committed 
and uninvested) in 1992/93 of approximately £9 billion (BVCA 1992). 
Table 7  Venture Capital Finns' Expected Minimum IRR by  Investment 
Stage:  Technology and Non-Technology Investments 
.  Non- Smd  H  Teehn9Im  SnL  N 
lnvestm~n~  Technglgu  D~v 1  ~  Mean IRRIJR  Dev.  ~ 
~  MeaniRR~ 
Seed  55.0  20.31  9  57.1  16.95  14 
Start-Up  49.5  11.64  22  52.4  11.07  23 
Expansion  36.3  6.91  28  39.1  8.14  31 
MBOIMBI  32.7  4.55  22  35.5  4.80  22 
Source:  Murray & Lott 1992 
KPMG  Peat Marwick in a  1992 study  for the UK's Department of Trade  & 
Industry isolated 128 sources of equity funds of under £250,000.  However, in 
reality,  the  majority  of these  sources  are  of marginal  importance  and  do  not 
represent a sustained source of new equity to small businesses.  Murray & Lott 
1992 also found that when venture capital firms in the UK are prepared to invest 
in technology based firms, they typically impose significantly higher prices their 
equity participation.  This situation is broadly similar to that found in the rest of 
Europe. 
That an equity gap exists is not in question.  A rather more pertinent question 
noted  by  Storey  (1994  forthcoming)  is  whether or not the  gap  signifies  the 
existence  of marlcet failure  in the  capital  markets  serving  small  finns. '  The 
existence of market failure would require evidence that, if venture capitalists were 
in receipt of full information on the early stage investments which were available 
to them, then the supply of capital would increase and the level of finance charges 
would decline.  Conversely, if venture capitalists were acting in concert to curtail 
the provision of equity and to raise the price at which the existing capital was 
supplied, this would also be an example of market failure. 
An alternative explanation is that the  scarce provision of early stage  venture 
capital  is  a  consequence  of the  limited  number  of attractive  deals  that  are 
presented to the investors.  Dixon 1991 and Bannock 1991 both allude to the fact 
that UK  venture  capitalists  believe  that  there  is  a  paucity  of attractive  deals 
available  to  them.  Given  that,  on  average,  venture  capitalist  invest  in 
12 
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approximately five percent of the deals which they are offered, this would suggest 
that the great majority of deals are unattractive to a commercial investor.  (The 
acceptan~ figure for European seed capitalists in the ESCF Scheme survey by 
Murray & Francis 1992 was also 5%).  In this argument, the high cost of capital 
at which early stage venture capitalists are prepared to invest in those firms which 
they  consider  have  commercial  potential,  is  a  rational  consequence  of the 
substantial risks incurred in making such investments.  Sahlman 1990 shows that, 
in the US between 1969-85  only  about one  in fifteen  of the  venture  capital 
industry's  investments  Showed  a  ·return  of more  than  ten  times  the  original 
investment.  One third of all investments resulted in total absolute losses.  Given 
that Sahlman was  looking  at the entire  industry  and early  stage  is  popul~ly 
viewed as being the most risky stage of investment (Murray 1991), these statistics 
are likely to under-estimate the risks associated with early stage investment. 
This alternative view of early stage investment would suggest that the problem is 
not that the capital markets  are inefficient but,  to the contrary,  are correctly 
pricing the high risks of such investment.  Therefore, the issue becomes not one 
of  the  supply  of  capital  but,  rather,  the  supply  of  sufficiently  attractive 
investments.  In this  scenario,  the additional provision of state owned funds 
would not drive down the cost of capital but would merely replace commercial 
. funds at the margin.  Commercial investors would leave public funds to make 
unattractive investments while they  concentrated on more attractive,  (primarily 
later stage) investment opportunities.  The performance problems associated with 
public provision of early stage investments in Europe and the very selective nature 
of the few successful early stage commercial investors would lend circumstantial 
evidence to this second proposition.  · 
4)  New or Replacement Capital 
The term  'venture capital industry' tends to imply a homogenous provision of 
services.  Yet, in reality, the term embraces two very different sets of investment 
activities.  ·  Bygrave & Timmons (1992) have termed the two sets of activities as 
classic  venture  capital,  ie.  the  provision  of  capital  to  new  and  or  young 
businesses, and merchant capital, ie. the later stage financing activities involv~ 
in development capital and leveraged buy-outs.  Murray (1992)  uses the terms 
new capital and replacement capital to make the same distinction.  Early stage 
investors are providing additional capital which is necessary for the formation or 
development  of the  business.  In later  stage  deals,  the  venture  capitalist  is 
essentially  providing  a  source  of replacement  capital  to assist  the  change  in 
. ownership of the assets of an existing business.  The means by which the two 
types of proposal can be appraised are very different.  Respondents to Murray's 
1991 survey of CEOs of leading UK venture capital finns bemoaned the fact that 
13 the industry had moved away from classic or  new equity (start-ups and technology 
investments were specifically mentioned) to the more attractive opportunities of 
replacement capital, particularly management buy-outs and buy-ins. 
Table 8  Percentage Numbers and Value of Technology Investments by UK 
Venture Capitalists 1984-91 
fiiu:  ~  1m l2Bi  1m 1m  '  1282  l22Jl  .1221 
Total No. UK  350  517  600  1174  1326  1302  1221  1196 
Companies Financed 
Technology-% No.  36.3  30.9  26.5  25.6  21.4  23.7  23.6  20.8 
Total Investments 
Total Value UK  140  278  384  934  1298  1420  1106  989, 
Investments (£m) 
Technology -% Value  33~3  26.4  17.8  15.7  8.9  12.4  12.9  13.1 
Total Investments 
Source:  BVCA Reports on Investment Activity 1984-1991 
Fig. 1 MBO/MBIInvestments by Number and Value as a Percentage of  Total 
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v)  Early. Stage or Seed Capital 
Throughout this paper, the tenn early stage capital has been used in preference 
to seed capital.  Early stage capital is a rubric which encompasses seed capital, 
start-up and subsequent·rounds of new equity in the post start-up, growth phase. 
The difference is not immaterial.  Of the twelve finns in Murray 1992 UK seed 
capital survey, nine organisations operated with 'closed end' funds.  Six of these 
funds were £5 million or less with the smallest fund having £0.5 million to invest. 
Murray  &  Francis  1992  survey  of the  European  Seed  Capital  Fund  Scheme 
showed that the average fund size of the EC supported seed capital organisations 
was  ECU  1. 7 million.  These  authors  suggested that funds  of this  size  are  not 
commercially sustainable in the longer tenn. 
Table 9  Minimum V'mble Size of a Commercial Seed Ca ital Fund 
Estimated Minimum Size 
of a of a Commercial 
Freguency 
(n =  10) 




£5 million or less 
£ > 5-20 million 







range £1.1-5.0 m. 
£11.6 
range £1.621-21  m. 
11bis figure was an outlier with the other four fund sizes averaging £15.8 million,  range 
£11.5-21 million. 
Source: Murray 1994 (forthcoming) 
In each  of  these  cases,  the  funds  could  only  be  described  as  seed  capital. 
However, their inability to provide the additional resources needed by successfully 
growing (or problematic) investees within their portfolio meant that, in Murray's 
te~, the investee companies faced  a second equity gap after the resources  of 
their initial backer were exhausted (Murray  1994 forthcoming).  Ironically, the 
more successful a seed capital investment, the more rapidly the resources of the 
seed capital provider become inadequate given the limited size of the funds under 
management  and  the  ceiling  on  finance  which  may  be  allocated  to  a  single 
portfolio  investment.  Thus,  a successful  in  vestee  company  can  pose  a major 
problem to the seed capital investor which has to seek further rounds of follow-on 
15 finance.  The original investor, without access to additional resources, invariably 
faces the situation of a major dilution of its equity stake in its. most successful 
business ventures at the stage of follow-on financing. 
Small seed funds get locked in a 'vicious circle'.  The intensity of the relationship 
between the fund  and its  investee companies limits the size of a  manageable 
portfolio.  This limited scale of operation reduces the· size of fluids which can be 
handled at the seed stage.  This in tum limits the amount of fee income which can 
be earned on the funds under management.  The limited income constrains the 
number of staff and assistance which can be employed in supporting the portfolio. 
The  resource  constraints  limit  the  size  of the  portfolio  ...  thus,  the  circle  is 
complete thereby locking the small fund  into a  size trap.  In addition to the 
disproportionate fixed costs of a small seed capital fund (a cost which the ESCF 
Scheme specifically  addresses),  the limited portfolio size prevents  the use of 
diversification to reduce non·systematic or non-market risk.  In consequence, 
small seed capital funds are likely to be inherently more risky that larger, early 
stage funds with portfolios of twenty or more investee films. 
In their review of the first three years of the European Seed Capital Fund (ESCF) 
Scheme, Murray & Francis reserved their greatest concern for the viability of the 
smaller funds which did not have additional, secured avenues of financial support. 
In particular, the operating costs of the seed capital funds were disproportionate 
to the size of the funds under management.  It is a recognition of these economic 
'iron laws'  which have obliged a  number of seed capital funds  to attempt to 
increase significantly the size of their funds under management by further fund 
raising.  Calculations conducted by Dr.  Robert  Hook of Prelude Technology 
Investments in Cambridge, England with the author suggest that a minimum, early 
stage fund size is  around £20 million if the fund is also to engage in further 
rounds of follow-on finance (Hook 1993).  However, the time to exit of a typical 
seed capital investment is typically 7-10 years (Bannock 1991).  Few seed capital 
funds started in the UK in the 1980s have yet a sufficient track record with which 
to impress new institutional investors.  Regardless of their ability to raise new 
funds, a number of seed capital investors have changed their names eschewing the 
tenn  seed  capital.  They  believe  that the  tenn,  seed  capital,  is  too  closely 
associated with uneconomic and excessively small funds  which are unlikely to 
. become commercially viable. 
6)  The Relationship Between Early Stage Funds and Development Capitalists 
It can be hypothesised that there could exist the opportunity for a complementarity 
between early stage venture capitalists and later stage,  development capitalists 
which will, in theory at least, allow for reciprocal and mutually advantageous co-
16 operation.  Later stage venture capitalists reject the vast majority of all investee 
applicants.  A number of these applicants may well have potentially attractive 
proposals  but be  at  too early  a  stage  for the  involvement of a  development 
capitalist.  These latter investors typieally prefer making equity·investments of 
£0.5 million upwards to management teams with an assessable track record.  In 
addition, most development capitalists are not organised to provide the intensive 
'hands-on'  support,  and  often  elementary  business  advice,  required  by  the 
inexperienced technology entrepreneur (Gorman and Sablman 1989). 
Thus, there would appear to be the potential for a 'symbiotic relationship'.  Early 
stage investors could nurture new and young companies (some of which would be 
redirected to the early stage investor by the development capitalist) up until the 
stage where the investee company needs financing beyond the resources of the 
original equity investors.  At this  stage,  the early stage investor would either 
syndicate with, or sell its interest outright to, one or a number of development 
capitalists.  These latter investors would take the company through successive 
rounds  of further finance until the company was ready for a market listing or 
trade sale. 
Table 10  Problems with future Fund Raising for 
Seed Capitalists 
Ratig of Problem of Raisin& 
Future Finance 




5 (rna· or  roblem) 








Such a putative relationship would, at least in theory, be to the advantage of the 
early stage investor by allowing the firm to realise its investments in an orderly 
manner or to continue as a minority shareholder in the subsequent development 
of the investee firms.  The development capitalist would have preferential access 
·to early stage, deal flow.  It would also be in receipt of greater information on the 
new and now operational investment than if it had invested 'cold' in a previously 
unknown company.  The relationship could therefore also ,serve  to reduce the 
critical problem of information asymmetries as a cause of markel failure. 
17 Thus, early and later stage development capitalists could each appear to benefit 
from a relationship characterised both by redirectedlexchanged deal flow ~joint 
investment.  The existence of a reciprocal relationship would, it is argued, be ' 
seen  most clearly at the time when an  early stage venture capitalist sought to 
~e  his investment either outright through a sale, or partially by inviting a new 
investor(s)  to  share, through syndication,  a  major part of the future financing 
burden. 
Table 11  Proposed Sources of Follow-On Finance for UK Seed Capitalists 
Propi!ied SgJI~m  'gf Addilignal  w~iahtm  fl:m~ume: 
Funds for Follow-On Investment  Rankin&  (n=12) 
Venture (Development) Capitalists  1st  10 
Corporate Investors  =2nd  5 
In-House Finance  =2nd  5 
Private Investors  4th  3 
Banks  (loans)  5th  1 
Source: Mumly 1994 
The twelve,  early  stage,  UK venture  capitalists  were  approached  to explore 
empirically  their  experience  of  attracting  further  finance  for  their  portfolio 
companies from development capitalists (Murray 1994). Eight organisations in  the 
study· expressed a view that they would experience clear difficulties in attracting 
follow-on finance.  While venture capitalists were the first choice for seeking 
additional funds, in practice, respondents believed that they would most likely exit_ 
from their investments via trade sales rather than  continuing the investment in 
syndication with development capitalists. 
Table 12  Planned Exit Route for UK Seed Capitalists • 
The seed capitalist managers overwhelmingly articulated a view that there was a 
substantial imbalance of  power in dealing with later stage venture capitalists which 
worked to their disadvantage.  In a parallel series of discussions with development 
capitalists, they evinced little enthusiasm in dealing with seed capitalists.  The 
majority of development capitalists had severe reservations as to the commercial 
experience and professionalism of the majority of seed capital fund managers, 
particularly regarding public sector supported activity, which was also reflected 
in their general disinterest in the investee companies of the early stage investors. 
7)  'Hands-On'  /'Hands-Off' lnvestee Support Relationships 
Without exception,  venture capitalist investors in seed capital and  other early 
stage,  technology  based  enterprises  employ  a  hands-on  style  of management 
regarding their investees.  These investors believe that they have no discretion in 
this matter.  Frequently, technology entrepreneurs create businesses based on their 
previous experience in universities, governmental and commercial laboratories and 
other centres of advanced technology.  It is highly unlikely, for all but a minority 
of exceptional technology  entrepreneurs,  that their technical  competencies  are 
matched with an equal level of skills and experience in creating and managing a 
new enterprise.  Accordingly, in the absence of an appropriate and credible public 
support structure for NTBFs,  the venture capitalist has  to assume the  role of 
nurturing  the  new  firms  and  supporting  the  technical  capabilities  of  the 
entrepreneurial owner/managers with equivalent commercial skills.  Gonnan & 
Sahlman (1989) indicated that the average venture capitalist in the US spent some -
80 hours per year in direct contact with each of his or her investee companies. 
A further 30 hours of contact was maintained by telephone.  In the case of the 
seed capital companies in the ESCF survey, the average amount of time spent 
with each investee businesses was 200 hours per annum (range 60 to 540 hours). 
Given the importance ascribed to maintaining an intense, supportive environment 
between the investor and the entrepreneurial finn, it is surprising that there has 
been very little empirical work to detennine the effectiveness of this assumption  . 
This is likely to be in part due to the methodological difficulties of constructing 
a research framework which would adequately test the effectiveness of a hands-on 
relationship. MacMillan et al (1989)  and Fredriksen et al (1990) have attempted 
this exercise in the US and Sweden, respectively.  In each case, the researchers 
could not establish robust evidence to show that the involvement of the venture 
capitalist  firm  materially  improved  the  relative  perfonnance  of the  investee 
companies receiving a hands-on style of supervision and support. 
The absence of unequivocal evidence in favour of a hands-on mode of intervention 
may be, in part, a consequence of the effectiveness of the advice provided by the 
19 investors.  In the ESCF study, forty entrepreneurs (53% of all finns which had 
received equity from ESCF supported funds,  were asked to rate the quality and 
relevance of advice  which they received from  all parties.  Three channels  of 
advice were isolated: i)  provided by the seed capitalist staff, ii) recommended by 
the seed capitalist staff and 'iii) sought out by the investee firm independent of the 
venture capitalist. 
Table 13  '11te  usefulness  of  Advice/  Assistance  Provided  to  ESCF 
Scheme Investees 
Area of advice:  NTBFs Rating of Providers of Advice/  Assistance 
(5-very important, 1-no importance) 
Provided by  Arranaed by  Unconnectecl with 
S. Capitalist  S. CapjtaUn  S. CgiqUttt 
Business strategy  3.82  4.45  3.88 
Marketing  3.51  4.05  4.01 
Finance  4.81  4.36  3.76 
Accounting  4.06  3.34  4.21 
Technology  3.01  4.03  3.91 
Production  1.01  0  2.52 
Personnel  3.05  2.33  3.56 
Recruitment  4.03  3.02  3.36 
Overall averages  3.9  3.8  3.8 
Overall totals  54  28  61 
Source: Murray & Francis 1992 
It is noteworthy that the seed capitalists only scored the highest relative rating in 
the  area  of finance.·  In the  functional  disciplines  required  by  the  fledgling 
business,  other parties than the seed capitalist were deemed  as  being able  to 
provide more relevant information and advice.  A not dissimilar reaction was 
found  among a  sample of five  NTBFs  in the former East Germany currently 
receiving financial  and advisory support from the federal  state under the TOU 
Scheme  investigated  by  Warwick  and  the  lSI  Fraunhofer  Institut  in  1993 
(Crossfield  &  Lange  1993).  The  technology  entrepreneurs  indicated  their 
misgivings at the relevance of the marketing/strategy advice they received from 
the support infrastructure employed to service these new companies. 
This problem centres around the availability of advice of appropriate specificity 
to  the  needs  of  the  new  entrepreneurs.  That  new  entrepreneur  needs  to 
understand  the  foundations  of a marketing  philosophy  is  not  questioned. 
20 
!t' However, to enter and succeed in a competitive market place for sophisticated 
technology  products  and  services  requires,  above  all,  a  comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of the target market and familiarity with the discipline 
of industrial marketing techniques.  Thus, the entrepreneurs have a requirement 
for marketing advice of a highly specific nature.  This requirement works against 
the provision of general or non specific advice by organisations with a wide, SME 
support remit.  There is an argument that the entrepreneur him or herself may 
have  a better understanding  as  to where  that advice  can  be  sourced -than  the 
investor. 
A number of seed capital firms have focused their investment choices to specific 
industries, technologies and sectors in an attempt to reduce the uncertainties of 
inadequate  industry  knowledge  (Murray  & Lott  1992).  However,  there  is  a 
delicate  trade-off  between  a  tight  investment  focus  and the  opportunity  for 
adequate deal flow.  In the former case of high gpecificity, the level of investor's 
knowledge  is  high  but  ~e volume  of deals  presented  to  the  firm  may  be 
insufficient to maintain necessary activity and/or rigorous selection criteria.  In 
the alternative case, if the focus is relaxed, the potential deal volume is less likely 
to be a problem but the spread of investment areas  is likely to be beyond the 
experiences  or competencies  of the  investor  team  which  is  undertaking  the 
appraisals. 
It  is  in  the  context  of investors'  uncertainty  or unfamiliarity  with  specific 
technology processes or markets, that the role of a corporate investor from the 
industry  in ql!estion  may  be  raised.  Corporate  venturing,  whereby  potential 
industry users either invest directly or via a  spe~alist venture  capital f1m1,  is 
more common in the US than in Europe.  Corporate exemplars, such as Xerox, 
3M, mM, Apple etc., are more evident by their absence than their involvement. 
With  few  exceptions,  corporate  venturing  remains  a  disappointing  success  in 
Europe.  While there are signs of increasing corporate venturing in both the US 
and Europe since 1990 (Mast 1991, McNally 1993), the involvement of very large 
industrial interests with the fledgling NTBFs is not without difficulties.  Oakey 
(1993) raises the question as to the motives of the larger ~mpany.  He uses the 
term  'predatory  networking'  to  describe  the  phenomenon  where  small  but 
promising  firms  may  have  their ideas  captured  or stifled by  an  inappropriate 
relationship with an  ~ensely  larger, corporate partner.  · 
However, the corporates do represent a set of opportunities to the NTBFs, albeit 
with  attendant  risks.  Particularly,  they  are  likely  to  be  users  of the  new 
. technological  products  or services  developed  by  the  NTBFs.  As  potential 
customers they are also aware of the nature, characteristics and dynamics of the 
specific technology market.  They, therefore, may also have a greater ability to 
21 appreciate the full market potential of a  new innovation than the technology 
entrepreneur.  That corporates  have  a  future  and  increasing  role  to play  in 
technology venturing is not the question.  What is less clear is how these different 
parties can organise to generate  reciprocal benefit at acceptable costs to both 
parties.  In the absence of clear guidelines and experience, NTBFs are advised to 
'eat with a long spoon'. 
8)  Exits from V~ture  Backed Enterprises 
Venture capitalists  are essentially  transient financial  partners to the supported 
enterprise.  With the exception of a  few organisations,  primarily development 
capitalists who structure the economics of.a deal primarily on the 'running yield' 
rather than the capital  gain at termination,  the  majority  of investors  wish to 
establish a clear horizon to their involvement in the client finn.  Development 
capitalists prefer to operate on a 3-5 year time span from investment to exit.  Seed 
capital,  start-up  and  other early  stage  investors,  while  possibly  preferring  a 
shorter period of investment, are nonnally committed up to ten years before being 
able to realise their stake in a young company (Bannock 1991). 
The term 'exit' is used to describe the point at which the venture capitalist ceases 
to have a financial interest in the investee company.  The primary means of exit 
or realisation are via i)  a trade sale, frequently to a larger business in the same 
sector as the investee company; ii) the flotation of the company on the main or 
secondary  stock market;  iii)  or the  sale of the enterprise  back to its  owner 
managers.  (In reality, it is unlikely that the investor can sell the entirety of its 
shares  in  an  enterprise  immediately  on  flotation.  because  of  stock  market . 
limitations.). In addition, the venture capitalist may sell its equity in part or full 
to another investor who will fund the needs of the growing company through the 
next or several stages of development.  Finally, the failure and liquidation of an 
unsuccessful in  vestee company is also a form of exit.  For the NTBF investor, 
flotation or trade sale are the two most common means most likely to produce an 
attractive return on the firm's investment. 
The relative immaturity and small deal volume of European stock markets when 
compared to their US counterparts has been a serious limitation on the opportunity 
to  exit  via  a  listing.  Even in the  UK,  which has  had the  most  developed 
secondary markets in Europe, the 1990s have seen the demise of the Third Market 
and the announcement that the Unlisted Securities Market, which was established 
in 1981, will cease trading in 1996.·  The venture capital industry (both the British 
and  European  Venture  Capital  Associations)  has  reacted  strongly  to  this 
announcement by the Stock Market and is currently exploring the feasibility of 
retaining some form of market for small firm stocks either on a UK or Europe 
22 wide basis.  The reason that the USM has been marked for closure has been the 
very limited volume of trading in this market since the stock market shock of 
'Black Monday'  and the subsequent move of the UK into recession.  In adverse 
economic  conditions,  the  price  of illiquid,  small  finn  stocks  is  particularly 
discounted. 
As  an  indication  of the  relative  minor  importance  of the  stock  markets  to 
development capital deals, only 181 MBOs have floated in the period 1982-92 out 
of a total number of MBOs created in that period of 3,  755 in the UK.  In the 
period  1985-92,  the  number  of MBO  and  private  MBI  flotations  was  169 
compared  to  356  trade  sales  (Centre  for  Management  Buy-Out  Research, 
University of Nottingham 1993). 
Adverse economic conditions since 1989 in the UK have caused the build up of 
a  number of venture backed companies which,  given an attractive market for 
corporate control,  would have been  exited by their investors.  It needs to be 
remembered that,  for a deal structured on a  specific time to exit,  the venture 
capital investor pays a considerable penalty for any delay in the realisation of its 
investment returns.  Annualised Internal Rates of Return are highly sensitive to 
a  delay in the planned receipt of realisation returns.  Increasing confidence in 
equity markets in the period since  1992 in the UK has  resulted in a flush  of 
venture backed investments being realised through a full stock market listing.  In 
the period from  the  1st July  1992  to the  30 th June  1993,  75  companies 
(excluding investment trusts  and reverse take-overs)  were floated.  Thirty six 
(48%) of these companies were venture backed.  Nineteen of the companies were 
MBOs or MBis and five were NTBFs. 
Table 14  Flotation (Full Usting) of UK Companies July '92 to June '93 
~  l!2Z  1993  1223. 
Ql  ~  Q1  m 
NTBFs  1  2  1  2 
MBOs/MBis  5  5  1  8 
All Venture Backed Companies  7  9  4  16 
All Companies12  14  11  38 
Source: BVCA 1993 
Bygrave and Timmons and other American researchers  have noted the  erratic 
nature  of the  stock  markets  interest ·in  NTBF  stocks.  There  are  irregular 
occasions  of  'hot  markets'  when  the  investors'  appetite  for  fashionable 
technologies (eg. Winchester disc manufacturers and, more recently, bio-genetics  , 
23 companies)  has  resulted  in very  substantial gains  to those  venture  firms  with 
investee companies ready for a flotation.  Bygrave and Timmons have referred to 
these extreme actions of stock market investors as a 'feeding frenzy'. It is likely 
that the projected demise of the  USM in the UK by 1996 and  the continued 
immaturity  of continental  European ·markets  will each serve  to  increase  the 
importance of US stock markets as a potential source of exits for those successful 
NTBFs  with  products  and/or  services  of international  market  attractiveness. 
Ineffective local stock markets will also increase the continued importance of trade 
sales in the venturing process. 
9)  The Potential 'Multiplier Effect' of Official Support - the Example of the 
European Commission's European Seed Capital Fund Pilot Scheme 
Both European and UK figures are consistent in showing the negligible resources 
available from market sources in the provision of early ~ge,  third party equity. 
The concern of the  European  Commission  (DGXXIn,  Enterprise  Policy  and 
DGXVI, Regional Policy)  as  to the effects of capital scarcity on the formation 
levels of NTBFs lead to the creation of the F.SCF pilot scheme in October 1988. 
In summary,  DGXXIn was prepared to pay up to 50% of the first five  year's 
operating costs of the new funds as an interest free loan for two approved funds 
in each member state.  For those  funds  operating  in selected  assisted  areas, 
DGXVI in addition would include an interest free loan to cover a maximum of 
25% of the capital needed to a ceiling of ECU 250,000 in order to assist the 
formation of the seed capital fund  .  This capital loan was to be administered 
through the  local  Business  Innovation  Centre  which  would become a  limited 
partner in the  fund  with  other investors.  The pilot scheme  was  to cover a 
maximum of twenty four funds for initially a period of no longer than five years. 
Murray and Francis were invited to review the progress of the first three years 
of the scheme in the spring of 1992.  The researchers,  reflecting the caveat of 
Standeven  (1993),  were  adamant in describing  their subsequent  survey of all 
twenty one, operating seed capital funds, which were assisted financially by the 
scheme, as a  'review' not an evaluation.  The researchers also interviewed, by 
postal questionnaire, 40 of the 76 extant businesses in which the supported funds 
had  invested  by  March  1992.  The  overwhelming  majority  of ·  the  investee 
companies had a direct technology focus. 
By the beginning of i992, the twenty-one supported funds had raised a total of 
over ECU 35 million, an average of ECU 1.7 million per fund (range ECU 0.5 
to 7 million).  The fund managers were asked to estimate what funds they ·would 
have been able to raise without the support of the EC scheme.  The 'additionality 
24 effect' of the EC's involvement was a significant ,100% increase in funds  made 
available from both public and private sources of investment.  The effect of the 
F.SCF  scheme is  even more dramatic if the funds  are segregated into strictly 
commercial  funds  and  those  regionally  based  funds  which  also  embraced  a 
significant, economic development focus.  It is these latter funds which are most 
likely to .be avoi4ed by strictly commercial, institutional investors. 
Table 15  Effect of the Imprimatur of the EC in Assisting the Fund Raising 
FJforts of Seed Capital Funds Supported by the FSCF Scheme 
Type gf Seed tluital  N  Estimatm fundi  Actual Fundi  ~ 
f'lmsli  widJIIIl ESC£  Raised lo ES~E  Diffct~D~~ 
Scheme  Scheme 
BC.Z millism  BCI.l milliu 
Strictly Commercial7  14.7  18.73  27.4 
inc. Regional  14  2.8  16.284  482.0 
Development Goals 
All Funds  21  17.5  35.0  100 
Source: MUIT8y  1993 
The  substantial  influence  of the  European  Commission's  support  in helping 
regional funds to raise over ECU 16 million is impressive.  However, the extreme 
sensitivity of these funds to official support is also a possible indication of their 
inherent  weakness  as  commercially  viable  businesses.  However,  the  seed 
capitalists were successful in attracting a wide range of sources of institutional 
funding from both the public and private sectors in order to launch the new funds. 
Table 16 Types of Investor in the ESCF Seed Funds 
Investor tfpe;  CJi,  total funds 
Financial institutions  37.02 
Banks  22.05 
Government agencies  14.81 
Venture capitalists  13.06 
Individuals  5. 81 
Chambers of commerce  3.46 
Churches  1. 72 
BICs  0.41 
Universities  0.24 
Source: Murray & Francis 1992 
25 This additionality effect was not restricted to the funds alone ..  The NTBFs which 
the funds supported also gained from the involvement of the EC in the scheme. 
84%  of  the  investee  managers  responding  to  the  postal  questionnaire 
acknowledged the involvement of the EC supported seed capital funds had raised 
their own credibility with additional sources of finance. 



















The  investee  finns  appeared  to  have  been  relatively  successful  in  attracting 
additional funds without long and fruitless searches.  On average, investees had 
approached 2.2 institutions before gaining finance.  70% of the respondents (ie. 
28 NTBFs) said that their seed capitalist could provide them with as much funding 
as they needed. 
In addition to the funds directly supplied by the Seed Capitalist, they were also 
responsible in giving additional assistance to investees in raising ECU 2,550,00 
(average/Investee  ECU  65,  397)  from  other sources  of finance.  Thus,  the 
entrepreneurs appeared to be extremely well resourced when eompared to the 
generality  of NTBF start-ups  where  the  predominant funding  is  commonly  a 
reliance on their own assets.  Moore (1992)  in a surVey of 89 NTBFs in the UK 
found that 44% of the sample relied 'overwhelmingly on self-finance' at start-up. 
In a follow-on survey by Moore of 42 NTBFs, the four most important sources 
of finance at start-up were: founders' savings 49%, venture capita110%, money 
from  government agencies  9%,  and bank loans  7%.  Moore notes  the  much 
smaller, initial role of banks in financing new NTBFs compared with small firms 
generally, a similar finding to Roberts (1991)  in the US. 
26 Table  18  Non-Seed  Capital Sources  of Finance  Available  to the F.SCF 
lnvestees 
Soun;e:  l:gtlll  Average/  Invgtee  N=40* 
(ECUs)  EaYiti  Debt  Other Funds  Emdtx  Debt  QtherFuncls 
Entrepreneur  2,954,200  390,000  75,749  9,750 
Family  637,800  49,000  16,354  1,225 
. Banks  3,097,900  77,448 
Grants  1,068,600  27,400 
Othen  4,288,000  539,300  982,300  109,949  13,438  25,187 
Total  7,880,000  4,076,200  2,050,900  202,052  101,861  52,587 
* While 40 investee replied in total, a number of averages had to be calculated on smaller 
number where appropriate. 
Souree: Murray & Francis 1992 
It can be seen that one outcome of the ESCF Scheme in its first three years has 
been to increase the multiplier effect of the EC base funding to the scheme which, 
as of 1st January 1993, has cost the European Commission ECU 4.8 million in 
direct support costs (European Commission, DGXXIll 1993). 
The Leverage Effect:  on average, the investees had raised: 
Equity 
Loans 
Grants &  Others 
Total 
ECU  202,05.2 
ECU  101,861 
ECU  52,587 
ECU  356,500 
This  was  in  addition  to  the  Seed  Capital  funding  of ECU·  139,650  (n=40). 
Therefore,  the  existence of the  seed capital funding  contributed to a leverage 
effect of approximately two and a half times.  However, this is at the level of the 
fundlinvestee.  If the  original funds of the European Commission of ECU 4.8 
million are compared to the total funds realised in early 1992 by the 76 investees 
(excluding  the  ECU  103,078  per investee  provided  by  the  entrepreneur  and 
family)  of  ECU  18.9  million,  the  leverage  effect,  to  that  date,  becomes 
approximately four times.  The same calculation between EC costs and the total 
finances raised by the twenty-one funds of ECU 36.2 million gives a multiplier 
of seven and a half times. 
27 These figures are encouraging but need to be taken in context.  Critically, the 
level  of  funds  invested  gives  no  indication  of the  commercial  out-turn  or 
performance  of the  investments  made.  The  scheme  appears  to  have  been 
successful in raising additional monies for seed capital activity in Europe.  The 
ability to raise further. funds,  particularly,  from  the  original investors· will be 
largely conditional on the performance of the funds to date.  Given the noted 7-10 
year gestation period of a typical seed capital investment, the funds will have to 
generate  additional  sources  of finance  before  the  majority  of any  successful 
investments show a return to the fund. 
This extended period before an investment can be seen as a success or failure is 
a problem when the objectives of the scheme are reviewed.  Essentially, the logic 
of the  pilot  scheme  was  to encourage  the  supply  of seed  capital  to  young 
European finDs.  Interestingly,  while NTBFs were not mentioned in the initial 
documentation of the scheme, the funds have almost universally committed their 
finances to NTBFs.  In order to act as a 'pump-priming exercise' it is critical that 
commercial institutions and investors can be shown attractive returns from early 
stage investment.  It is not likely that such infonnation will be in existence before 
the pilot programme reaches its planned tennination, or review, in 1994/5. 
10)  The Challenge of Seed Capital as a Regional Development Instrument-
the Problem of Incompatible Goals 
Sixteen of the twenty-one seed capital funds reviewed by Murray & Francis had 
a  specific regional  development  remit.  Exclusively  commercial funds  in the 
scheme were, and remain, a minority.  The addition of a developmental objective 
to a seed capital fund adds a further level of complexity and challenge.  This is 
reflected in the decision of DGXVI to give an additional level of loans to support 
these regional funds.  In the opinion of Murray (1993), who subsequently revised 
the  original  research  database  on  the  ESCF  scheme  report  to  separate  the 
characteristics  of  the  regional  and  commercial  funds,  the  addition  of  a 
developmental objective on the regional funds  further weakens their ability to 
pursue and achieve commercial, investment goals.  The differences between the 
commercial and regional funds  was highly significant and the comparison was 
almost universally to the detriment of the regional funds. 
The  regional  funds  were  smaller;  took  longer to  raise  their  finances;  were 
supported less by commercial rather than governmental investors; and, reflecting 
their smaller size, had significantly higher operating costs as a percentage of toial 
funds under management.  In addition, the performance evaluation systems of the 
regional funds were often rudimentary.  Commercial funds were more likely to 
require a minimum return on capital before agreeing to invest in a project.  These 
28 minima  were  also  higher  for  commercial  funds  reflecting  their  greater 
discrimination of projects.  When commercial funds' did invest,  they allocated 
nearly four times as much per investee than the regional funds.  However, to their 
advantage,  regional funds  like commercial funds  invested in enterprises  at the 
earliest stages of their development and dedicated the majority of their finances 
to medium  and  high technology,  new -firms.  None the less,  management of 
regional funds spent, on average, half the amount of  time allocated by commercial 
funds  both to  assessing  projects  pre-deal  and,  subsequently  supporting  their 
investee companies post-deal.  The support ability of regional funds, despite the 
existence of Business Innovation Centres, also remains in question.  60% of the 
investees supported by regional funds sought technical advice unassociated with 
the regional fund or BIC.·  The regional fund managers acknowledged that their 
inability to provide appropriate technical advice to their investees was the single 
biggest  weakness  of their  advisory  services.  Perhaps  most  critical  of all, 
assuming the level of costs of the regional funds and their investment patterns to 
date continue, Murray calculated that the average regional fund is likely to run out 
of money and/or face a major funding crisis in approximately four year's time. 
Table 19  Finances Raised by Regional and Commercial ESCF Funds 
ECUs: 
Average Fund Size 
Max. Funds Raised 









These pessimistic conclusions raise the issue of whether or not commercial and 
regional development goals are compatible for a small,  seed capital fund.  The 
regional  funds  also  face  problems  of the  number  and  quality  of supply  of 
attractive investments in their regions. A substantial and continuing, quality deal 
flow is a necessary precondition for the economic success of a seed capital fund. 
It is no co-incidence that the largest concentration of seed capital activity in the 
US  is  centred  around  international  centres  of  economic  and,  particularly, 
technologically  innovative  activity.  Thus,  seed  capital  firms  tend  to  be 
concentrated in Palo  Alto  and other areas  of California's  'Silicon Valley'  or 
Boston's  'Route  128'  conurbation.  Both  these  areas  share  a  similarly  high 
incidence of internationally recognised universities, major technology companies 
and their research laboratories, and a tradition of spin-off, high technology firms. 
This pattern of economic geography immediately raises important policy issues 
for policy makers with a remit to support socio-economic development in less 
favoured regions within the European Community. 
















Total Funds Raised 
Source: Murray 1993 
Investment in  C)f, TotiJ 
Regional Funds  Investment 
<ECUs) 
1,569,000  12.3 
2,500,000  13.3 
132,000  1.0 
120,000  0.9 
556,000  4.4 
2,775,000  21.7 
2,886,650  22.6 
805,600  6.3 
402,000  3.1 
2,748,650  21.5 
77,250  0.6 







3,063,040  16.4 
1,000,000  5.3 
8,751960  46.7 
750,000  4.0 
1480,000  7.9 
1,185,000  6.3 
18,730,000 
A  number of crude calculations  can be made in order to start to address  the 
minimum location needs for a new seed capital fund.  The following assumptions 
are made.  A  'closed end' fund starts with ECU 10 million.  This,  as already 
noted,  is likely to not be  the  optimum  size for.  a  seed capital fund  but it is 
arguably a practicable fund goal.  Within its ten year investment life, the fund 
makes  SO  initial  investments  of average  size  of 100,000 ECU.  20% of the 
portfolio (10 investees) fail losing all the fund's investment.  Of the remaining 40 
investments, 25 firms are categorised as  "living dead".  These 25 firms neither 
make or lose the fund money over time but they do tie ~p  2.5 million ECU of the 
total fund.  Of the now remaining 15 investments, the fund decides to put further 
finance of 250,000 ECU into the ten most promising investees.  From the fund's 
remaining 2.5 million Ecu, operating costs of 160,000 ECU per year will absorb 
all but 0.9 million ECU of the total fund over its life.  This last figure can be 
seen as a sum for contingencies.  In all probability, the fund will have to consider 
further rounds of finance by year 4 or 5 in order to survive beyond its ten year . 
30 life but this is ignored in the example. 
Taking  an industry  average,  it is  assumed  that  the fund  accepts  5%  of all 
applicants for its funds.  Thus, it needs a deal flow of 100 firms per year.  These 
applicants  will  primarily  come  at  the  recommendation  of  intennediaries 
(accountants, notaries, banks,  BICs etc.).  The intennediaries will also act as a 
filter and the assumption is  made that they consider half the firms they see as 
appropriate for seed  capital finance.  (This assumes that the intennediaries are 
able to make infonned decisions regarding the appropriateness and role of seed 
capital.  Work by Murray et al (1993) on UK intennediaries in the MBO market 
indicates a very variable level of intennediary knowledge.  It is unlikely that their 
information on seed capital is greater or more infonned.)  Thus, the indirect deal 
flow to the intennediaries needs to be 200 firms per year.  However, not all 
NTBFs will be interested or prepared to accept the disciplines of an external, 
equity investor.  None the less, the sources of alternative external finance are 
highly limited.  Thus, it is  assumed that 75% of potential investee companies 
would accept seed capital funds if offered to them.  This takes the derived deal 
flow to 267 firms per year. 
NTBFs fonn a relatively small percentage of all new firms started in any one 
year.  It is assumed that technology-based firms represent 5% of the population 
of all new firm starts.  (As noted in table 5, this figure is approximately correct 
for UK data from VAT returns).  Thus, the total number of firm starts within the 
area of operation of the seed capital fund needs to be 5,333 per year, assuming 
the distribution of NTBFs is geographically homogeneous (a heroic assumption). 
The geographic area of operation appropriate for a seed capital fund will depend 
on the amount and the nature of economic activity within its sphere of influence. 
Catchment areas can be smaller for seed capital funds  based in areas of high 
levels  of  technological  and  innovation  excellence.  For  funds  based  in 
predominantly rural areas or regions characterised by declining ·heaVy industries, 
the catchment area will necessarily be larger.  It is difficult to generalise on this 
issue and hence the need for empirical research data.  The above calculations are 
an initial attempt te look at the process of detennining where, and over what area, 
a fund should be located.  Other factors will be important, including the existence 
of a well developed, or develop-able, network relationship with key intermediary, 
support organis~tions as well as suppliers and customers. 
This paper is not the vehicle to develop these arguments further.  However, the 
author suggests that the placement of both commercial and economic goals on a 
-seed capital fund is  to put the fund  managers in a  very difficult situation.  If 
economic goals are not realised then it is improbable that the continued support 
31 from commercial investors will be realised.  In order to meet commercial goals, 
the imposition of investment constraints to encourage support for local firms, 
sometimes  despite  questions  regarding  their  commercial  viability,  has  little 
commercial logic.  Yet the majority of regional funds  are constrained to invest 
within their region.  This  circle cannot be squared  without relaxing either the 
developmental or commercial goals.  It may be more sensible to recognise the 
· economic limitations on regional funds and to expect a return on funds employed 
of a lesser order than that which would be imposed on a strictly commercial fund. 
In effect, a 'social discount' on the cost of capital would be applied to reflect the 
wider social benefits perceived from the existence and operation of such a fund. 
However, such a compromise would have to accept the consequence that the state 
or other public bodies would become the primary investors in such an investment 
activity.  Commercial  institutions  would  only  participate· in  such  funds  for 
philanthropic  or socially  motivated  reasons. ·  Such  largesse  is  likely  to  be 
relatively modest and irregular. 
11)  Some Final Obsenations on the Future 
This paper has attempted to give a brief review of the European situation as  it 
affects early stage. and seed capital investment.  The following statements are the 
author's subjective opinions as  to how the European venture capital industries 
might develop over the next three to five years: 
i. Seed capital and early stage investment will continue to by a minority activity 
undertaken by less than thirty professional venture capital firms in the UK 
The high risks of early stage investment, particularly related to the financing of 
new technologies and young companies will prove to be an unpalatable activity 
for all but the most dedicated,  specialist organisations.  However, those funds. 
which do invest in technology related investments will become larger ~d  more 
technologically specialist in nature.  They will invariable forge greater overseas 
links particularly with the US, and to a lesser extent continental Europe. 
ii. The majority of  UK venture capitalists will continue to invest in development 
capital but in an increasingly concentrated and competitive market. 
The  majority  of  UK  venture  capitalists  will  continue  to  be  later  stage, 
development or replacement capital funds.  However, the level of competitive 
rivalry in this market will increase thereby forcing out a number of less successful 
players.  The inability of less successful funds to attract additional institutional 
finance will be the single biggest cause of finns leaving the industry.  These exits 
will accelerate over the next five years as a number of poorly perfonning finns 
32 face a 'funds famine' ... The greater competition in the development capital market 
will encourage a number of venture capitalists to revisit technology focused funds. 
These  will likely  be the larger fums  which may  create  a  number of smaller 
dedicated technology funds.  By definition, these funds will be obliged to invest 
at an earlier stage than the other funds in the venture capital finns' portfolios. 
iii. Government wiU be obliged to recognise that the traditional venture capillll 
industry does not cater for the specific and legitimate needs of  NTBFs and their 
investors 
The continuing importance of NTBFs for the future of developed economies will 
remain  a  cogent  argument  for special  treatment  for  young  technology  based 
companies.  Government  will  be  challenged  to  make  specific  arrangements 
whereby technology entrepreneurs and their investors are incentivised to continue 
to accept the significant risks and extended pay-back periods of investment in this 
area.  State supported NTBF investment programmes will continue in a number 
of European states despite equivocal performance results  in the medium tenn. 
There will be a tendency to in~asingly use commercial investors as the vehicle 
for technology investments in preference to the staff of state owned organisations. 
However, in less economically advantaged regions,  the schemes employed will 
continue to be primarily state engendered and supported given the' low attraction 
of such activity to cOmmercial (ie.  private) investment organisations.  European 
Commission  involvement  in  innovation  will  continue  to  have  an  important 
influence.  US federal government initiatives to support NTBFs will also be an 
influence on European policy makers. 
iv.  The planned demise  of the  USM  market  in  the  UK  and the  rudimentary 
secondary markets in continental Europe will encourage the flotation of  European 
high technology new firms on the US marlcet 
The continued availability of stock  market exit routes  is  a primary concern to 
investors in NTBFs.  The periodic attraction of US markets will require European 
venture capitalists to ensure that a conduit is maintained for the sale of attractive 
technology based fums from their portfolios.  If the planned demise of the UK's 
Unlisted Securities Market occurs,  this will encourage greater attention on US 
flotations.  Stock market flotations will not necessarily be a substitute for trade 
sales but, rather, will increase, or maintain, the alternative exit channels open to 
the investors and thereby the opportunity to maximise realisation prices. 
33 v.  Corporate venturing will increase in Europe but from a low base of  activity 
Corporate venturing will continue to be an practice most actively pursued by US 
organisations and their European subsidiaries.  · However,  an increasing number 
of Japanese and European finns will emulate US activity with the introduction of 
venture funds managed both internally or by specialist venture capital finns.  In 
the absence of easily emulated models, a variety of relationships will be tested as 
finns learn the pros and cons of creating productive relationships with technology 
entrepreneurs  and  their  fledgling  companies.  The- imperative  to  maintain 
innovatory  impetus  by  corporates  in  increasingly  _global,  technology  based  . 
industries  will  encourage  large  finns  to  take  a  long  term  view  on  such 
experiments. 
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The  purpose  of  this  introductory  note  is  to  provide  some  basic 
elements  to understand  the  need  for  and  the  form  of  public support 
for  New  Technology  Based  Firms  (NBTF's)  in the  European  Community. 
It will  describe  first  very  briefly  why  do  members  states  support 
these  firms.  In other words  what  is the implicit or explicit policy 
rationale  of  these  actions.  Second,  it will  set  out  the  types  of 
policy  actions  directly  addressing  the  needs  of  NTBFs.  Thirdly  it 
will summarise  the findings  of  a  survey of  schemes  available in the 
European  Community  to  support  NTBFs  prepared  for  the  workshop  and 
included in the report. 
Why  do  Member  States support NTBFs? 
Most  policy  documents  which  aim  at  supporting  New  Technology  Based 
Firms  (NTBFs)  argue  that  those  companies  play  an  important  role  in 
spearheading technical advance and hence can contribute positively to 
the  competitiveness  of  the  regional  or national  industrial  fabric. 
Much  of  the  early  evidence  of  the  role  which  NTBFs  played  in  the 
emergence of new,  high -technology sectors such as semiconductors and 
bio-technology  was  based  on  the  United  States  experience  (Rothwell 
and  Zegveld,1982,1984;  Kaplinsky,  1982). 
The  growing  belief  during  the  1970's  in  small  firm's  greater  than 
average capacity  for  innovation,  employment  creation and  industrial 
renewal  spurred the emergence  of  an  increasing number  of  schemes  to 
support R&D  of small and medium  sized firms  {Braunling,1982).  Most  of 
the  schemes  had  the  form  of  tax  relief,  loan  guarantees  or  grants 
which  financed  t_he  start-up  phase  of  SMF' s.  More  targeted  pol  icy 
actions  concentrated  on  the  cost  of  the  whole  or  part  of  the  R&D 
activity. 
During the 1980's the attention of policy makers  and policy analysts 
started to shift towards  a  particular sub-set of  SMF's:  those small 
and  new  enterprises  which  were  technology  based.  Several  studies 
attempted  to show  the  importance of  this particular group of  SMF's. 
Based  on  a  study  for  the  European  Commission's  Industrial  Research 
and  Development  Advisory  Committee  ( IRDAC},  Rothwell  and  Dodgson 
(1989}  summarise  some  of  the findings  of  these studies as  follows: 
There  are  indications  that  the  share  of  innovations  which  are 
developed  by  SMF' s  {employment  between  1  -499)  has  increased 
rapidly.  In  the  UK  these  SMF's  would  have  almost  doubled  their 
share  of  significant British  innovations  from  22%  in  1965-69  to 
38%  in  1980-83.  See  Fig. 1965-1  1150-~ 1855-58  1981).M 1150 1170-7. 11~71 198C).f3 
Year 
Figure 1.  Trends In the size distribution of lnnovat· 
lng firma 1945-83 
Note:  Unit employment in boxes. 
Source:  SPRU innovation databank. 
~esults  o~ studies relating specifically to NTBFs  show  an explosive 
J.ncrease  J.n  the  number  of  firms  and  give  some  impression  on  the 
number  and  importance in terms of employment  for the UK  and the FRG. 
See  Tables  1  and  2. 
Table 1.  NTBFs lri Europe ·1950·1975  Table 2.  NTBFs in Eurooe: 1970-1985 
UK  FRG  UK  FRG 
Number in exist-
ence: 
200  100 
(considered only manufacturing- probably an under-
statemem) 
Total employment:  15.000  12.000 
Total annual sates 
(1985): 
Expon ratio: 
£200 million  £180 million 
(SO% from  (60% from one 
four companies  company - Nix-
dorf 
30% 
Sectors:  mainly electrical and electronic 
Source:  AD Little (1977) 
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Strong geographical clustering effects in both coun-
tries. 
Source: Segai, Quince, Wicksteed and lSI ,(1986). 
2 Kulicke and Krupp  (1987)  arrive to similar conclusions:  "The rate of 
formation  of NTBFs  in  the  F.RG  seems  to be  on  the  rise.  This  trend 
began in the late  19 70s.  The  annual founding rate in 1983  appeared to 
_be  twice  that of  1973;  today it may  be  up  to  three  times  as  large, 
possibly  500  annually."  However  the  authors  also  sound  a  note  of 
warning:  "  This  cannot yet be attributed to specific NTBF  promotion 
schemes,  but  only,  if at  all,  to  earlier  promotional  activities 
designed generally for small  and medium  sized firms." 
Having  sketched very briefly the possible  importance of  NTBFs  still 
does not explain completely why  public authorities have selected this 
particular  group  of  companies  as  an  object  of  public  action.  Two 
reasons are usually presented. 
First,  there  is  the  implicit  or  explicit  assumption  that  some  of 
those companies  might  end  up  by  growing  into large firms which  open 
a  new  technological  trajectory. It  is  argued  that  new  technical 
advances  can  be  developed  more  easily  in  NTBFs,  because  their 
responsiveness  to  new  demands  is greater  than  that of  large  firms. 
This  is said  to  result  from  the  shorter  decision path  between  the 
different functions within the firm.  Much  of the evidence is based on 
the  US  experience of development and growth of start-ups which  today 
form  the back-bone of  the us  semiconductor and  biotech industry. 
One  should keep  in mind  however  that not  every  NTBF  is a  winner.As 
our  survey  of  schemes  shows,  failure  rates  for  companies  supported 
can be as high as 35%.  Moreover of those companies which survive only 
a  very  reduced  number  can  be  defined  to  be  high  performers  on  the 
long  run.  A German  study  by  Kulike  {1987)  which  followed  2000  SMEs 
over a  ten year period comes  to the conclusion that NTBFs  grow  fast 
in the start-up phase of the firm leveling out to average growthrates 
in  their  industrial  sector  after  a  period  of  1  to  7  years.  On  the 
whole  the  contribution  to  employment  is  relatively  small  on  the 
national scale.  Nevertheless  some  regions with a  high clustering of 
these  type  of  firms  might  benefit  significantly  due  to  the  effect 
they  have  on  the regional/  local economy. 
There  is  however  a  second  reason  to  propose  actions  of  support  of 
vNTBFs  by  public authorities.  As  Kulicke and  Krupp(1987)  argue,  large 
and  small  firms  live  in  a  complementary  symbiosis.  In  other  words 
they  constitute together  the  industrial  fabric  of  a  country.  Large 
firms  take  most  of  the  initial  steps  as  far  as  mayor  or  basic 
innovations  go,  including massive  market  penetration and diffusion. 
Small  firms  either use  these  innovations  in order to  feed  their own 
innovations in niche markets,  or through supply relations with large 
.firms contribute to increased competitiveness.  Due  to their position 
in the  'national system of innovation'  NTBFs  appear as an interesting 
group  of  small  firms  to  support  if  the public authority  intends  to 
promote  the competitiveness of  the economic  system. 
Whatever  the reasoning used to  justify public support  for  NTBFs  the 
scope  of  the  action  will  by  necessity  be  limited.  As  Rothwell  and 
zegveld  (1985)  argue,  some  sectors  where  R&D  requirements  are  very 
large and capital costs very high,  will see little contribution from 
small  firms  (pharmaceuticals).  High  entry  barriers  make  it almost 
impossible for them  to participate.  Industries where  mass  production 
3 process  innovation is the  prime  mover  for  competitiveness  are also 
unlikely to see many  contributions from  small firms,  except in small 
localised innovations. 
Policy instruments used to support N'l'BFs 
As  argued  the  growing  belief  during  the  1970 
1 s  in  small  firm 
1 s 
greater than average capacity for innovation,  employment creation and 
industrial renewal  spurred the emergence  of  an increasing number  of 
schemes  to support  R&D  of  small  and  medium  sized firms.  During  the 
1980's the attention of policy makers  and policy analysts started to 
shift  towards  a  particular  sub-set  of  SMEs:  those  small  and  new, 
enterprises which  were  technology based.  Several countries of the EC 
started to  device  schemes  for  a  particular sub-set  of  small  firms: 
the  NTBFs.  In  1983  the  FRG  launched  its  'Pilot  scheme  for  the 
Promotion  of NTBFs'  (TOU).  In France  ANVAR  has been  involved in the 
provision  of  'seed  money'  since  1982  through  different  programmes 
which later merged  into the ASI-CE  (Aide aux Services de 1' Innovati-
on  en  vue  de  la  Creation  d'Enterprises).  The  UK  introduced  in  1986 
the SMART  scheme  which provides funds  to encourage innovative firms. 
In  1981  the  Netherlands  introduced  the  PPM  Guarantee  program  for 
private venture-capital companies.  etc. 
The  inventory  of  policy  instruments  which  EC  member  states  use  to 
support  NTBFs  in the 80s  and  up  to now  show  an  increasing degree of 
sophistication.  Many  of  them  are geared to aid NTBFs  on  one  or more 
problems  which  they encounter  in different phases of  their develop-
ment.  From  different studies one  can  identify roughly  the following 
factors  which  might  affect the development  of  NBTFs  : 
*  A  group  of  financial  problems-.  The  factor  which  most  studies 
identify as an important constrain to the development of NTBFs  are 
of  financial  nature.  More  or  less  detailed  surveys  of  the 
difficulties which  NTBFs  find in most  Member  States all indicate 
that availability  and  cost  of  finance  is perceived  as  the  most 
important  constrain.(for  example  ·saRC,Cambridge  1992).  Not 
surprisingly public  authority  intervention  tends  to  concentrate 
on  these aspects. Two  main type of constrains have been identified 
which  in  turn  give  rise  to  two  different  forms  of  action  by 
governments: 
one  type  of  problems  refers  to the  functioning  of  the  financial 
markets  and  their relative aversion to risk.  Since by  definition 
NTBFs  tend  to  be  difficult  to  assess  according  to  tradi  tiona! 
economic  criteria  they  also  have  difficulties  of  access  to 
traditional financial markets. 
The  second  set  of  problems  refer  to  the  fact  that  NTBFs  have  a 
very costly first phase of development  {R&D,  pilot project), which 
make  them  much  more  vulnerable  if  ,financial  resources  are  not 
readily available. 
*  Another  group  of  factors  affecting the development  of  NTBFs  are 
related  to  the  management  capabilities  of  High-Technology  firm  · 
founders.  Entrepreneurial  and  marketing  skills  tend  to  be  less 
developed  in this particular group  of  firms 
4 * 
* 
Another  set  of  factors  is  the  availability  of  risk  accepting 
markets.  The  existence  of  markets  for  innovative  products  and 
processes is considered crucial for the rate of formation as well 
as for the longer term viability of -NTBFs.  The  market miqht  be  a 
group of consumers  which takes up  innovations easily. It can also 
be other large firms which are supplied by  NTBFs  or institutional 
consumers  such as  the public and  private health and  educational 
sector,  or the·public administration itself. 
Last but not  least some  studies mention  the access to state-of-
the-art  technology  as  another  factor  which  might  affect  the 
formation and  survival of NTBFs.  Clearly qovernments  can play an 
important role by  establishin9 centres of R&D  with easy access by 
private companies. 
This list of factors affecting the creation and development of NTBFs 
is not intended to be exhaustive. Nevertheless it gives an impression 
of the possible range and  forms  of public authority support to NTBFs. 
Instruments available to public authorities to support NTBFs 
Based on  an extensive typology prepared by  the OECD  one can identify 
several forms  of action by  public authorities to financially support 
firms.  (See  insert  in  annex)  This  typology  gives  an  overview  of 
potential instruments.  However,  not all of them  are applied in the EC 
or have an effect on  the development of NTBFs.  Based on this overview 
of  potential  instruments  we  defined three basically different  forms 
of  support to NTBFs. 
The  forms  of  indirect  financial  aid  which  can  include  acti.ons  to 
reduce  the risk which  intermediaries such  as banks,  venture capita-
lists,  development  corporations might  have  when  dealing with NTBFs. 
Usually  these  instruments  take  the  form  of  guarantees  or  equity 
participation. Governments  might also increase the attractiveness of 
the financing NTBFs  by  changing the fiscal treatment of risk capital. 
Within  the  same  group  of  indirect  forms  of  support  to  NTBFs  we  can 
find  measures  which  affect  the  market  and  demand  for  innovative 
products  (procurement,  trade guarantees,  etc  ) 
Support for NTBFs  might also take the form  of direct financial aid to 
enterprises  to- develop  a  particular  activity  (R&D,  prototyping, 
machinery  and  equipment  etc).  They  take the  form  of  grants,  loans, 
equity participation or reduce  the tax .burden  of  NTBFs.  · 
In addition to the  financial' forms  of  support one  can also identify 
those which have no  quantifiable form:  manaqement/marketing support, 
technological support etc. 
Finally  several  of  the  policy  instruments  can  be  integrated in one 
scheme. 
5 Policy instruments used by  EC  Member  States to support NTBPs 
In producing  a  compilation of  policy  instruments  used  by  EC  Member 
State to support NTBFs  one  can  identify many  of  the above  described 
policy instrument.  However  most  of them  have a  wider scope and apply 
either  to  all  enterprises  (for  example  direct  financial  aid  to 
stimulate  R&D)  or  are directed at  the  wider  group  of  SHEs.  In  the 
overview  presented  in  the  next  pages  we  used  the  rather  pragmatic 
criteria of  selection:  When  a  particular country  had policy instru-
ments  explicitly  addressing  NTBFs  we  only  described  those  instru-
ments.  For countries which had no  specific policy of support of NTBFs 
we  included those schemes  which  indirectly also addressed them.  This 
might  give  a  somewhat  distorted picture,  but  at  least  we  hoped  it 
would  not  leave out  actions  which  in practice might  be  stimulating 
the development  of  NTBFs. 
Our  review included 25  to 30  schemes.  Not  all of them are included in 
the  following  tables  and  inventory  forms,  either  because  the 
necessary information dit not reach us in time or because their small 
size would make  the overview less clear.  In some  cases we  included in 
this selection some  regional programmes  either because they were  the 
main  programmes  in very decentralised countries or because of  their 
size.  · 
Based on this overview one can make  the following general comments  on 
the nature of  the support  to NTBFs  in the EC: 
The  most  dominant  form  of  support  in Europe  is clearly  the direct 
financial  aid in its many  forms.  One  can  identify only  four  schemes 
in two  countries which operate indirectly by  attempting to reduce the 
risk to capital providers for NTBFs:  The  Business Investment Capital 
for NTBFs  scheme  (BJTU)  and  the Pilot Scheme  to Stimulate NTBFs(TOU) 
in  Germany;  the  Guarantee  Scheme  for  Venture  Capital  companies 
(  Garantieregeling  PPM)  in  The  Netherlands;  Law  31 7,  article  4  in 
Italy. 
In  the  review  we  did  not  find  any  tax  mechanisms  which  explicitly 
address  the  issue  of  making  investments  in  venture  capital  more 
attractive.  This  might  be  an  area  worth  looking  at.  The  new  US 
Administration is exploring  several  proposals  which  make  long  term 
finance  of  SHEs  more  attractive. 
Within  the  indirect  forms  of  aid  we  did  not  identify  any  actions 
directed  at  stimulating  markets  and  the  demand  for  innovative 
products specifically targeted at NTBFs. 
The  majority of  European  schemes  addressing  the  needs  of  NTBFs,  or 
more  generally  SHEs,  have  the  form  of  direct  financial  aid.  One  of 
the . main  reasons  could  be  the  fact  that  it  allows  a  much  more 
targeted  approach  than  the  indirect  policies.  The  target  can  be  a 
certain  type  of  companies,  operating  in  specified  sectors  of  the 
economy  and  aiming at the development  of  specific technologies.  The 
most  widely used type of  instrument is the grant,  followed by  loans. 
In both these instruments we  find a great variety of modalities:  non-
refundable and  refundable grants and  loans  in case of success,  some 
of  the grants might  have  the form  of an  award,  different coverage of 
costs  supported,  different  percentages  of  support,  different  forms 
and  levels of  reduction of  interest rates,  etc.  However  all of  them 
have  to conform  to European  regulation on  competition. 
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Equity participation is used in only three, mainly integrated schemes 
and  thus in combination with other forms  of support. 
Management  and  technical  support  schemes  are  usually  part  of  an 
integrated  scheme  where  financial  aid  is  combined  with  management 
support  and  some  sort of  "hands  on"  assistance  on  the  part  of  the 
scheme  managers.  To  a  certain extend'scheme· managers. are providing 
through this form  of aid the support which  NTBFs  get through venture 
capitalists where  the latter exist. 
Integrated  schemes  can  be  found  in  several  countries.  In  some  of 
them,  for  exa~ple Italy,  France and  Ireland they are the.main if not 
the only policy  instrument.  Moreover  many  of  these  schemes  are not 
exclusively directed at NTBFs,  but cover all types of SHEs. 
From  the  review  per  country  one  thing becomes  clear:  every  country 
has its own  way  of dealing with the problem of supporting NTBFs.  The 
differences  would  seem  to  be  bigger  than  the  similarities  between 
'them.  The  differences are partly the result of the specific forms  of 
development  of  the national system of  innovation  (  type of  economic 
struct~e, infrastructure supporting it) and  the policies which have 
been  employed  to  support  it.  However  Memner  States  have  been 
incorporating  new  policy  instruments  ~nd  adapting  them  to  the · 
national policy context. 
Based  on  the  available  information  one  can  summarize  the  forms  of 
support for  NTBFs  per country as  follows: 
Given  the  increasing  decentralization  of  government  in  Belgium 
support  for  enterprises  is  also  progressively  shifting  to  the 
regional level. It is unlikely that any  new  schemes will be initiated 
at  the  federal  level.  The  three  regions  (Flanders,  Wallonia  and 
Brussels)  have  been setting up  support schemes  in recent years.  One 
of  the  schemes,  the  Flanders  based  "Take  off  Fund"_  started  its 
operations  in  1989.  The  main  strategic  issue  here  will  be  the 
creation of employment.  The  Brussels based scheme  "Brustart" started 
its operations in 1993.  At  federal level innovative companies had the 
Innovation  Company  scheme.  This  scheme  was  discussed  du~ing  the 
workshop  as  being  an  example  of  a  tax related scheme.  To  apply  for 
the scheme companies had to be identified as innovating companies and 
once  they had  they were  allowed  tax reduction,  either on  profits or 
on  income tax. The  scheme,  although seen as successful was  phased out 
in 1990  due  to budgetary constrains. 
Denmark  has  a  complex  set of  interrelated schemes  which  include the 
schemes  for  searching and  stimulating spin-offs at research centres 
and  universities,  a  scholarship  scheme,  management  support  schemes 
and  a  grant  scheme  which  supports  the  development  of  new  product 
ideas.  It  is  still  not  very  clear  which  strategy  the  new  Danish 
government  will  follow.  However  Danish participants to the workshop 
expressed  their belief  that  the  labour effects of  actions  aimed  at 
creating  new  firms  will  be  more  important  than  in  the  past.  It is 
also  likely  that  the  government  develops  a  guarantee  scheme  for 
financial institutions to stimulate the development  of  NTBFs. 
9 Germany  with  its  decentralised/  federalised  form  of  government 
presents a  great variety of policy instruments at different levels. 
Of  the european countries it would  seem  to have  the most  complex.set 
of schemes covering almost all forms  of support. At  the federal level 
Germany  has the BJTU  pilot programme  which  supports NTBFs  indirectly 
through  providing  better  investment  capital  conditions.  This 
programme  which  was  discussed during the workshop  is due  to renewal 
in  1994.  According  to  the  German  participants  it is  likely  to  be 
continued.  From  the experience with the pilot programme  the issue is 
not  so  much  about  how  to  promote  but  who  will  do  it.  In  the  new 
Lander the integrated TOU  programme  covers a  great variety of direct 
and indirect actions by  providing risk capital, grants and management 
support  to  NTBFS.This  programme  will  be  continued  after  1995.  The 
credit guarantee might be transformed into an equity participation to 
improve  the capital base  of  firms.  It is likely that a  cooperation 
programme  designed  to  bring  together  research  and  development  is 
implemented.  At  the Lander level one might find in addition sometimes 
two  or  three  initiatives which  support  NTBFs  and  SHEs  on  different 
aspects  of  their develop.  Most  of  them  include  some  form  of  direct 
financial aid and/or management  support. 
Greece has no  programmes  specifically aimed at NTBFs.  However  it has 
three schemes  to stimulate the innovative capacity of firms and  thus 
also NTBFs.  The  Programme  for the Advancement  of Industrial Research · 
and.  Innovation  (PAVE)  is aimed  all  types  of  productive enterprises 
(including  SMEs).It  is  a  grant  programme  which  supports  personnel, 
consultant  and  running  costs  of  small  equipment.The  Law  1892/90  on 
modernisation  and  development  subsidizes  high-tech  investments 
through grants,  combined  with  loans.' Finally Greece  has developed a 
scheme  to  promote  risk capital.  The  Venture  Capital  Company  scheme 
creates  a  regulatory  environment  for  the  operation  of  v  .c.c.  by 
providing public subsidies to these companies. 
Spain, ·as  several  other  European  countries,  has  two  different  and 
rather  independent .levels of government  action:  the central govern-
ment  and  the Comunidades  Aut6nomas.  At  central government  level one 
can identify. two  schemes  which although not specifically directed at 
'  SHEs  or NTBFs  are nevertheless applicable to them.  The  Joint Research 
Projects is aimed  at improving  the collaboration between  companies, 
research  centres  and  universities.  It provides  free  interest  loans 
for  R&D  expenditure  and  investment.  The  Development  Projects 
Programme  provides  soft  loans  which  are  not  refundable  in  case  of 
failure  for  R&D  expenditure  and  investment.  Both  schemes  are 
implemented by  CDTI.  The  venture capital market  in Spain is conside-
red to be relatively weak.  At  the level of the Comunidades  Aut6nomas 
there are many  different initiatives with a  similar nature.  Some  of 
them  are explicitly aimed  at SME's.  In the survey we  included as  an 
example  only  one:  the  Plan  Tecnol6gico  of  the  Comunidad  Valenciana 
which  s.upport  through  grants  the  R&D  expenditure  of  SMEs  including 
personnel,  equipment  and ·the acquisition of  licences. 
10 France has  one  of  the biggest nationally  and  regionally  integrated 
programmes.  The  ANVAR  programme  "Aide  a  la  creation  d' etreprises 
innovantes"  is  a  national  programme  managed  through  24  regional 
offices  which  implement  the  scheme.  ANVARs  main  target are  SMEs  in 
all sectors of  industry.  Innovation assistance is given to projects 
of technological nature,  via advances of up  to 40%  of the cost of the 
innovation  programme,  in  the  form  of  interest  -free  loans.  These 
loans are  rep~yable in four instalments,  depending on  the failure or 
success  of  the project.  The  assistance is offered  for  the complete 
innovation trajectory,  from  feasibility studies to commercialisation 
of the project. In addition to the financial support it also provides 
innovation support services and  consultancies.  ANVAR  has  identified 
the insufficient knowledge  of  the market  by  SHEs  as one  of the main 
sources of failure.  Two  thirds of the failures are due  to commercial 
reasons.  In  the  future  it intends  to  strengthen  this  capability. 
Moreover  ANVAR  intends  to  strengthen  the  risk  capital  provision 
through the  implementation of  some  mechanisms  of guarantee. 
A similar,  but  given  the  size  of  the  country  ,  somewhat  smaller 
integrated  programme  can  be  found  in  Ireland.  The  IDA  "Enterprise 
Development  Programme"  is less explicitly focused  on  NTBFs.  However 
some  of the requirements such as the one that firms should operate in 
markets  for  internationally traded goods  and  export services should 
produce  a  certain bias towards  this type of  firms.  NTBFs  constitute 
about  one  third  of  the  IDA  projects.  Although  initially  this 
programme  was  explicitly focused on  NTBFs  this focus was  abandoned in 
1985.  Since that  period  IDA  has  concentrated more  on  the strategic 
characteristics of the business.  The  main  aim  of the programme  is to 
create  employment.  This  programme  includes  mainly  direct  forms  of 
financial  aid  and  management  support.  There  is  a  wide  range  of 
support  services  which  include  interesting  features  such  as  key 
customer  introduction. 
Italy does not have an explicit system of support for NTBFs.  However. 
the Italian Parliament recently approved a new  comprehensive law,  Law 
317,  which  puts  together  eight different  forms  of  support  for  SMEs 
and  simplified the procedure of  access to that support  (a procedure 
of self-certification with control a posteriori}. Some  of these forms 
of support are clearly directed at small  firms  with a  high technolo-
gical  content.  As  an  integrated  scheme  it  covers  indirect  aid  to 
stimulate risk participation in the capital of SMEs  and various forms 
of  direct  financial  aid  .(in  tax  credits  or  grants)  for  different 
purposes  (R&D  exp~nses,  innovative  investments,  counselling).  This 
scheme  has encountered two  problems  in its first year of implementa-
tion.  The  first  one  refers  to  the  type  of  aid  which  is preferred. 
Most  enterprises have opted for the form  of grant,  oversubscribing it 
in a  very short period of time.  The  second problem has arisen through 
the  implementation  of  EC  regulation on  support  for  SMEs  which  will 
require to change  some  aspects of  the law. 
11 The  Netherlands has three schemes  which address either explicitly or 
implicitly  NTBFs.  The  PPM  programme  which  supplies  guarantees  for 
risk capital providers is the most specific instrument addressing the 
financial needs of NTBFs.  This scheme,  established in 1981,  is aimed 
at  stimulating  private  venture  capital  firms  to  provide  equity 
investment  in  SMEs.  Essence  of  the -programme  is  that  the  Dutch 
government  guarantees  a  recovery ·of  50%  of  eventual  losses  of 
investors.  It  has  allowed  to  establish  in a  period  of  12  years  a 
stable group  of  approximately  100  VCCs.  Although  the  PPM  scheme  is 
supposed  to end  in 1995,  it is likely to be continued.  In addition 
and  similarly  to  schemes  in  other  countries  firms  can  apply  for 
Technical  development  credits  (  TOK)  and  for  grants  to  develop 
selected  technologies  (  PBTS).  Dutch  participants  to  the  workshop 
suggested  that  the  government  might  further  promote  NTBFs  through 
support  to  clustering  and  networking  of  firms.  It is  likely  that 
after  the  significant  reduction  in  the  support  to  SMEs  due  to  the 
phasing out of  the WIR  subsidies in 1991  the government  might  again 
increase its support  through other means. 
The  UK,  has two  national programmes  for NTBFs.  Both of them  are grant 
based  programmes.  The  Small  Firms  Merit  Awards  for  Research  and 
Technology  (SMART)  programme is a national competition established in 
1986  which provides non  repayable. grants for NTBFs.  It provides up to 
150  grants per year for feasibility studies  (stage I)  and  75  grants 
to continue with the development  of pre-production prototypes  (stage 
II).  The  grants  are  also  meant  to  be  a  signal  of  quality  of  the 
projects to individuals and  financial  institutions.  The  Support  for 
Products  under Research  (SPUR)  programme  was  started in  1991  and  is 
aimed at encouraging SMEs  to increase R&D  expenditure and  to develop 
new  products  and  processes.  SPUR  is a  grant  programme  which  covers 
30%  of  the  costs  of  the  project.  In  addition  to  these  national 
programmes  most  regions  in  the  UK  have  their  own  proqrammes  to 
support  SMEs  and  NTBFs.  Most  of  those  proqrammes  provide  not  only 
direct forms  of aid (grants,  loans) but also technical and managerial 
support.  Moreover  the entities responsible for the implementation of 
the  national  schemes  are  usually  the  regional  agencies  (Scottish 
Office,  Welsh  Office). 
Summary of the main  characteristics of the schemes 
The  following tables present a  summary  of the main characteristics of 
each  of  the  schemes  included  in  the survey.  For  further details on 
each of the schemes  see the survey forms  included in this report.  The 
summary  of  some  of  the main  results and  the size of  the schemes  are 
orqanized according to the  type of  scheme  and  should allow a  better 
cross comparison of the different schemes supporting NTBFs  .in Europe. 
The  indirect schemes 
The  survey  identified  three  indirect  schemes  which  are  aimed  at 
strengthening the availability of risk capital  (see table). There are 
a  few  other,  usually integrated schemes  such as the Italian Law  317, 
which also have  some  form.of  stimulation to develop the risk capital 
12 market.  The  Dutch  PPM  seheme  is the oldest of the three.  Through its 
operation  it has  been  able  to  create  a  substantial  risk  capital 
market.  VCCs  making  use of this scheme  have  taken a  participation in 
100  to 120  firms per year.  Cumulatively  the decade of operation has 
meant  a  participation of  VCCs  in nearly  800  firms.  The  German  BJTU 
scheme  is more  recent  (1989).  In  1991  it provided risk finance  for 
nearly  100  firms.  CUmulatively  the  scheme  is  involved  in  42  oper-
ations  through refinancing and  144  operations through coinves.tment. 
On  the Greek  scheme  we  have  very little information. 
The  budgetary information on both,  the Dutch and the German  scheme is 
very difficult to compare  since one  scheme  operates  through guaran-
tees  (PPM)  and  he other mainly  through refinancing and coinvestment. 
Table  4:  Indirect Schemes 
Scheme.  Operatioa  Number of Firms  Failure r.  Budget 
D  BJTU  1989/1994  from 89 to 92:  6 9fl of  Total 300 Min DM •  154 MECU 
refiJwlce~  firms  of  which already invested: 
cobwest.144  have failed  50 Min DM ( 26 MECU) reinvestmeatmeDt 
30 Min DM ( 15 MECU) cofiaaDce 
Gr  Law  1988  One VCC created 
1755/ 
88 
N  PPM  1981  from 81  to 91:  359(, firms  Reimbunements due to failure of panicipati· 
L  cumulative: 716  have failed  00: 
firms  1983 to 91• fl 89.6 Min (41  MECU) 
approx• 100 to  in1991  •  fl20.6 Min (9 MECU) 
120 firms p/y 
The  direct financial schemes 
They  constitute  the  majority  of  schemes  in  the  EC.  Only  few  are 
explicitly  aimed.  at  NTBFs.  The  SMART  programme  being  the  most 
explicitly directed at NTBFs.  Most  other programmes  include NTBFs  but 
do  not  exclude  others.  Some  programmes  tend  to  privilege  SMEs  and 
certain technologies.  Given  the difference in coverage  and  the fact 
that some  of  them  are repayable loans in case of success  (TOK),  soft 
loans  (the Spanish programmes)  or grants  (  most  of  the rest)  one  can 
not compare  the size of  the supp0rt directly. 
13 Table 5: Direct Financial Schemes 
Scl8ne  o..-an  Number of Finna  ~~- Budget 
littt:el tD 
B  Innovation  1984/1990  260 appliclnts  n.a.  budget n.L (tax reduction scheme) 
Compa- 75firmsselec1ed 
nies 
D  New prod.  1990  in 1992:  n.L  90-92: 13.8 MECU 
k  ideas  105 grants  1992:7.3 MECU 
Prog. 
N  TOK  1954  from 88 to 92:  Budget fixed annually 
L  355 grants.  New loans: apprax fl130 Minty (60 MEClJ) 
60 to 90 per/year  loan only repayable on success: 
40% payback 
N  PBTS  1987  600-800 reQUestS  expenditure per year apprax A 100 Min 
L  per year  (46 MECU) 
u  SMART  1986  In 1991 awarded:  budget: 
K  stage 1: 180 gmt.  86 to 91:  34 Min  (43 MECU) 
stage 2: 1  O!j gmt.  92:  12,5 Min  (18 MECU) 
u  SPUR  1991  in 1992:  budget 1991-1993 : 32 Min ( 42 MECU) 
K  148 firms 
s  Oevetopm.  1978  between  loans: 
p  Projects  78-88: 838 loans  between 1978-90: 390 MECU 
1&92: 90S loans  1992: 82 MECU 
s  Joint  1987  between  I  loans: 
p  Research  88-92: 552 loans  between 1987-92:198 MECU 
1992:31 MECU 
G  PAVE  1985  between  budget: 
r  8&-92: 430 grants  approx 500 Min dr per year (2 MECU) 
100 to 150 p/y 
Integrated Programmes 
In the survey  we  identified six national  programmes  which  have  this 
integrated  character  and  operate  a  great  variety  of  schemes  in  a 
single  framework.  Again,  most  of  them  do  not  focus  exclusively  on 
NTBFs.  The  French  ANVAR  programme  'Aide a la creation d'enterprises 
innovantes'  is  possibly  the  biggest  one  with  an  annual  budget  of 
nearly  45  MECU.  The  German  TOU  programme  today  only  applies  to  the 
New  Lander.  The  Italian law  317  programme  is only in operation since 
1992. 
Integrated programmes  will be  found  in most  regions in Europe.  Only 
a  few  of  these  have  been  included  in  the  survey,  and  mainly  as 
examples.  The  following table does not  include  them. 
14 Table  6:  Integrated Programmes 
SchaM  OIJel*n  Number al Finns  ~r.  Budget 
rilrt:e/tD 
B  Brustart  1993  n.a.  Fund hu  just started 
B  Take-off  1989  90-92:  n.a. 
Fund  10 equity partie. 
2 conv. oblig 
D  TOU  1983-1988  stage1  258  13to 25%  Budget over the lifetime of the 
stage2 373  scheme: 210Min DM  ( 108 MECU) 
stage397  median exp: 24 Min DM (12 MECU) 
D  TOU  1991-1994  similar in structure to the above 
NewLan-
der 
F  Aide a Ia  1983  between  20%  Budget 
creation  •••  8&91: 3965 firms  total expenditure 380 MECU 
AHVM  approx 1000 p/y  1992: 45 MECU 
lr  EDP-1~  1978  between  average  Budget per annum 
91-92: 37 pro- SMEs  2,4 Min lr Pounds (3 MECU) 
jects approx: 700 
jobs 
It  Law 317  1992  in 1992:  annual budget: 
8800 grams  500 Billn Ura  (26 MECU) 
A comparison of levels of support by Member  States 
Based on  the information produced by  the survey it is not possible to 
give  any  impression  on  the  volume  of  aid  member  states  spend  on 
supporting NTBFs.  The  reasons are many:  in some  cases the information 
was  simply not available.  The  schemes  are of a  very different nature 
(  for example grants, soft loan of different types,  equity participa-
tion)  and  hence  the,aid intensity is not comparable.  The  schemes  in 
some  cases  cover  all  sorts  of  industries  and  technologies  and  in 
others only  NTBFs. 
To  overcome  this  limitations of  the  survey  we  can  however  use  some 
proxies which  give us  an  impression on  the intensity of  aid to SHEs 
in the different Member  States.  Using  the "Third Survey on  State Aid 
in  the  European  Community  in  the  Manufacturing  and  certain  other 
Sectors"  (CEC,  1992)  one  can  compare  in  a  systematic  and  weighted 
form  the volume  of aid spend by  Member  States on supporting SHEs.  The 
information  collected  by  the  European  Commission  to  prepare  this 
report is based on  the official information provided by  Member  States 
under Articles 92  and  93  of the EEC  Treaty.  As  the report explains in 
its  annexes  the  intensity  of  aid  is  calculated  by  weighting  the 
different  forms  of- aid.  It is not  a  simple  addition of  the volumes 
spend  by  each Member  State for a  particular purpose. 
The  intensity  of  State  aid  for  SMEs  in  the  period  1981  to  1990 
developed in absolute terms  as  follows: 
15 Table  7 
MECU  State Aid SME's 
1200 
1000 
annual average in period 
800  •  81-86 
600  086-88 
400  •  88-90 
200 
0 
co  ::=.::::  0  a::  a.  ...._  9:  - __,  __,  a.  ~ 
0  c.!)  (./')  :z  :;::) 
Source: CEC 1112 
Given  the size of  the different Member  States it is not  surpr~s~ng 
that  Germany,  France  and  Italy  spend  the  most  on  support  to  SMEs. 
What  is more  surprising is the relatively low  level of suppo·rt in the 
UK,  although it almost doubled  in the same  period.  On  the whole  the 
intensity of aid to·SMEs  has increased over the decade indicating the 
importance  this  issue  has  in  the  different  member  states.  The 
increase is the most  impressive in France. 
Since  the  total'  value  of  aid  makes  , it  very  difficult  to  compare 
bigger with smaller countries we  calculated the intensity of aid to 
SMEs  per person employed  in industry in _the  period 1988  to 1990.  The 
result is very different. 
Table  8 
State Aid SME's per person employed in industry 





Source: CEC 1992 
16 The  intensity  of  aid  to  SMEs  is  the  highest  in  the  three  Benelux 
countries.  In some  cases almost double the average spend by  the EC. 
However  this picture has  changed  radically  in the  beginning of  the 
90s.  Belgium  has  reduced  the  level  of  aid  substantially  (between · 
other measures  aimed  at reducing the deficit see the phasing out of 
the  Innovation Company  Scheme).  The  Netherlands  has  phased  out  two 
schemes  (WIR  and  INSTIR)  which  had  been  increasingly aimed  at SHEs. 
The  result might,  as Dutch  and  Belgian representatives argued during 
the workshop  that the two  countries might  actually be  spending much 
less than other EC  countries today. 
Of  the big countries Italy seems  to be spending most  on  aid to SMEs 
not only in absolute but also in relative terms. 
Two  countries seem  to be  spending very little on  supporting SHEs.  In 
the  case  of  Portugal  it might  be  due  to  the  fact  that  it is only 
recently gearing up  to this type of actions.  In the Danish case it is 
more  remarkable since Denmark  has  some  of  the most  successful SMEs. 
One  of  the  explanations might  be  that  much  of  the  support  for  SMEs 
takes place through intermediaries (for example the national research 
infrastructure)  and  thus  is not  considered as  a  form  of  aid  in the 
sense of Articles 92  and  93  of the  EEC  Treaty. 
Summarizing  one  could  argue  that  although  there  were  significant 
differences in the level of support between  the member  states in the 
80s,  the  process  of  economic  convergence  is equalising  the  condi-
tions.  However  this says very little about  the effectiveness of  the 
aid  instruments.  The  workshop  concentrated  mainly  on  exchanging 
experiences  to  improve  effectiveness  of  the  forms  of  support  to 
NTBFs.  The  results of this debate is summarized  in the report of  the 
workshop. 
17 ANNEX 
A.-DIFECT FINANCIAL  AID 
· 1.-Act  di'ectly :on entapises to support 
•·  -R&D activities-Gena"al 
-Specific technological areas 
•  -Building prototypes 
•  ·-New premises 
.  ·:  •:·. ·  .. ··New ·machinery: 
·  •  -Management support 
•  -Technical capabilities 
•···  -Intellectual property 
Types·: of instruments. 
Subsidies:-non refundable  -refundable in case of success· 
Loans:·  -with low rate of interest  -with extended .duration · -non-refundable 
in case of failure 
Equity participation .(with different limits and degree of participation) 
.. Guarantees  ' 
'  .  ..  ··~ 
2...;1ndirect .. financial  aid ttrough . iritennediaries  .. 
•••· ··a.-Actions  to  reduce  the ·risk of financial  institutions.  The risk .  might:.: ne8d.<to·:  .· 
cover long term  investments  in premises,  machinery ·or  equipment, ·or :··more· 
short  term  expenditure . for  intangible  assets,  current  expenditure, .  working 
capital. 
-private  (banks,investors,  venture  capitalists,  leasing .. 
companies) 
-public or semi-public (development corporations) 
••  b.-Actions on the market and demand for innovative products 
B. FISCAL  MEASURES. 
-on the national market  . 
-on  government  and  institutional  market . 
(procurement) 
-on  the  private  market  (trade  finance  guaran-·· 
tees,  factoring) 
-on export (through export credits, trade guarantees, .foreign 
currency loans, factoring) 
1. Direct actions  on the tax burden of NllFs: 
•  -expenditure on R&D  -current expenditure or capital expenditure 
•  -expenditure on patents and licences 
•  -expenditure on machinery and premises 
•  -expenditure on technical and managerial support 
2.  Actions  on the environment  of NllFs: 
•  ·fiscal treatment of SMEs and NTBFs 
•• -fiscal treatment of risk capital 
·fiscal treatment of non-profit R&D institutions 
-fiscal treatment of equipment which incorporates new technologies 
The policy instruments and  mechanisms which  governments might use to support 
the  above  actions  might  be  very  varied  and  depend  to  a  great  extend  on  the 
composition of the general tax regime.  It includes mechanisms such as reduction .in  . 
tax· rates, the taxable base, the method of fiscal  depre~iation, tax credits, etc.  · I 






Innovation Company scheme 
Support to SME for expansion 
Scholarship scheme 
Scout scheme 
P~uct  idea support scheme 
Establishment scheme 
Professional boards initiative 
Development of new product ideas 
GERMANY:  (federal programmes) 
Business Investment for New Based Firms, BJTU 
Pilot scheme for New Technology Based Finns: TOU 
Foundation  of  NTBFs  and  incubator- and  technology 
centres, in the new Linder (TOU-NBL) 
Baden-Wiirtemberg:  Promotion  of  technology  oriented 
start ups 
Berlin:  Promotion by Innovationfund · 
GREECE:  PAVE (PAVE A,  PAVE B) 
Law 1892/90 on modernisation and development 
Venture capital companies 
SPAIN:  Joint Research Projects 
Development Projects 
Plan Tecnol6gico- Valencia 
FRANCE:  ANV AR,  Support for creation of innovative enterprises 
IRELAND:  Enterprise Development Programme 
ITALY:  Law 317 
NETHERLANDS:  Guarantee-scheme for Venture Capital Companies,  PPM 
Technical Development Credit, TOK 
Business-Oriented Technology Promotion, PBTS 
PORTUGAL  n.a. 
UK:  Small  fmns  Merit Award  for Research  and Technology, 
SMART 
Support for Products under Research, SPUR I 
BELGIUM  I COUNTRY  Belgium,  region Brussels 
Name  of Scheme:  Brust  art 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
The  government  of  the Brussels Region  assigned to the S.R.I.B.  the 
mission to create Brustart as part of  its poli~y to develop and encou-
rage Brussels's economy.  Brustart was  formally set up  on  21-12-'92. 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Schemes: 
1993  unlimited  none 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Allow  small  and  medium-sized companies  to have access to venture capital. 
Brustart provides  financing to start ups  companies  or to growing  new  companies. 
Brustart is allowed to either take  ~inority stakes  in the capital or to  lend money 
at market  rates.  Loans  are granted without  guarantees if needed;  reimbursement  can 
be deferred for  a  period of  up  to two  years.  Brustart's stake is to be  bought  back 
by  the manager  at a  later stage as decided  in the contract. 
Btustart's interventions are granted for  an average period of  7  years.  Brustart 
was  also set up  with a  view  to support management  of  these  new  firms. 
The  program is ecpected to support  100  firms  in four  years. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
no 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
none 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
The  Brussel  Region  (19  burroughs) 
Enti.ty responsible for  the budget: 
GIMB 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
GIMB Name  of Scheme:  Brustart,  Belgium 
I.  b.  Target group 
What  is the target group: 
Newly  set up  companies  or entrepreneurs willing to launch a  new  product or 
service  (with some  growth potential);  Experienced companies  willing to commercial-
ize a  new  product or service;  and  researchers who  want  to ensure that their 
product or service meets  market  needs,and need  the fund  to realise a  market  study 
and  to draft a  business plan before launching the product. 
Specific requireiiients for participation in this scheiiie: 
-Size  (turnover,  eiDployees) 











5 years old maximum 
capital has  to be  positive 
company  has  to be  located in Brussels 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securi.ng  intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc. ) 
none 
2 • 
Name  of Scheme  Brustart,  Belgium 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
Jlhat is supported? 
'rype of activities supported: 
No  specific activities are excluded 
llaxi•U61 I  •iniJmlll a.Jilounts  per project or action and/ or  reilllbursMent: 
500.000- 7.500.000  Bfr  . 
'rype of support: 
- Financial support  (in capital or loans)  for  an  average period of  5  years. 
- If needed aiding management  in the running of his company. 
- If needed,  sharing of  required consultancy costs. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
Director:  Eddy  van  Gelder 
Coordinator:Serge van  Hamme 
Financial analysts:  Fran~oise Macq  and  Barbara Roose 
Information  {phone  calls,  letters,  thick files ...  )  is received by  any  member  of 
this team  of  four people and  thereafter cases are assigned to either coprdinator 
or any  of  the financial  analysts.  They  first review  the project and  get to meet 
the managers.  They  then ask to produce so called receivability notes,  which  are 
then submitted to Brustarts Board.  These  notes present briefly the company  and  the 
project,  and  allow a  first selection to take place.  Once  and  if receivability is 
granted,  the analysis procedure starts,  whereby  a  file  (containing all sorts of 
legal documents  ~s well  as market  information)  is constituted.  More  interviews are 
done  in order to determine  the management-capacities of  the entrepreneur,  in depth 
financial analysis is carried out,  as well  as  a  market  study. 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
scheme  n.a. 
n.a. 
Other budgetary  inform~tion 
none 
II. RESULTS 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS  not yet available. 
3 COUNTRY  Belgium,  Region  Flanders 
Name  of Scheme:  Take-off  Fund  GIMV  (Regional  Investmentcompany  for  Flanders) 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a.  General  information 
~: {do  not fill in) 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
In operation since:  Life of the Schellle:  Previous Schellles: 
1989 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Take-off  fund:  Offer start-up finance  for  growth or product-diversification 
Seed-capital  fund:  Finance seed-phase of  innovative projects  /new  firms, 
to test feasibility leading to possibilities for start-up finance. 
Have  the goals been changed during the impleiDentation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Relation with other programmes:.(is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Seed-capital .fund  was  sponsored by  EC  fund? 
The  Seed  Capital  Fund  for the Kempen,  an affiliate of  the Take-off  fund, 
received EC  Funds  for its start up. 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
preference:  Flanders 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
GIMV 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
GIMV Name  of Scheme:  Take-off  Fund 
I.b. Target group 
fihat  is the target group: 
- Management-teams  wanting to commercialise  innovative products and  services, 
also for making  a  business plan; 
- Researchers wanting to commercialise a  product or prototype, 
- Study-consortia,  preceding the establishment of  a  firm,  which  depends  on  wether 
feasibility-study or product-development proves viability of 
the product  for  commercialization. 
Take-of  fund:  Firms  that'started less than  3 years  ago  (not real-estate,  or 
small shops) 
Seed-capital  fund  for  the  Kempen:  Companies  established not more  than 2  years 
ago,  with the intention to commercialise  innovative products and  services. 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size (turnover,  employees) 
-sectors,  branches 
-technology 
-age/investlll.ent stage  age:  seed-capital 
-specific probleiiJS 
-geographical aspects  - preference:  Flanders; 
tor the seed-capital  fund  for  the kempen: 
Kempenregion 
-others 
Other selection criteria: 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
2 I 
Name  of Scheme  Take-off  fund 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
flhat is supported? 
'.l'ype of activities supported: 
lfaxiBIUIII  I  BliniBIUIII  a1110unts  per project or action and/ or  reilllburseiilellt: 
In general  small  amounts,  but in some  specific start-ups also substantial amounts 
(e.g.  investments  in health  care) 
'.l'ype of support:  (describe the type of  support to NTBF's  .Example:  financial 
support provided directly  or indirectly through  investment  companies.  It might 
take  the  form  of  early stage seed equity funding  ,  soft loans,  grants or guaran-
tees.  Assistance in definition of  product,  securing intellectual property rights, 
business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
-early stage seed equity.funding 
- management  assistance 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the ·target group). 
- GIMV's  network 
- own  contacts 
- requests  from  researchers,  businessmen etc. 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
scheiiJ.e 
Other budgetary information 
3 Name  of Scheme:- Take-off  Fund 
II. RESULTS 












3  equity participations 
convertible obligation 
3  equity participation 
convertible obligations 
equity participations 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Observations 
One  portfolio company  of  the Seed 
capital fund  for  the Kempen  has 
already been sold. 
(9.000.000)  Bfr. 
(2.000.000)  Bfr. 
(4.000.000  - 70.000.000)  Bfr. 
(2.000.000)  Bfr. 
(3.210.000  - 29.000.000)  Bfr. 
Brief SUlllllliJry of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
Take  off  fund  is to young  to draw  major  conclusions yet. 
The  importance of  management  as selection criterium 
Strong  follow-up efforts necessary. 
4 COUNTRY  Belgium 
Name  of Scheme:  Innovative companies 
!._DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
~: (do  not fill in) 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
"Recovery"  Law  of July  31,  1984 
In operation since: 
1984 
Stated goals of the scheJile: 
Life of the Scheiile: 
The  law  was  abolished in 
1990,  ahead of  time 
Previous Scheaes: 
Confer  fiscal advantages  to stock holders,  employees  and  the company  itself in the 
case of  the creation of  small  innovative companies  (i.e.  exploiting themselves  a 
proprietary new  technology)  which  were  considered as the major  guarantee for 
permanent  industrial activities in Belgium. 
Have  the goals been changed during the impleiilentation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) · 
NO 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
In the same  period of  the  "RECOVERY"  law,  the Belgian Government  created also the 
scheme  of  the  "EMPLOYMENT  ZONES"  and  of  the  "COORDINATION  C;ENTRES". 
All  three  formulas  aim  at the growth of  stable economical  activities and  employ-
ment  in Belgium. 
Geographical  coverage:  (national,  regional) 
Belgium 
Entity responsible for the budget:  I  (Fiscal exemptions) 
Entity responsible  for implementation:  Ministry of  Finance Name  of Scheme:  Innovative companies 
I.b. Tarqet qroup 
fihat is the target group: 
Newly  created,  small,  innovative and  technologically and  industrially autonomous 
companies. 
Private capital investors:  individuals,  venture capital companies 
personnel of  the  innovative companies 
Specific requireaents for participation in this sches~e: 
-Size  (turnover,  eaployees  J 






Other selection criteria: 
max.  99  employees 
all 
must  be  new  high-technology processes 
·created between  1984- 1993 
national coverage:  all activities undertaken in 
Belgium;  only sales and  service activities allowed 
abroad. 
the  firm should be  dedicated solely to the exploi-
tation and  commercialization of  the innovative 
processes,  and  should be  autonomous  in all develop-
ment  stages 
New  applications are needed  for  every new  process, the company  exploits 
The  innovative company  can not receive tax reduction if it benefits from  other 
support schemes:  no  cumulation of  support 
The  evaluation of  the technology  (new,  innovative and  autonomous)  had  to lead to a 
unanimous  positive advice  from  a  panel  of  experts  from  3 ministries: 
for  Economic  Affairs  (IRSIA-IWONL),  Science Policy and  SME.  The  final descision 
was  made  by  the Minister of  Finance. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
2 Name  of, Scheme  Innovative companies 
I.  c.  Organization and  Implementation 
What  is supported? 
'l'ype of activities supported: 
starting new  technological  innovative firms 
investing in such firms 
llaxilllWI I  111inimW1  a111ounts  per project or action and/ or  reilllburseiilent: 
'l'ype of support: 
Fiscal exemptions: 
- on  firm-income  for a  10-years period,  in the first  13  years of  the firms 
existence,  max  13%  of  invested capital 
- on  value added  for  firms  founded  not more  than three years ago. 
- on  ROI  - for private investors  50%  income  tax reduction 
- for  employees  of  the innovative company  100%  income  tax reduction 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
After initial sensibilisation  ('84)  the scheme  was  auto catalytic.  A small 
committee,  with representatives  from  the  4 ministries involved,  assessed the 
granting of  the statute to the companies  which  applied for it. 
'l'otal  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
scheiile 
Not  available  (fiscal) 
Other budgetary information 
3 • 
Name  of Scheme:  Innovative companies 
II. RESULTS 







9  (abolished) 
I 
In total:  ±  260  applicants.over 
the years 84-90 
III. EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 




The  scheme  was  a successful  'focal point'  f9r venture capitalists, 
for  'entrepreneurs'  within big companies,  for  fostering  innovation in-
general 
various dichotomies:  size limitation vs employment;  autonomy  vs 
corporate strategy;  innovative technology during  10  years  vs diversi-
fication 
4 COUNTRY  Belgium,  Flemisch Government 
Name  of Scheme:  Support to  SME  for expansion 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a.  General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Law  04  08  78 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheiiie: 
aug.  1990 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Give  stimuli to regional  SME- among  others especially 
- for  investments  leading to increase of  employment 
Previous Scheiiies: 
- extra support  for strategically important  firms e.g.  high-tee 
- extra support for establishment of  new  firms  by  young  entrepreneurs 
Have  the goals been  changed during the i•plementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Geographical coverage:  Flanders region 
aEnti ty responsible for the budget: 
Krediet voor  de nijverheid  (Creditbank for  the small-self employed} 
Entity responsible for imple111entation: . . 
·Name  of Scheme:  expansion support to  SME 
I .b. Target group 
What  is the target group: 
- Young  entrepreneurs  <  35  year who  want  to start their own  business 
- Established SME  - who  want  to invest for expansion 
- or start production of high-tee products or use high-tee 
proces 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheiM: 
for established firms: 
-Size (turnover,  e111ployees) 






40  employees  max.  for trading companies, 
50  "  for other firms 
turnover max.  300  mln  Bfr/year 
For  high-tee firm:  strategic importance if the 
process or product is rare in Flanders region. 
If one  of  these required measures  is exeeded,  the firm falls under the law 
concerning expansion of  large firms. 
Other selection criteria: 
For start support: 
entrepreneurs must  be  under  35  years of  age, 
not  have  started a  firm before, 
be owner/director of  the firm 
and  hold majority of  shares for at least 5 years to come. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
•  fiscal  exemptions 
2 Name  of Scheme  expansion support to  SME 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
flhat is supported?  Investments  in 
'rype of activities supported:  - fixed assets:  land,  buildings 
- capital goods:  machinery 
- immaterial  goods:  patents,  market  reorganization 
ecology researches. 
llaxiiiiUill I  llliniiiiUill uounts per project or action and/ or  reilllburseiiJ.ent: 
percentage of  investment 
for new  high-tee entrepreneurs 
for strategic important  firms 
'rype of support: 
3%  (min  800.000) 
3-6%  (min.  3.000.000) 
Investments  may  be  financed with own  or external money 
Investment  <  50%  with own  finance,  will be  supported via rent-support: 
3  payments/year 
Investment  >  50%  own  finance  - rent support  for  the externally  financed part 
+  premium  paid directly to firm 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
Firms  apply at Krediet  aan de nijverheid. 
'l'otal  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
scheiiJ.e 
Other budgetary information 
3 • 
Name  of Scheme:  expansion support to  SME 
II. RESULTS 





Other 111easures~ents of results (per 
year) 
Bottlenecks 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
l:tTaluator: 
Brief SWlllllary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  econo111ic  effects, 
etc: 
4 I 
DENMARK  I 
.. COUNTRY  Denmark 
Name  of Scheme:  The  Scholarship Scheme 
I. DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Part of  coordinated support programme  for entrepreneurs and  small 
businesses under  the Ministry of  Industry,  represented by  the 
National  Agency  for  Industry and Trade. 
In operation since:  Life of the ScheiiJe:  Previous ScheiiJes: 
1982  Still' in operation 
Stated goals of the scheiiJe: 
To  promote  the establishment of  new  Danish production companies 
with a  high content of  technology or know-how. 
Have  the goals been  changed during the impleiiJentation of the scheiiJe:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
No 
Relation  wi~h other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
It is an  independent  programme,  but works  closely together with the start-up 
scheme  and  the Grants  Scheme  for  working  up  high-potential product  ideas. 
Geographical coverage:  National 
Entity responsible for  the budget:  DTI/Danish  Innovation Centre 
Entity responsible for implementation:  DTI/Danish  Innovation Centre Name  of Scheme:  The  Scholarship Scheme,  Denmark 
I.b. Target group 
ffhat is the target group: 
Private individuals with particulary prom1s1ng  product  ideas  who  wish 
to start their own  production business. 
Specific requirelllents for participation in this scheiile: 
-Size  (turnover,  elllployees  J 
-sectors,  branches 





Other selection criteria: 
Other promoted activities:  (examples:  consultancy  in, definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Yes,  comprising all the examples  mentioned.  , 
2 Name  of Scheme  The  scholarship Scheme,  .Denmark 
I.  c.  Organization and Implementation 
What  is supported? 
'l'ype of activities supported: 
The  scholarship covers subsistence for  a  maximum  of  2  years, 
plus counselling from  the scheme  administration.  In this period the scholar should 
document  and establish the basis for setting up  a  new  business. 
NaxilllWII  I  minl.mWII  amounts per project or action and/ or  reilllburselllent: 
Maximum  support:  1  Mln  DKK,  minimum:  175.000  DKK 
Type of support: 
Apart  from  the direct financial  support to subsistence  (the scholarship),  up  to 
50.000  DKK  is granted to cover expenses  for external  technical,  commercial,  legal 
or property right counselling. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
In cooperation petween the applicant and  the secretariat the latter sets up  an 
application. to be presented before a  grants committee  under  the National  Agency 
for  Industry  and  Trade.  Through  close contact and quarterly reports the secre-
tariat monitors  the scholar's development  of  the project. 
·Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
scheme 
Budget  1993:  6 mill.  DKK 
25,5  mill.  DKK 
Other budgetary information 
3 Name  of Scheme:  Scholarschip scheme,  Denmark 
II.  RESULTS 
NUIIlber  of fii711S  involved 
1988  7 
1989  9 
1990  6 
1991  9 
Other .measurements of results (per 
year) 
The  total employment  created,  includ-
ing subsuppliers,  is 280  in  1991  (38 
surviving companies  out of  62). 
Average  employment  rate 
after  1-2  years:  5.3 
after 7-8  years:  12.3 
Bottlenecks 
Additional  equity capital financing. 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Observations 
In average,  55%  of  the turnover  in 
exporting scholarschip businesses comes 
from  export. 
Brief slJllllllary  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
• 
4 COUNTRY  Denmark 
Name  of Scheme:  The  scout  scheme 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
\ 
~.a. General  information  Looking  up  of  product  ideas in research centres 
'l'ype: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Act  of  business development 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheiiie:  Previous Scheiiies: 
About  1980  ongoing 
Stated goals of the scheiiie: 
To  promote  development  of  product  ideas emerging  as  spin off  from  research work. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheiiie:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and learning process) 
No 
Relation with other prograiiiilles:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or  initiative) 
Part of  entrepreneur  including inventor programme 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
•  National 
Entity responsible for the budget: 
The  National  Agency  of  Trade  and  Industry 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
Danish Technology  Institute Name  of Scheme:  The  scout  scheme,  Denmark 
I .b. Target group 
fihat is the target group: 
Researchers  and  research centres 
Specific reqt~.irements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees) 






Other selection criteria: 
Other pro•oted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
- examination of  novelty 
- securing intellectual property rights 
- assistance to licencing negotiations 
2 Name  of Scheme  The  scout  scheme,  Denmark 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
flhat is supported? 
'l'ype of activities supported: 
See:  other promoted activities 
llaximUlll I  minilllUlll aJ/lounts per project or action and/ or  reimbursement: 
No  limitation 
'l'ype of support: 
Management  and  technical 
See:  other promoted activities 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
Consultants visit the research centres,  searching for  product  ideas. 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the 
scheme 
200.000  ECU  pr.  year 
Other budgetary information 
Expenditure per year 
3 Name  of Scheme:  The  scout scheme,  Denmark 
II.  RESULTS 
Nuaber of firtllS involved 
1988 
1989.  About  7%  of  the ideas 
1990  are licenced  to 
1991  enterprises 
Other measurements of results (per 
year) 
Bottlenecks 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Observations 
Brief sUllllllary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  econolllic effects, 
etc: 
Not  available. 
4 COUNTRY  DENMARK 
Name  of Scheme:  The  Product  Ideas  Support  Scheme 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
'l'ype: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Part of  coordinated support programme  for  entrepreneurs and  small 
businesses under  the Ministry of  Industry/t~e National  Agency  for 
Industry and  Trade 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheille:  Previous Scheilles: 
1982  Still in operation  PROFEO,  start 1972 
Stated goals of the scheJIIe: 
To  improve  product  renewal  and  competitiveness  of  Danisch  industry 
through licensing of product  ideas  from  Danish private individuals 
to industry. 
Have  the goals been changed during the impleillentation of the scheJIIe:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
No 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
The  scheme  works  as the natural extension of  the Technology  Scout  Scheme, 
the aim  of  which  is to identify commercially applicable scientif,ic research at 
Danish universities. 
Geographical coverage:  national 
Entity responsible for the budget:  DTI/Danish  Innovation Centre 
Entity responsible for impleillentation:  DTI/Danish  Innovation Centre Name  of Scheme:  The  Product _Ideas  Support  Scheme,  Denmark 
I .b.  Tarqet qroup 
What  is the  target group: 
Source target group.  Danish private inventors. 
End  target group:  Danish companies 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees  J 






Other selection criteria: 
- Documentation  by  the  inventor of his rights 
to the product  idea. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training, ,etc.) 
2 Name  of Scheme  The  Product  Ideas  Support  Scheme,  Denmark 
I.e. Organization and  Implementation 
fthat  is supported? 
Type of activities supported: 
Technical documentation, 
p~eliminary market  surveys, 
setting up  and  filing of patent application, 
legal assistance in setting up draft contract, 
contract negotiation. 
HaximUlll  I  111inimUlll  amounts per project or action and/ or  reilllbursement: 
Maximum:  300,000  DKK 
Minimum:  10,000  DKK 
Type of support: 
The  scheme  covers cost in connection with external consultancy,  advisory 
assistance from  DIC  test, _materials  and  prototype development.  In case of 
failure,  i.e.  no  licence contract being made,  the state bares  the whole  risk. 
In case of  success,  the  inventor repays  what  has  been  spent on  his project  through 
DIC,  on  behalf  of  the scheme,  deducting the amount  from  his license fee. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
The  DIC  administers all activities and  payments  under  the scheme,  in cooperation 
with the  inventor  and  based on  an  agreed action plan.  Informal  applications  for 
support are handled every  two  weeks  in a  committee  of  DIC~staff members  and  a 
representative  from  the National  Agency  for  Industry and  Trade. 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the 
ScheiBe 
approx.  30  mill  DKK 
Other budgetary information 
Expenditure per year 
1992  ·  6.3  mill  DKK 
3 Name  of Scheme:  The  Product  Ideas  Support  Scheme,  Denmark 
II. RESULTS 
Nulllber of firms involved  Observations 
1988.  100 
1989  115 
1990  97 
1991  140 
Other measurements of results (per 
year) 
Bottleneclcs 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief SWillllary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  econOIDic  effects, 
etc: 
The  scheme  is being evaluated at present. 
4 COUNTRY  DENMARK 
Name  of Scheme:  The  establishment scheme 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information  Counselling to entrepreneurs at reduced rates 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Act  of  business development 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheae: 
about  1980  ongoing 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Counselling to entrepreneurs at reduced rates 
To  ensure a  better start for new,  small  firms 
Previous Schellles: 
_Have  the goals been changed during the i•plelllentation of the schellle:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
No 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Part of  the entrepreneur and  inventor programme 
Geographical coverage:  National 
Entity responsible for the budget: 
The  national Agency  of  Industry and  Trade 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
Danish Technological  Institute Name  of Scheme:  The  establishment scheme,  Denmark 
I.b~ Target group 
What  is the target group: 
New  starters and  companies  not  more  than three years old. 
Specific requireiilents for participation in this scheme: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees) 
-sectors,  branches  - manufacturing companies  · 
-technology  - and  technology  and  knowledge  based  on~ service 
-specific problelllS  enterprises. 
-age/invest:IIlent stage 
-geographical aspects 
-others  - Development  oriented companies 
Other selection criteria: 
Other promoted activities:  {  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.} 
I.e.  Organization and  Implementation 
What  is supported? 
TY.Pe  of activities supported: 
Consultancy services 
HaximWII  I  minimWII  amounts per project or action and/ or  reimbursement: 
No  limitation 
TY.Pe  of support: 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
I  involved,  how  they  reach  the ·target group). 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
scheme 
Other budgetary information 
2 Name  of Scheme:  The  establishment  scheme,  Denmark 
II. RESULTS 
NWIIber of firiiJS  involved  Observations 
1988  ca.  450 
1989  ca.  500 
1990  ca.  400 
1991  ca.  600 




III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief SUlllliiiJry  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
n.a. 
3 COUNTRY  Denmark 
Name :of .  Scheme:  Initiative on  Professional Boards 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information  Promote  the use of professional boards  in small  firms 
'rype: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Act  on  business development 
In operation since:  Life of the ScheiiJe:  Previous ScheiiJes: 
1993  two  years 
Stated goals of the scheiiJe: 
Promote  the use of professional boards  in small  firms 
Have  the goals been changed during the impleiilentation of the scheiiJe:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Part of  entrepreneurs and  inventors program 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
National 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
The  agency  of  Industry  and  Trade 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
The  Agency  of  Industry and  Trade Name  of Scheme:  Initiative on  Professional  Boards,  Denmark 
I.b. Target group 
flbat is the target group: 
Small  enterprises 
Specific requireiBents for participation in this scheme: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees) 




-geographical aspects  No  limitation 
-others 
Other selection criteria: 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
2 Name  of Scheme  Initiative -on  Professional  Boards,  Denmark 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
What  is supported? 
'rype of activities supported: 
See  type of  support 
llaxiiiiWII I  minimWil  amounts per project or action and/ or  reimbursement: 
'rype of support: 
Promotive campaigns,  directed at companies  and potential boards  members 
Education of  intermediares supporting activities: 
Information materials 
Database on  professional board members. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group}. 
The  scheme  has not  yet started 
'l'otal  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per y~ar 
scheme 
350.000  ECU 
700.000  ECU 
Other budgetary information 
II.  RESULTS  No  results,  for  scheme  has not yet started. 
no  further  pages. 
3 COUNTRY  Denmark 
Name  of Scheme:  Development  of  new  product  ideas 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
I 
~= (do  not fill in) 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Law  of  Industry and  Trade development 
In operation since:  Life of the Schellle:  Previous Sche111es: 
beginning  1990  no  limit  no 
Stated goals of the  sche~~~e: 
The  aim  of  providing grants for entrepreneurs and  small  companies  is,  to ensure 
that more  new  co~panies are set up  and  that these new  entrepreneurs are particu-
larly creative and  have  strong growth  potent~ial.  These  measures  will not  only 
benefit Denmark  exports and  employment  situation in the longer  term,  but should 
also be  seen as  an  important contribution towards  the rejuvenation of  Danish 
industry. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implelllentation of the sche111e:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
no 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or  initiative} 
Yes:  -entrepreneurs and  new  production:  an offer to entrepreneurs and  people with 
new  product  ideas, 
- advise on  small-business establishment, 
- co-funding in the establishment phase, 
- co-funding of  new,  promising product-ideas. 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
Denmark,  (Greenland and  Faroe  Islands not  included) 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
The  National  Agency  of  Industry and  Trade 
Entity responsible tor implementation: 
The  National  Agency  of  Industry and  Trade Name  of Scheme:  Development  of  new  product  ideas,  Denmark 
I.  b.  Targe~ group 
fihat is the target group: 
Entrepreneurs and  small companies 
Specific requirelllents for participation in this schellle: 
-Size  (turnover,  eaployees  J 
-sectors,  branches 
-technology 
-age/  investment stage 
-specific probleiiiS 
-geographi'cal aspects 
Other selection criteria: 
Less  than  SO  employees 
Combination of:  special  technologies,  specialist 
knowledge  and  promising marketing prospectives. 
Maximum  3  years of  age. 
Applicants must  be able to demonstrate that: 
- The  product-idea has  a~ exiting technical and  commercial  potential, 
The  grant will enable the applicant to manage  the project in terms of  the 
technical,  financial  and  commercial  framework, 
Any  technical or commercial  grants are of  a  nature which  makes  a  grant 
imperative if the entrepreneur is to be able to see the project through. 
A substantial proportion of  future  revenue earning from  the product must  be 
attributable to exports. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
The  project development  must  be  described as a  project  to qualify  for consider-
ation.  Information must  be  submitted specifying which  stage the  idea currently is 
in,  the  type of activities the applicant  intends to undertake and  what  the aims 
are.  Applicants must  submit  a  schedule in respect of  the above  work  as well  as  a 
budget  which  relates to the  implementation  schedu~e in such a  way  as  to make  early 
deviation easily detectable.  Applicants must  submit  a  business-plan. 
2 Name  of Scheme  Development  of  new  product  ideas,  Denmark 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
·What  is supported? 
~  of activities supported: 
Applications are invited with respect to actual costs,  connected with the project, 
such as the entrepreneurs salary,  staff salaries,  consultancy  fees,  materials, 
special equipment.  However,  funding will not normally be available for capital 
investments. 
Applications are invited in respect of  the preliminary stage of  a  development 
project.  This  would  cover essential activities relating to the documentation phase 
which will help the company  reach a  stage from  where  it is able to seek funding 
form  the private capital market.  Thus  the grant might  cover a  period from  concep-
tion to,  if necessary  ,  up  to the product preparation phase. 
lfaJCilllWII  I  DiinilllWII  a.ounts per project or action and/ or  reilllbursement: 
Minimum  normal 
Maximum  normal 
Maximum  exceptional 
Type of support: 
10.000  ECU 
67.000  ECU 
200.000  ECU  (1ECU  = 7,5  DKK) 
Grants,  normally up  to  50%  of  project costs. 
With  projects where  the grants are over  67.000  ECU  ,  and  the results are exploited 
commercially,  the subsidy  (over  67.000  ECU)  shall be  repaid  in the  form  of  royalty 
on  the .sales. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
Total  cost over the lifetiDie of the 
scheme 
Expenditure per year 
1990  2.1  Mln.  ECU 
90-92:  13.800  Mln.  ECU  1991  4,4  Mln. 
1992  7,3 
1993  3,2  approx.  (budget) 
Other budgetary information 
Running  costs approx.  105.000  ECU  per year. 
3 Name  of Scheme:  Development  of  new  product  ideas,  Denmark 
II.  RESULTS 
NUIIlber  of firms involved  Observations 








or small  companies) 
I  58 
I  58 
I  1  OS 
Other measurelllents of results (per 
year) 
Distribution of grants with respect to 
firm size: 
number  of  applications  I  grants 
employees 
0  - 3  62,8%  I  67,5% 
4  - 6  13,8%  I  13,6% 
7  - 9  5,6%  I  5,3% 
0  - 49  16,6%  I  13,0% 
>49  1, 1%  I  0,6% 
Bottlenecks 
Lack  of  money,  especially in 1993. 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator:  An  external evaluator will be  used. 
Brief summary  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
An  evaluation has not  been done  yet,  because only  98  projects have  ended  so far. 
4 I 
GERMANY  .  I COUNTRY  GERMANY 
Name  of Scheme:  Pilot scheme  "  Business  Investment Capital  for  New 
Technology  - Based  Firms"  (BJTU} 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
'l'ype: 
Reference to legal basis..: 
Richtlinie 
In operation since:  Life of the Schellle:  Previous Schellles: 
1989  5  years 
Pilot scheme  "support of 
New  Technology  Based 
Firms"  (  TOU) . 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
- To  encourage Venture- and  Business  Investment companies  to early 
investments  {seed-,  start up) 
- To  enable  learning processes with  investors,  for  the best practice· 
of  acquisition assessment  and  management  assistance of  NTBFs 
- To  find out,  whether  there is a  level of  necessary public  involvement 
in the venture capital market  to ensure an  adequate supply of  capital  for early 
stage investments. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
National 
Entity responsible for the budget: 
BMFT 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
Kreditanstalt fur  Wiederaufpau  (KfW},  Frankfurt 
Deutsche  Ausgleichsbank,  Bonn  (DtAB} 
.· Name  of Scheme :  BJTU  Germany 
I .b.  Target group 
llhat is the target group: 
Investments  companies,  private investors etc., 
which  invest in a  NTBF  not more  than  3  years of  age 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees  J 






Other selection criteria: 
New  and/or  innovative technology 
Seed  +  start up  stage of  NTBF 
R&D  and  market  introduction 
- Background  of  the founder/team:  professional orientation in the same  industry; 
market  orientation;  capabilities to manage  a  fast growing  NTBF. 
- Market  potential for  the  innovative products:  special advantage  in technological 
competition;  market potential to growth  and  to achieve a  stable market 
position;  strategies to overcome  market barriers;  potential to create a 
competitive portfolio of  products and  services. 
- Financial status:  role of  the participation  (fresh money  to finance  R&D  and 
market entry/penetration expenditures vs.  removal  of current financial 
gaps);  realistic planning of  the expected financial  requirements; 
financial  reserves for unexpected expenditures. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
2 Name  of Scheme  BJTU  Germany 
I.e. Organization and  Implementation 
What  is supported? 
'rype of activities supported: 
llaxilllUIII I  lllinilllUIII  a111ounts  ~r  project or action and/ or  reilllburse111ent: 
KfW-model:  - refinancing of  an  investment in a  NTBF  up  to  1 Million  OM 
~  - 90%  release from  liability 
tbg-model:  - dormant  holding up  to  1 Million  OM 
~ NTBF  can get:  - 1  Mln.  OM  via  Kfw  (investment by  1 company) 
- 2  Mln.  DM  via  tbg-model 
'rype of support: 
See  appendix 
structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors  involved,  how  they 
reach the target group). 
BJTU  is carried out  in  two  models:  The  Co-investment,  and  the Refinancing-model. 
The  Refinancing model  is carried out by  the Kreditanstalt  fur  Wiederaufbau  KfW, 
which  makes  loans available for  investment  companies,  with up  to  90%  release from 
liability,  which  serves the refinancing of  investments to the  NTBFs. 
The  other is carried out by  the tbg,  a  subsidiary of  the OtAB,  which will enter 
into dormant  holdings with NTBFs,  to which at least an other investor must  equally 
be committed,  with an  investment of at least the same  amount  (cooperative 
investor)  .. 
Total  cost over the lifetillle of the  EJcpendi ture per year 
scheiiie 
50  Mln.  have  been  invested by  Kfw 
150  Mln.  invested in each scheme,  30  Mln.  by  the  tbg-model 
adds  up  to a  sum  af  300  Mln.  Om.  (1989- 1992/9) 
Other budgetary information 
3 Name·  of Scheme :  BJTU  Germany 
II.  RESULTS 
NUIIIber  of firiiJS  involved (cumulative)  Observations 
Refipance,  coinvestmentmodel 
1988 
1989  4  4 
1990  21  20 
1991  39  60 
1992-9  42  144 
(see appendix  2) 
Other measurements of results (per  -
year) 
BottlenecJcs 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief SUillJIIary  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 





• • • • • • • • • •  • 
transfer of capital 
assumption of risk 
interest payment 
management support 
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transfer of capital 

















































































































































































































































































































































BJTU-Germany  Appendix  3 
Criteria for investment seiection 
Background of the founder/founder team: 
,  o- professional experience in the same industry 
j  . 
j  o  market orientation 
I 
1  o  capabilities to manage a fast growthing NTBF 
1 
(e.g. :o negotiate and cooperate with different 
types of pa~ers, to motivate the employees) 
Market potential for the innovative products: 
6  special advantages in technoiogicai competition 
I 
I 
i  o  market potential to growth and to achieve a sta-
ble market position 
o  strategies to overcome·market barriers 
o  potential to create a competitive portfolio of pro-
ducts and services 
Financial status of the NTBF:  ! 
;  o  role of the participation: fresh money to finance 
R&D  and market entry/penetration expenditures 
vs.  removal of current financial gaps 
'  o  realistic planning of the, expected financial requi-
rements 














I BJTP  Germany  appendix  4 
Grants ·by different types of investment companies in 
both models {concerning the amount of investments) 
KfW 
seed  capital 
companies  15  X 
venta.n capital 
companies  3  X 
MBGs,  funds of the 
federal  Lander 34 7. 
privat investors and 
enterprises 0  X 
tbg 
seed  capital 
companies 42  ~ 
investment companies 
of banks,  insurance  comp  •• 
enterprises  0  ~ 
banks  (incl. saving 
and  privat banks)  0  ~ 
banks (incl. saving 
and  privat banks) 25 X 
investment companies 
of banks.  insu"anCe  comp  •• 
enterprises 8  X 
investment companies 
of saving banks  15  X 
privat investors and 
enterprises  8  X 
investment companies 
of saving banks  6  X 
MBGs.  funds of the 
federal  Lander 8  X 
venture  capital 
companies  36  ~ 
"-• 
COUNTRY  Germany 
Name  of Scheme:  Pilot scheme  for  New  Technology-Based  Firms:  TOU 
(Technologie-Orientierte Unternehmensgrlindungen) 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
~= (do  not fill in) 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Richtlinie 
In operation since: 
beginning  4/83 
Life of the Scheme: 
end  31-12-88 
Previous Schemes: 
Promotion of  the Deutsche 
Wagnis  Finanzierungs-
gesellschaft  (Support  of 
German  venture-capital 
firms) 
Stated goals of the scheme:  TOU  is a  'learning program'.  Aims  are:  To  find out: 
- How  to achieve a  climate favourable  to foundation  and  innovation of  NTBF, 
- problems  and demands  of  NTBFs  in their first stages of  development, 
- qualified consultancy and  assistance services for  NTBFs, 
- financial aid to improve  the start up  and  growth  for  NTBFs, 
~- how  can risk capital be stimulated to finance  NTBFs, 
»  what  are suitable instruments  I  measures  to promote  NTBFs. 
- Stimulation of starting of  NTBFS  and  supporting founders  of  NTBFs, 
- improvement  of conditions of  start-up and  growth  for  NTBFs, 
- stimulation of consulting activities;  risk capital market,  technology transfer, 
- improvement  of  environmental  conditions for  NTBFs. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  --
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Geogr~phical co~erage:  National  scheme. 
6  regions,  Berlin,  Hamburg,  Ruhrgebiet,  Saarland,  Karlsruhe/Pfalzheim, 
Ost-Bayern. 
15  technology centres 
National:  Biotechnology-,  micro-electronics and  Risk capital variant 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
Federal Ministry  for  R&D  (BMFT) 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
8  Technology  consultancy agencies  (Technologieberatungsstellen tbs) Name  of Scheme :  TOU  Germany 
I .b. Target group 
flhat is the target group: 
NTBFs  that started less than 3  years ago. 
Specific requireDJents for participation in this schellle: 
-Size  (turnover,  e111ployees J 
-sectors,  branChes 
-technology 




Other selection criteria: 
less than  10  employees 
company  not more  than  3  years old,  seed + start-up 
stage 
region of  the 8  tbs  (6  regions) 
located in one  of  the  15  technology-centres 
national:  - biotechnology  I  micro-electronics 
- commitment  of  a  risk-capital company. 
- innovative products,  processes or services,  based on  new  or advanced 
technology,  or  improved  new  product based on  new  technology. 
- viability 
- 50'%  share of  the starter, 
25%  share of  the starter with technological  know-how. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
see  type of  support 
2 ' 
Name  of Scheme  TOU  Germany 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
Jlhat is supported? 
'l'ype of activities supported: 
llaxi.IIIWII  I  •ini•WII aaounts per project or action and/ or  reimburseaent: 
Stage I:  Financial support  for contracts with experts who  help to develop a 
business plan 
(up  to om.  60.000) 
Stage II:  Non-reimbursble grants  for  finance of  the development  costs, 
(to a  maximum  of  750.000;  75%  of  max.  1  Mln  Dm.  R&D  costs) 
Stage III:  Guarantees  for bank  loans to finance  the cost of  the production 
facilities and  introduction on  the market. 
(  maximum  80%  of  up  to  1  Mln.  Om) 
Type of support: 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
The  pilote scheme  was  carried out via  5  regionally active technological 
consultancy agencies,  two  techn.  oriented management  agencies,  15  selected 
technology and  incubator centres and via investment  companies. 
The  consultancy agencies were  responsible  for selection and  consulting of  the 
NTBFs  that were  promoted. 
Total,cost over  the lifetime of  the 
scheme 
210.157  000  OM 
Other budgetary information 
I 
Expenditure per year 
1983  598  x  1000  OM 
84  9.571 
85  25.553 
86  39.841 
87  43.401 
88  37.970 
89  37.979 
90  27. 120 
91  10.890 
92  8.640 
3 Name  of Scheme :  TOU  Germany 
II. RESULTS 
Nulllber of firms involved 
(Cumulative over period  1983  - 1988) 
overview dated 31-12-1991 
Stage I  258  firms;  106  only this 
stage. 
stage II  373 
stage III  97  (14  of which not  in 
stage II) 
Other 111easureiilents  of results (per 
year) 
Relevenace  of various ways  to enter the 
scheme,  in % participating NTBFs. 
see appendix. 
Bottleneck.s 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Observations 
Stage  I 
stage II 
7,6 mln.  OM  involved 
240,2  Mln.  OM  subsidies 
(319) 
5,3 Mln.  OM  guarantees  (54) 
stage III  90, 9  Mln.  OM 
Brief summary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  econolllic effects, 
etc: 
failure rates  '87  88  89  90  91 
(by  the end of 
number  of  firms 
·With  completed  11 3  163  243  281  317 
development  phase 
of  which: 
succesfull  87%  83%  81%  7'7%  74% 
change of activitites 
or base-line existence  8%  8%  8%  12%  12% 
stopped  5%  9%  11%  11%  14% 
, 
4 COUN'l'RY  Germany 
Name  of Scheme:  Foundation of NTBF' s  and incubator- and technology centres, 
in the new  Lander  (TOU-NBL.}  PILOTE  SCHEME 
I. DESCRIPTION. OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
~: (do  not fill in) 
~  Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Richtlinie 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Schemes: 
1991  1994 
I 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
- promotion of NTBF's 
- development  of  an efficient structure  (environmental}  supporting NTBF's 
- stimul~t~on of regional  technology centres 
-development and  testing of different activities for  the promoting of  NTBF's 
in the specific situation of  the new  Lander 
- stimulation of  'learning-effects'  of  the different actors. 
Have  the goals been changed during the i111plementation  of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
I 
New  Lander 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
Bundes  Ministerium fur  Industrie  (Federal  Ministry  for  Industry) 
Entity responsible for i111plementation: 
VDI/VDE  Technologiezentrum Berlin  (Technology  centre Berlin) 
The  pilot scheme  is also  carries out by  the VDI/VDE.  Cf.  TOU 
Other  information on  the scheme  CF  ·TOU-scheme  Germany 
no  more  pages COUNTRY  Baden-Wurtemberg  Germany 
Name  of Scheme:  Promotion of  technology oriented start ups 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
~= Regional  program by  Bundesland  Baden-Wurtemberg 
Reference to legal basis: 
Guideline  from  Ministry  ~f Industry,  Trade,  and  Technology,  for  the 
adjudgement  of prizes for  the development  of  new  products and processes. 
according to the Innovation-support program. 
+  Guideline  from  Ministry for  ITT  for restructuring of  firms. 
Regulation of  the Mittelstandische Beteiligungsgesellschaft  (MBG  BAWU)  and  the 
Burgschaftsbank Baden-Wurtemberg 
In operation since:  Life of the Schellle:  Previous Schellles: 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
- increasing the numbers  of  companies  that use new  technologies 
- stimulation of  start-ups of  NTBF's 
- creation of qualified jobs 
Have  the goals been changed during the implelllentation of the scheme 
(changes  through evaluation and learning process) 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
Baden-Wurtemberg 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
Ministry of  Industry,  Trade  and  Technology  Ba-wU. • 
.. 
Name  of Scheme:  Promotion of  technology oriented start-ups,  BA-WO,  Germany 
I~b  •. Target group 
llhat is the target group: 
Starters of  companies,  which  use new  technologies 
Specific requireaents for participation in this scheiile: 
-Size  (turnover,  eiiiPloyees) 






Other selection criteria: 
new  start-up 
investment in - acquisition of  a  company  to 
introduce new  technologies 
- consolidation of  the company  within  5 years. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
What  is supported? 
Type of activities supported: 
llaxi•Ulll I  •ini•Ulll uounts per project or action and/ or  reilllbursement: 
- loans up  to  1  Mln.  om.  by  Landeskreditbank 
- investmentcapital up  to 300.000  Dm.  by  MBG  bank 
- guarantees for  loans 
Type of support:  (to NTBF) 
- grants for development  of  new  products/processes  (according  to the  innovation 
stimulation program)  up  to  50%  of  R&D  costs 
- loans up  to  15%  of  the  investments-costs concerned with the use of  new 
technologies,  according to the promotion of  new  technologies  scheme. 
Organization and structure:  · (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
2 COUNTRY  State of  Berlin,  Germany 
Name  of Scheme:  Promotion  by  Innovationfund 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General information  Berlin/FRG 
'l'ype:  (do  not fill in) 
Reference-to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
§ 264  st6B,  § 2,4  Subventionsgesetz  §  1  Landessubventionsgesetz 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Schemes: 
15  - 7  - 1991 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
- strenghten ability of  innovation in Berlin's SMEs 
- help carry risk by  risk capital 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
Berlin 
Entity responsible for the budget: 
Berliner Industriebank  AG 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
I.b.  Target group 
What  is the target group: 
SME's  & NTBF's 
Specific requirements  for participation in this scheme: 
-Size (turnover,  employees)  <  50  MLn.  D~/year turnover 
-sectors,  branches 
-technology 
-age/investment stage 




Other selection criteria: 
Eventually no  promotion if Federal  promotion available 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Eventually advice Name  of Scheme:  Promotion  by  Innovationfund 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
flhat is supported? 
~- of activities supported: 
all 
llaJCi•w. I  •iniaJIII as10unts per project or action and/ or  reiaburse~~~ent: 
~  of su.pport: 
Investment,  loan,  subsidy  (evtl.  backpayable)  or combination of  these. 
" 
2 '  . 
. ~~  =============================aREE=======r:E  ============================!! COUNTRY- Greece 
Name  of Scheme:  PAVE  (PAVE  A,  PAVE  B) 
I. DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME  Programme  for  the  advancement  of  Industrial  Research 
(and  Innovation) 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference  to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Presidential Decree  558/85  modified and  complemented  by  P.O.  434/88 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Schemes: 
1985/88  on  going 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Increase the share of business enterprises in the national  R&D  effort 
Improve  liquidities in firms  spending money  for  R&D,  and.  encourage  them  to exploit, 
new  knowledge  or assimilate  imported  knowledge 
Have  the goals been  changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe · 
changes  tprough evaluation and  learning process) 
The  scheme  started in 1985  and  focussed  on  industrial  R&D  promotion.  In  1988-89  a 
segment  on  innovation  (prototype construction and  testing,  marketing studies)  was 
added. 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Since  1992  it is part of  the operational programme  for  research and  technology, 
funded  under  the Common  Support  Framework  (DG  XVI) 
Geographical coverage:  National 
Entity responsible for the budget:  General  Secretariat for  Research & Technology 
Entity responsible for implementation:  idem Name  of Scheme:  PAVE  (PAVE  A,  PAVE  B) 
I.b. Target group 
rthat is the target group: 
Productive entreprises  (private or public) 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees) 




-geographical  aspects 
-others 
Other selection criteria: 
Serious working  team 
Viable company 
Quality of  the project 
Cost/utility  (rough ratio) 
Other promoted activities:  {  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Entreprises may  sub-contract their project  (or part of it)  to a  public researcch 
centre or to a  university laboratory. 
... 
2 • 
Name  of Scheme  PAVE 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
fibat is supported? 
~  of activities supported: 
Personnel  employed  in the project,  running costs 
small  equipment,  subcontracting to universities or consultants 
Jlaxi.JinJID  I  miniliJUIII  amounts per project or action and/ or  reimburse111ent: 
Formally none 
In practice the public contribution does  not'exceed  40  million drachmae.  The 
average contribution is 1  0  to  15  million drachmae·. 
~  of support: 
Subsidy given in 2  parts  (at the beginning and  at the middle  of  the 2-year 
project).  A letter of  guarantee  from  a  bank  is given by  the company  to the 
Ministry at the beginning of  the project.  The  guarantee is equivalent to  20%  of 
the public contribution.  Is returned to the company  after finishing the project. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the. scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
Call  for proposals - evaluation of  proposals  through expert committees  - approval 
by  Minsterial decision - funding  - monitoring  (weak)  - acception of  deliverables.' 
Total cost over the lifetime of the 
sche111e 
approx.  3500  million dr . 
Other budgetary information 
Expenditure per year 
approx.  500  million dr. 
3 Name  of Scheme:  PAVE 
II. RESULTS 
NUIIIber  of firms involved 
1988  BO 
1989  100 
1990  100 
1992  150 
Other measurements of results (per 
year) 
A specific ex-post evaluation study is 




The  evaluation - approval  procedure last more  than  12  months 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Br~ef summary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
4 COUNTRY  Greece 
Name  of Scheme:  Law  1892/90  on  modernisation and  development 
I •.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General information 
'l'ype: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
• 
Act  1892/90 
In operation since:  Life of the SchMe:  Previous Schellies: 
1990  2  years  L.1262/82,  L.1360/8~ 
Stated goals of the scheiii.e: 
Promote  the investment  in Greece,  and  regional development 
Have  the goals been changed during the i111ple11entation  of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
All  the beginning emphasis  was  given to direct subsidies and  to the creation of 
new  jobs  (1982).  Later,  effectiveness/efficiency of  the  investment became  more 
important  than new  jobs.  Since  1990·only hi-tech investments are subsidezed,  the 
other are given tax incentives. 
Relation with other progriJlllllles:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Subsidies are supported throu9h the Common  Support  Framework  for  Greece. 
Geographical coverage:  National 
Entity responsible for the budget:  Ministry of  National  Economy 
Entity responsible for illlplementation: Name  of Scheme:  Law  1892/90 
I.  b.  Target group 
flh.a t  is the target group: 
Potential investors,  productive firms  undergoing modernisation 
Specific require~~~ents for participation in this schellle: 
to qualify for subsidy as hitec 
-Size  (turnover,  e111ployees J 
-sectors,  branches 
-.technology 




Other selection criteria: 
products and  services produced 
only hi-tee producing firms qualify for subsidies in 
Athens,  Thessaloniki 
Three  groups of criteria are used to qualify as hitec: 
- age of  the product or service in the international market 
- international organisation of  the company  to support hitec  (R&D  department, 
personnel) 
- marketing etc.  capabilities of  the  firm 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Most  investors use private consultants for drafting the application forms 
2 • 
Name  of Scheme  Law  1892/90 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
What  is supported? 
~  of activities supported: 
Construction of facilities,  equipment  acquisition and start up 
llax.iiiiUlll  I  mini111U111  a1110unts  per project or action and/ or  reilllbursement: 
The  percentage of grant,  varies according to the region:  Athens  and  Thessaloniki 
<  30%  of  the total cost.  In remote  regions,  it may_  theoretically go  up  to 65%.  In 
practice does  not exceed  50%.  Minimum·own  participation varies between  40%  and 
15%. 
~  of support: 
Grant,  a  percentage of  the investment,  provided by  the Ministry.  The  grant is 
combined  to bank  loans and  own  financial participation. 
Organization and structure:  {describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
The  Minister of  National Economy  and  an  Advisory  Committee  decide on  major 
investments.  Smaller  investments are  'admitted'  by  the regional  services of  the 
Ministry or by  the  EOMMEX  {small  & medium  Entreprises and  Handcrafts).  In order to 
be admitted as hitec in the scheme,  the application is evaluated by  a  committee  of 
experts  (mainly university professors)  of  the Gen.  secretariat for Research and 
Technology 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the 
scheiiie 
only  for  the hitec approvals  for  further 
consideration -73  billion Dr  (1983-1992) 
includes  loans,  subsidies and  own  par-
ticipation of  the investor 
Other budgetary information 
Expenditure per year 
7,3 bill. dr. 
min  1,6  (1985) 
max  14,8  (1989) 
3 Name  of Scheme:  Law  1892/90 
II. RESULTS 















financial  means  involved 
(volume  of  the  investment) 
1988  14 
1989  15 
1990  11 
1991  2,3 
1992  8,5  billion drachmae 
Long  last evaluation procedure.  Evaluators are university professors with little 
or no  business experience  (in  'hitec'  investments) 
No  managerial  or other assistance is provided to investors - monitoring is very 
poor.  Public funding  comes  late,  for  small  new  investors. 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief SU11Ul1ar}'  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
No  formal  evaluation is made  up  to date. 
An  estimation of  the participation of hitec on  the total budget allocations 
(approvals of  subsidies)  for  the period  1983-1987  (spring)  has  shown  that hitec 
receives less than  1%  of  the approvals. 
.. 
4 COUNTRY  Greece 
Name  of Scheme:  Venture capital companies 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
1 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
.. 
Law  1775/1988 
In operation since:  Life of the Sche61e:  Previous  Sche~~~es: 
1988  4  years 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Create a  regulatory environment  for  the operation of venture capital companies. 
Provide for public subsidies to these companies. 
Have  the goals been changed during the impleiDentation of the scheiDe:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Relation with other progriJlllliJes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Law  1262/82  modified by  law  1892/90. 
Geographical coverage:  National 
Entity responsible for  the buq.get:  Min.  of  National  Economy. 
Entity responsible for implementation:  "  "  " Name  of Scheme:  venture Capital Companies 
I.  b.  Target group 
flhat is the target group: 
at 1st level:  V.C.  companies 
at end:  entreprises investing in high technology and  innovation 
Specific requirS~e~Jts for participation in this scheae: 
-Size  (turnover,  e~~~ployees) 






Other selection criteria: 
for v.c.  companies:  total stock 500  million 
drachmae  (1ECU  = 265  dr.  approx.) 
high tech firms:  small/new 
For  the pr·oposed  investment:  hi  tee products or services, 
appropriate organisation of  the  firm  (R&D  personnel,  R&D  support services, 
marketing services). 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Every  v.c.  company  is free to organise the support to companies  "subsidised" 
2 Name  of Scheme  Venture Capital Companies 
I.  c. Organization and  Implementation 
What  is supported? 
'l'ype of activities supported: 
Provision of Venture capital for participation in the stock capital or  loans to 
hi-tee or "innovative"  firms 
I 
lfaxi61Ua  I  111inimam  a1110unts  per project or action and/ or  reilllburselllellt: 
The  v.c.  company  is allowed to participate in hitec firms  for a  max.  of  20%  of its 
stock capital by  firms.  (If the stock capital is 500  million drs the max. 
participations is 5). 
The  Min.  of  National  Economy  subsidises  30%  of  the participation of v.c.  companies 
in NTBFs  (or the corresponding in loans) 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target  gro~p). 
I 
Decision by  the Ministry of  National  Economy  for  the subsidy to the v.c.  company. 
The  General  Secretariat for Research and  Technology  evaluates  the investment to be 
supported,  and  gives its opinion to the Ministry of National Economy 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
sche111e 
Other budgetary information 
3 Name  of Scheme:  Venture Capital  Companies 
II.  RESULTS 









The  scheme  is considered as  too  "bureaucratic" by  ventur_e  capitalists.  Two  or 
three V.C.  companies  have  been  created since 1988,  with no  reference to the 
L.1775/88.  Only  one  has  applied for  subsidies of  the Law.  The  2  new  ventures 
supported are not in hitec areas. 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief summary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
4 • COUNTRY  Spain 
Name  of Scheme:  Joint Research Projects 
I. DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
'rype: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
\ 
Spanish Law  for  the Fostering and  Coordination of Technical  and  Scientific 
Development 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Schemes: 
1978  No  limit 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
To  improve  joint research between  Spanish companies  and  Spanish universities and 
Public Research Centers. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Also private research centers have  been elegible for  these projects. 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or  initiative) 
Related  to the National  Plan of  Research  and  Development 
Geographical coverage:  National 
Entity responsible for  the budget:  General  Secretariat for  National  Plan of 
Research  and  Development 
Entity responsible for implementation:  CDTI Name  of Scheme:  Joint Research Projects 
I.b. Target group 
ffhat  is the target group: 
Companies  established in Spain who  want  to do  research in a  technology still far 
from  the marktet  , 
and subcontracting R&D  facilities. 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size (tur,nover,  employees) 






Other selection criteria: 
Must  be  of scientific interest and  promise good 
future performance in the market 
- Better technical  performance  that the State of  the Art 
- Good  market possibilities 
- Financial soundness  of  the company 
- Capable management  team  to reach success 
- Good  scientific level of  the research team 
Other pro~oted activities:  (  examples:  Consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Property rights are secured  through a  new  type of  scheme  called Technology  Promo-
tion Projects 
2 Name  of Scheme  Joint Research Projects 
I.e. Organization and  Implementation 
What  is supported? 
~'of  activities supported:  R&D  expenditures and  Investments 
Naxil/lUIII  I  miililiiWII alllounts per project or action and/ or  reimburseiilent: 
No  maximum  or minimum  fixed 
Average  budget per project:  0,83  MECUS  (million ECUS) 
Loan  of  CDTI:  0,  36  MECUS  (43%  of  total budget) 
~  of support: 
- Interest free  loans 
- No  guarantees required 
- Technical risk shared with  the company  (in case of  technical  failure, 
CDTI  would  receive only  the proportional  amount  lent,  of  the sold project 
assets. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach  the  target group) .. 
Financial evaluation 
350  per year 
Application ./  8  persons 
;  ~  ;Technical Evaluation  1 
Scientifi~ evaluationv
1  ~  teams  of  8  pers.  each: 
Decision of  Board 
of  Directors: 
National  Evaluation 
Agency 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the 
scheme 
Total  loans  (1987-1992):  112  MECUS 
Total  loans  commited  by  CDTI 
period  (87/920:  202,  8  MECUS 
Other budgetary information 
I 
Approval:  114  projects 
I  Auditing  team 
1  8  persons 
Expenditure per year 
(1992  data) 
Expenditure:  31,6  MECUS 
Committed:  31,6  MECUS 
3 Name  of Scheme:  Joint Research Projects 
I·I.  RESULTS 
NUlllber of projects: Loans  Observations  total amounts  in R&D  and 
Investements  in Spain: 
1988  76  34,4  1988  68 
1989  124  41,4  1989  91,1 
1990  129  47,2  1990  111, 3 
1991  114  41,7  1991  100,8 
1992  109  31,6  1992  81,3  MECUS 
MECUS 
Other •easure~~~ents of results (per 
year) 
Bottlenecks 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator:  It is early to evaluate because a  standard project last about  5  years 
Brief sUlllliUJry  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  econ0111ic  effects, 
etc: 
• 
4 COUNTRY  Spain 
Name  of Scheme:  Development  projects 
I. .DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference  to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Spanish  Law  for  the Fostering and  Coordination of  Technical  and  Scientific 
Development 
In operation since:  Life pf the Scheme:  Previous Schemes: 
1978  No  limit 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
To  improve  the number  and quality of  the  technologies developed by  companies 
established in Spain. 
Have  the goals been  changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
We  have  changed  the target technology sectors as the general  conditions of  the 
industry have  changed. 
Technology  rights protection is being promoted  more  actively. 
i 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
This  scheme  is under  the initiative of  the Spanish Ministry of  Industry,  Commerce 
and  Tourism,  called PAT!  (Working  Plan on  Technology  and  Industry) 
Geographical coverage:  National 
Entity responsible for the budget:  COT! 
Entity responsible for implementation:  COT! Name  of Scheme:  Developments  projects 
I.b. Target group 
What  is the target group: 
Companies  established in Spain and  with  R&D  facilities in this country. 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size (turnover,  employees) 
-sectors,  branches 
-technology  Must  be  new  in Spain 




Other selection criteria: 
- Better technical  performance that the State of  the Art 
- Good  market possibilities 
- Financial  soundness  of  the company 
- Capable  mangement  team  to reach success 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing,intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Property rights are secured  through  a  new  type of  scheme  called Technology 
Promotion Projects 
2 Name  of Scheme  Development  projects 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
lfhat is supported? 
~  of activities supported: 
R&D  expenditures and  Investments 
HaximUIII  I  minimUIII  amounts per project or action and/ or  reimburselllent: 
No  maximum  or minimum  fixed 
Average  budget per project:  1,08  MECUS 
Loan  of  CDTI:  0,4  MECUS  (37%  of  total budget) 
~  of support: 
- Soft  loans:  half the zero-risk rate of  Spanish market 
- No  guarantees required 
- Technical risk shared with  the company  (  in case of  technical  failure,  CDTI 
would  receive only  the proportional' amount  lent,  of  the sold project assets. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the  scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group)-. 
!II!  Financial evaluation ~· 
~  8  persons  I  ·  !.----------,,
1  Application <  i...__ _________  ___.i  I decision of  Board 
629  per year  ~!  1  ~ of  Directors  ! 
14  teams  of  8  pers.  each~  I  ________  __. 
i  i  Approval:  205  projects 
!Auditing  team  i 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the 
scheme 
Total  loans  (1978-1992):  426  MECUS 
Total  loans  commited  by  CDTI 
period  (78/92):  649,9  MECUS 
Other budgetary information 
!  8  persons  ! 
Expenditure per year 
Expenditure:  58,4  MECUS 
Committed:  82,1  MECUS 
Total  investment  in projects  (1978-1992):  1.741  MECUS 
3 Name  of Scheme:  Development  projects 
II.  RESULTS 
NUillber  of projects:  Loans  Investment  Observations Total  amount  of  the 
firms's  investments 
1978/83  176  31,8  58,7  1978-83  58,7  1 
1984/88  662  196  744,5  1984-88  744,5 
1988  140  68,3  193  1988  193 
1989  160  73,'29  227,2  1989  227,2 
1990  178  79,7  226,4  1990  226,4 
1991  205  86,8  235,5  1991  235,5 
1992  222  82, 1  248,6  1992  248,6 
MECUS  MECUS 
Other measurements of results (per 
year) 
Bottlenecks 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator:  Annual  reports of  CDTI  (evaluation until  1991) 
Brief sUllllllary  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
-Failure rate:  Real  failure rate:  1,1% 
Estimated failure rate:  12,3% 
- Total  investment  in  R&D  (companies  +  CDTI) 
34,556 MPtas  in  1992  =  248,6  MECUS  , 
7,6%  of  the total  investment  in R&D  in Spain 
... 
4 COUNTRY  Spain 
Name  of Scheme:  PLAN  TECNOLOGICO  - VALENCIA 
I. DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Resolution of  local government 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Sche111es: 
1/1/93  31/12/97  Several  R&D  support Pro-
grammes 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Increase capacity of  firms  to  incorporate: 
-existing technologies 
-development of  new  technologies 
· -new  products  and  processes 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Earlier programmes  concentrated on  firms  which  already did  R&D.  The  Plan 
Tecnologico covers all  type of  firms. 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Geographical coverage:  Comunidad  Valenciana 
Entity responsible for the budget: Consejeria de  Industria,  Comercio  y  Turismo  de 
la Generalidad Valenciana  through  IMPIVA  (Institute de  la Pequena  y  Mediana 
Industria Valenciana) 
Entity responsible' for implementation:  IMP IVA Name  of Scheme:  PLAN  TECNOLOGICO 
I.b. Target group 
W-hat  is the target group:  SMEs  of  the Comunidad  Valenciana 
Specific requirements  for participa'tion in this scheme: 
-Size (turnover,  employees) 






Other selection criteria: 
250 
all 
all but special attention to emerging  technologies 
Comunidad  Valenciana 
-Previous experience with  R&D;  innovating characteristics of  the project,  effect on 
the industrial environment  of  the  region. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Support  and advice  in product design;  intellectual property rights and  patents; 
management  support  and  training of  R&D  personnel. 
2 Name  of Scheme 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
What  is supported? 
Type of activi~ies supported: acquisition of  R&D  equipment,  contracting technical 
personnel,  external  technical  advice,  acquisition of  licences and  patents, 
collaboration with research institutions and  Universities. 
llaximUl/1  I  minimUlll  amounts per project or action and/ or  reimbursement: 
Programmed  basic research:  up  to  50%  of  inv~stment 
Programmed  applied research:  up  to  25%  of  investment 
In addition:  another  10%  if the  firm  is an  SME 
another  10%  if the project is linked to an  European project 
Type of support: 
Grants as described above 
\ 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
Step 1:  IMPIVA  makes  a  technical  assessment  of  the project and  a  proposal  to the 
Permanent  Committee  of  the Plan. 
Step 2:  The  Permanent  Committee  of  the Plan approves  or rejects the project and 
proposes  a  level of  support  to  IMPIVA. 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
schetDe 
4.000  Million Pesetas  for  4 years  1.000  Million Pesetas per year 
Other budgetary information Name  of Scheme:  PLAN  TECNOLOGICO 
II. RESULTS 
NUlllber  of firms involved 





Other llleasureiilents of results (per 
year) 
- 20  firms  launched new  products. 
- creation of  new  activities and  sec-_ 
tors 
Bot  tleneclcs 
Observations 
The  aims  achieved are the strengthening 
of  150  firm  which  incorporate  R&D  sys-
tematically and  the strengthening of 
the relation between  firms  and  Univer-
sities 
Problems  related to the financing of  firms.  The  banking  system  is reluctant to 
support  long  term projects and  charges  high interest rates 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief summary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  econQIIlic  effects, 
etc: 
- 8  companies  had  to close their activities due  to financial  problems 
- 10%  of  the  firms  did not  finish  the  R&D  project 
- Increased investment  in the region 
- Employment  in the group  of  firms  has slightly increased. 
4 ·  11!::=:=:==:=1  ==============================FRAN=======CE  ==============~' COUNTR~  France 
Name  of Scheme:  Aide a la creation d 'entreprises innovantes 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
~: (do  not fill in) 
Reference to legal basis:  (white·paper,  act,  public document) 
Decree  July  13,  1979 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous ScheiBes: 
1983  10  years 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Assistance to creation of  new  innovative businesses particularly technology  -
based firms: 
- by  funding preparation phase  (business plan) 
- by  funding  product of  process  innovation 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
No 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of -a  programme  or initiative} 
The  scheme  is part of  Programme  for  Promotion and  Support  of  INNOVATION  and 
TECHNOLOGY  in Industry. 
With  a  financial  tool  "Aide a !'Innovation" 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
National 
Entity responsible for  the budget:  ANVAR 
Entity responsible for implementation:  ANVAR Name  of Scheme:  Aide a la creation d' entreprises innovantes 
I.b.  Tarqet qroup 
ffhat is the target group: 
Technology- based  firms  aged<  3 or individual's project 
Specific, requirements for participation in this sche111e: 
-Size  (turnover,  elllployees  J 






Other selection criteria: 
no  size requirements 
all 
all 




Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
*  innovation support services: 
All  consultancy needed  for the development  of  new  innovative  firms: 
- market  studies 
- value analysis 
- intellectual property rights 
- management  of  technology 
- design 
- partner search· 
- feasibility studies 
- information on  technology 
- business plan 
*  technology  transfer 
* R&D  support 
/ 
2 • 
Name  of Scheme  Aide a la creation d'entreprises  innovantes 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
Jihat  is supported?  Business preparation phase and  technical development  of 
product or process 
Type of activities supported: 
- consultancy 
- R and  D 
llaxiiiiUIIl  I  •ini•lBI aDJOunts  per project or action and/ or  reiiDburs"eslent: 
Variable amount  of  financial  support as required by  the project: 
business plan  :  300  KFF-(50.000  ECUS)  -grant' 
and/or 
R and  D :  > 300  KFF  (50.000  ECUS)  - conditional  loan 
Type of sqpport: 
Financial support  provided directly to the individual or the  firms 
- it is a  grant  for  innovation support services 
- a  conditional  loan for  R and  D phase activity in a  'sha,ring risk'  partnership 
- no  equity funding  provided 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
ANVAR  is organised with 24  regional offices which  are  implementing  the scheme  -
Assistance to the NTBF  is directly provided by  the  ANVAR  regional offices  (review 
of  the project,  decision of  financial  support,  follow-up) 
Total  cost over the )ifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
scheme 
1992:  45  MECUS  (294,4  MFF) 
380  MECUS 
Other budgetary information 
21%  of  the  ANVAR  budget allocation 
3 Name  of Scheme:  Aide a la creation d' entreprises innovantes 
II. RESULTS 













ANVAR  invests more,  per year,  in less 
than three years old firms,  than the 
French venture capital 
- Lack  of  seed capital I  2nd  roundtable stage insufficient 
- Under  estimation of  commercialization difficulties 
- Misappreciation of  market  (over estimation) 
- No  clear decision by  firms  about  what  market  they wish  to serve 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator:  ANVAR  and  INSEE 
Brief summary of results of the evaluation su~ as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
- 20%  of  new  technology-based  firms  disappeared during the first five  years 
compared  to  44%  of  industrial start-up 
- 20%  are successful 
- 32%  of.  the NTBF  have employed after 5 years,  more  than 20  people 
- Most  failures of  firm's  innovation projects are at the commercial  stage 
Market  is,  most  of  the time,  misappreciated 




I COUNTRY  Ireland 
Name  of Scheme:  Enterprise Development  Programme 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  {white paper,  act,  public document) 
In operation since:  Life of the  Sche~~~e:  Previous Sche111es: 
1978  Open 
Stated goals of the sche111e: 
Provide encouragement  and  assistance to  (high-calibre)  managers,  academics  and 
professionals to establish entrepreurial businesses. 
NB.  This  scheme  is available to all types of enterprise,  not  just technology-
based initiatives.  There is no  exclusively targetted scheme  for  NTBFs  in 
Ireland. 
Have  the goals been changed during the imple111entation of the scheille:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
- Higher  Education Industry Co-operation Scheme  (administered by  EOLAS,  the 
National  Technology  Agency) 
- Enterprises Preparation Programme  (run  jointly with  IMI,  the Irish Management 
Institute) 
- Business  Innovation Centres and  Business  Innovation Fund 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
National 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
Industrial 'Development  Authority of  Ireland  (IDA) 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
IDA 
,. Name  of Scheme:  Enterprise Development  Programme 
I.  b.  Target group 
fihat is the target group: 
Mid  career managers,  academics  and  professionals wishing to set up  own  businesses. 
Specific require111ents  for participation in this sche111e: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees  J 






Other selection criteria: 
- projects must  be  able to achieve significant 
scale in SME-context  (sales of  £1  Mln.  or 
employment  20  persons or  investment of  £500K 
within three years. 
- operate in markets  for  iternationally traded 
goods  and  export services 
Other companies  may  be  supported under  the programme  if they promise significant 
contributions to the development  of  an  industry sector.  All projects must  be 
commercially viable. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.} 
EDP  offers mentoring and  a  range of  commercial  information and  analysis  in 
addition to grants,  subsidies,  equity participation and  loan guarantees. 
2 Name  of Scheme  Enterprise Development  Programme 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
llhat is supported? 
'rype of activities supported: 
- Pre-project expenditures  (Feasibility Studies,  Produc~ Development  Costs, 
- Planning costs  (50%)  and 
- Project costs  Cas  set out below) 
lfaxi•Wil I  •ini•Wil a.ounts per project or action and/ or  reiDiburse~aent: 
Up  to  50%  of project cost 
Up  to  65%  of  financial  exposure 
~  of support: 
At  project identification and preparation stage,  promoters are eligible for: 
- participation in Enterprise Preparation Programme  seminar  (6-day  seminar where 
experienced entrepreneurs provide opportunity to discuss  the practical  issues an 
entrepreneur has  to face.) 
- Appointment  of  an experienced business-person to act as mentor 
- Personal  IDA  project officer for  advise,  contacts,  administration of  financial 
inputs. 
- 50%  grant for costs of  feasibility studies,  product-dev~lopment programmes. 
As  soon as bankable busineses proposal  is prepared,  IDA  offers: 
- Capital grants/rent subsidies,  (max  45%  of  costs of  fixed assets and/or rent, 
,- Employment  grants up  to £9000  per employee  (ew  job created) 
Management  Development  Grants up  to  50%  additional costs 
Convertible,  redeemable,  preference shares typically convertible into  10% 
ordinary shares of  the promoting company 
Loan  guarantees  typically  50%  of  borrowing  requirement  of  project 
Interest subsidies on  loans/overdraft to bring interest costs down  to  4%  per 
year. 
An  IDA  officer remains at disposal  throughout project  implementation and  post 
start-up. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the  scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach  the target group). 
- potential candidates  for  support are invited through a  targeted marketing 
programme,  to  participat~ in the entreprise preparation Programme  seminar. 
- The  E'DP  programme  is promoted nationally by  a  dedicated unit of  IDA. 
- Financial resources are disbursed by  IDA  directly to client. 
- Information,  analysis is provided by  IDA  staff and  an  extensive network  of 
external mentors  and  consultants. 
3 Name  of Scheme  Enterprise Development  Programme 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
schellle 
currently £2,4  IR  per annum 
Other budgetary information 
II. RESULTS 
Nulllber of firms involved  Observations 




1990  448 
1991  15  7  254 
1992  22  11 
Other measurelllen ts of results {per 
year} 




- Shortage of  managers  willing to promote projects 
- Severe lack of  seed capital 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief summary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
- EDP- stimulates a  good  proportion of  high calibre/high growth  projects, 
- Historical failure rates in line with small business  average 
4 • COUNTRY  Italy 
Name  of Scheme:  Law  31 7 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal.basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Parliament act,  law  317  of  october  1991 
In operation since:  Life of the ScheJile:  Previous ScheJiles: 
april  1992  11  months  law  399  of  1987 
Stated goals of the scheJile: 
Supporting innovation and development  of  small  firms. 
Have  the goals been changed during the impleJilentation of the scheJile:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
no. 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
The  scheme  is composed  of  several programmes  covering different aspects of 
innovation support  for  SHE's. 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
National 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
Ministry of  Industry  and  Commerce 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
Ministry of  Industry and  Commerce. Name  of Scheme:  Law  31 7 october  5,  1991 
I .b. Target group 
/ 
llhat is the target group: 
SME's,  industrial,  craft and partly commercial  sectors,  both new  and existing. 
Specific requireiEnts for participation in this scheae: 
-Size (turnover,  e.ployees)* 






- small  =  up  to 100  employees, 
medium  = up  to 200  employees 
- certain particular sectors have  some  extra 
benefits; 
Higher aid intensity for  firms  operative in objec-
tives  1  and  2  areas 
* -in manufacturing sector:  autonomous  firms  <  250  employees  and  <  25  Bln Lire 
fixed assets 
-in service sector:  operating in the field of  infrastructure,  industrial plants, 
computer  & data processing,  <  75  employees  and  <  7,5 Bln lire fixed assets 
-craft sector:  <  20  employees,  manufacturers,  and  included in law  443  of  1985. 
Other selection criteria: 
New  SME's  created in one  of  the sectors listed by  the interministerial committee 
for  industrial policy,  have  'particular'  benefits under article 8. 
Other promoted activities:  (mezzogiorno  region  between  brackets) 
A:  Research and Innovation 
1)  aquisition of  advanced  technology industrial machinery  /art.  5  :  tax credit, 
or direct contribution 
2)  research expenditures  /art.  8 
B:  Counselling 
3)  consultancy  /art.  7  :  50%  (75%)  subsidy,  or tax credit 
4)  Innovation consortia  /art.  17 
consortium of  >  5  SME's  :  30%  subsidy on  annual  costs 
5)  Mixed  consortium companies  /art.  27 
private company  and  public organizations who  support  SME's  :  subsidy  50%  annual 
expense 
c:  Finance and Credit 
6)  Participation in SME's  capital /art.  2  :subsidy 50%  annual  increase of·holding 
7)  aid for mutual  guarantee consortia /art.  29  +  30 
8)  aid for participation loans /art 35 
Only  art.  5  has  been  implemented  so far. 
2 • 
Name  of Scheme Law .  31 7  october  5,  1  991 
.I.e. Organization and Implementation 
flhat is supported? 
'l'ype of activities supported: 
see other promoted activities 
llaxiBIWII  I  minimwa IJDiounts  per project or action and/ or  reimbursement: 
up  to  100  employees:  25%  of  expenses  (37,5%  Obj.  1  and  2) 
up  to 200  employees:  20%  of expenses  (30%  Obj.  1  and  2) 
'l'ype of support: 
- firms  have  a  choice between grants and  tax credits for aquisition of  advanced 
technology machinery. 
- All other schemes  within the  law  only grant tax credits. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme ·works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
- The  scheme  is based on  a  form  where  SME's  'self-certificate'  the posession of 
the requirements stated by  the  law. 
- After the aid is granted by  Ministry of  Industry,  firms  have  to submit 
documentation,  proving that they were  in fact eligible for  the benefits.  This 
control is carried out by  the banks. 
'l'otal  cost over the lifetJ.•e of the 
scheme 
1,500 billion lire  (1991-1993) 
Other budgetary information 
The  available money  is devided as  follows: 
-60%  to central\northern Italy 
-40%  for mezzo  giorno regions 
Expenditure per year 
500  billion lire 
3 Name  of Scheme :  Law  31 7  ,  october  5,  1  991 
II. RESULTS 
·  Nulllber of firtiiS involved  Observations 
1991 
1992 8800 
Other m.easurS~etJts of -results (per 
year) 
Bottleneclcs 
To  many  requests  for grants  (under articles) while more  money  is available for tax 
credit. 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: ministry of  Industry  (report to parliament) 
Brief SUJIJlllary  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
The  procedure based on  self-certification. has  the advantage of being very  rapid 
(15/20  days),  but often the following control carried out by  banks  shows  that 





COUNTRY  Netherlands 
Name  of Scheme:  Garantieregeling  PPM  (Guarantee-program  for  private 
venture-capital companies) 
I. DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Letter from  Ministries  for  Economic  Affairs and  Finance,  to Parliament; 
dated  16-9-1980 
TK  nr  .  1  6 . 4  0  3 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Schellles: 
1981  ends  in 1995  no 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
'  - To  .stimulate private venture capital  firms  to  ~nvest in small  and 
medium  sized businesses,  via equity  investments,  or covertible subordinated 
loans. 
- Create conditions  for  the development  of  a  ~ture venture-capital market. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
After the evaluation in 1990,  focus  shifted onto market  segment  for  small  SHE's  of 
the venture-capital market  (i.e.  smaller SME's).  Requirements  regarding the size 
of  the  SME  in which  vc  companies  could participate under  the PPM-program  shifted 
from  ~  500  to  ~  100  employees,  for  a  concern  from  $1000  to  ~  200  employees. 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Initially:  PPM's  for  investments  < fl  4  Mln. 
MIP  (57%  state}  for  investments  >  fl  4 Mln. 
MIP  merged  in  1991  with  APM  in~o Alpinvest  (30%  state} 
(MIP,  Maatschappij  voor  Industriele Projecten, 
venture Company  for  Industrial Projects) 
Geographical coverage:  national 
Entity responsible for  the budget:  Ministry  for  Economic  Affairs  (since  1992) 
Entity responsible for implementation: Dutch  National  Bank Name· of Scheme:  PPM-program 
I.  b.  Target group 
What  is the target group:  SME's,  through private venture capital companies, 
investment  companies. 
Specific requir~ents for. participation in this scheme: 
-Size (turnover,  employees)  - SME  s  100  employees  (concern  s  200  employes), 
- max.  investment per  SME  under  guarantee 
fl 2,5  Mln, 






Other selection criteria: 
The  Dutch  National  Bank  decides wether  an  investment company  will  be  accepted as 
participant.  Criteria: 
- Max.  20%  of  investment company's  portfolio in.-one  single SME, 
- of  the company  portfolio,  at least: 
40%  in the  3d, 
50%  in the  4th,  and 
60%  in  ~he 5th bookyear  have  to be  invested in projects under  the  PPM 
programme. 
- Fund  must  be  >  1  Mln.  Fl, 
- Investment  fund  reliant on  money  from  private sector 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
2 Name  of Scheme  PPM-program 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
fihat is supported? 
'rype of activities supported: 
Investments  in SME's  by  private venture capital companies. 
Jlaxi.JDUJD  I  mini111U111  amounts per project or action and/or reilllburse111ent: 
Half  of  the loss on  an  investment will be  reimbursed. 
Guarantee effective:  50%  during years  1-5,  then declining by  10%  per annum. 
(Since  1988,  no  reimbursement will  be paid within the first year after acquisition 
of  a  participation.,) 
Max.  guarantee/annum is fl  50  Mln,  which  allows fl  100  Mln.  investments  under this 
scheme. 
Maximum  guarantee per firm is f  2,5  mln  {was  4 mln  before  '91) 
Type of support: 
Financial  support provided directly to investment  companies. 
Reducing risks for venture-capital  companies  to  invest  in SME's,  in the  form  of 
equity  funding  or convertible soft loans.  By  sharing half of  eventual  losses in 
investments with the state,  venture-capitalists will  be  more  willing to  invest  in 
SME's,  so problems  for  SME's  to aquire seed- and  start-up capital will  be  reduced. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
Venture capital companies  apply at the Dutch  National  Bank  to be  accepted as 
participant in the PPM-program.  Individual  investments need  be  recongized by  the 
DNB  to make  the guarantee effective. 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year  (reimbursements) 
sche111e  '87  5,0  Mln 
'83-'92  119,2  Mln  fl.  '88  12, 1  Mln 
'89  23,3  Mln 
'90  22,3  Mln 
I 91  20,6  Mln. 
'92  29,6  Mln. 
Other budgetary information 
in  '88 a  guarantee ceiling was  introduced of  fl  75  Mln/year 
in· '91  the ceiling was  lowered  to fl  50  Mln/year 
3 Name  of Scheme:  PPM-program 
II. RESULTS 
NUIIIber of firms involved 
vccy's  SHE's  cumul. 
1988  90  125  479 
1989  99  109  588 
1990  98  113  701 
1991  104  75  776 
1992  99  153  . 828 
Other measurements of results 
Distribution of  height of  invested sums 
(cumulated) 
invested sum  number  of  invested 
per  firm:  firms  ·sum  cum. 
0  - 0,2 fl Mln.  140+  42  13,8+  0,6 
0,2  - 0,5  213+  26  57,9+  8,6 
0,5  - 1,0  134+  23  92,7+  15,8 
1, 0  - 2,0  94+  27  133,5+  35·, 1 
2,0  - 4,0  120+  35  383,6+  94,8 
--- -----
153  154,9 
Data  from  evaluation  1989,  results for 
1992  added. 
Bottlenecks 
Observations 
invested sum  p.annum  cumulative 
1986  86,9  200,9 
1987  167,7  349,7 
1988  109,2  478 
1989  109,8  587,8 
1990/9  93,7  681,5 
Mean  investment  1  mln  Dfl. 
Distribution of  height of  invested 
sums,  (cumulative,  x  fl mln.) 
over new  and established fi.rms: 
(mid  1990) 
number  invested  mean 
established:  418  456,6  1, 09 
new  firms  257  224,9  0,88 
--- ---- ----
total  675  681,5  1 '0  1 
- Few  investment opportunities with acceptable risk-return profile, . 
- entrepreneurial management  support 
- exits. 
~ 
4 Name  of Scheme:  PPM-program 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator:  Ministry of  Finance,  Financing Directorate  (1990) 
Brief'sU11llllary of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
Distribution over new/established  firms  (mid  1.990)  of  State expenses  (losses)  on, 
participations accepted under  the PPM-measure.  (x  fl mln.) 
invested sum  by  experienced 
vc  companies  loss by  State 
establi~hed firms  456,6  35,9  7,9% 
new  firms  224,9  23,8  10,6% 
Total  681,5  59,7  8,8% 
Distribution of  reimbursements  regarding height of  invested sum:  (x  fl  mln.) 
invested sum  participations 
per  firm  under  PPM-program 
0  - 0,2  13,8 
0,2  - 0,5  57,9 
0,5  - 1 1 0  92,7 
1  1 0  - 2,0  133,5 
2,0  - 4,0  383,6 
reimbursed  state loss  % 
0,9  6,5  % 
5,2  9,0 
6,6  7  I  1 
13,3  10,0 
33,7  8,8 
In general  the PPM-program  is considered to have  been effective with regard to  the 
stated goals. 
About  1/3  of  all participations accepted under  the  PPM-program,  lead to  losses. 
There is little difference between  small  or  bigger participations with regard  to 
this. 
About  34%  of  the  loss occurs due  to failure of  the participations.  Acquisitions 
that are sold at a  loss are resposible  for  the other  66%  reimbursements. 
5 COUNTRY  Netherlands 
Name  of Scheme:  Technical  Development  Credit  (TOK) 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
~: (do  not fill in) 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Regeling  TOK  1991.  Start  31  juli nr.  146,  1991 
Start 20  aug.  nr.  160,  1991 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme: 
1954  not restricted 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
Previous Schemes: 
Stimulate firms  to undertake risk-bea.ring research and development  projects. 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
No  important changes 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
TOK  is one  of  the main  technology policy programmes  of  the Netherlands. 
Others are:  PBTS 
·  Eureka  (international cooperation) 
·  collective research 
·  IOP  (institutions research) 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
national 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
Ministry  for  Economic  Affairs 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
SENTER Name  of Scheme:  Technical  Development  Credit  (TOK),  Netherlands 
I .b.  Target group 
ffhat is the target group: 
All  companies  in the Netherlands below  20.000  employees. 
Specific requirements for participation in this scheme: 
-Size  (turnover,  employees  J 
-sectors,  branches 
-technology 









Located  in the Netherlands 
A development  project for  a  technical  new  product/process or service,  .with  more 
than average technical and  financial risks. 
Other promoted activities:  (beside financial  support,  e.g.  consultancy  in defini-
tion of  product,  securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  manage-
·ment  training,  etc.) 
* financial  support  from  the scheme  plus mediation  for  financial  support  from 
other banks,  investment  companies 
*  project-connected consultancy on  property rights,  project-approach,  management, 
expertise from  outside cooperation with other companies/institutes 
2 Name  of Scheme  Technical  Development  Credit  (TOK),  Netherlands 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
flhat is supported? 
~  of activities supported: 
development  costs 
llaxilllWil I  111inilllUJil  a111ounts  per project or action and/ or  reilllburselllent: 
maximum  40%  of project-costs 
~  of support: 
Interest-bearing credit directly to firm 
1.- financial  support is  40%  of project costs 
- loan,  without securities,  off balance 
- interest rate is 8%,  added  to the  loan in the development  fase 
- pay-back is based on  sales after development  fase 
2.  - consultancy  > project related only 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group).  r 
- yearly fixed budget,  50  to  100  projects a  year 
- programme  is published 
- Senter is the executive organisation: 
>10  professional project advisers,  external advisory board 
- two  third of  budget goes  to comp.  <  500 
'l'otal  cost over the lifetime of the  Expenditure per year 
schellle 
new  loans  ±  130  mln  gld. 
2500  mln  gld.  Pay  back ca  40%  , 
Other budgetary information 
3 • 
Name  of Scheme:  Technical  Development  Credit  (TOK),  Netherlands 
II. RESULTS 
NUlllber  of firms involved 
1988  requests  120,  granted  68 











Machine  and  fine mechanical  and  elec-
tronic ind.  are important sectors  . 
Companies  up  to 20  employees:  important 
participation  >·40% 
In small  companies:  1)  management  and  finance 
2)  information/networks 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief slJIIllllary  of results of the evaluation such as failure rate,  ~anomie effects, 
etc: 
4 COUNTRY  Netherlands 
Name  of Scheme:  Business Oriented Technology  Promotion Programme  (  PBTS) 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
~= (do  not fill in) 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
PBTS  Regeling  (start 1988,  nr.  42,  start 1991,  nr.  49) 
In operation since:  Life of the ScheiE:  Previous ScheRJ.es: 
1987  not restricted 
Stated goals of the scheRJ.e: 
Stimulate firms  to do  research and  development  in certain areas of  technology 
Every  year the specific areas are reconsidered for  which  subsidies will  be 
available 
Have  the goals been changed during the i111plementation  of the scheiiie:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
No  important  changes 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative} 
PBTS  is an  instrument  in the National  Technology  Programs.  PBTS,  aimed at enter-
prises,  together with  Innovation Oriented Research Programmes  (IOP's)  for  univer-
sities,  are designed to stimulate knowledge  development. 
Geographical coverage: 
national 
Entity responsible for  the budget: 
Ministry for  Economic  Affairs 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
SENTER • 
Name  of  Scheme:  Technology  Promotion  Programme  (PBTS),  Netherlands 
I.b. Target group 
What  is the target group: 
Dutch enterprises 
Specific requirements  for participation in this scheme: 
-Size (turnover,  employees) 
-sectors,  branches 









biotechnology,  information-technology, 
new  materials  technology,  environmental 
technology. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy  in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
Knowledge  diffusion and  cooperation of  enterprises with less than  250  employees 
2 Name  of Scheme Technology  Promotion  Programme  (  PBTS},  Netherlands 
I.e. Orqanization and  Implementation 
What  is supported?  Feasibility-studies 
~  of activities supported:  Research-projects  (not  for  information  technology) 
Demonstration-projects  (not  for  environment. 
technology) 
llaxilllWil I  111inilllWil  alllouilts per project or action and/ or  reilllburseiilent: 
subsidy up  to 37,5%  of project-costs,  to a  maximum  of 
-for feasibility-studies  Dfl.  250.000  {or  500.00  for concerted projects) 
-research projects  20%  of  research-budget 
-demonstration-projects  Dfl.  500.000  (or  1.000.000  for  concerted actions} 
~  of support: 
Subsidy,  direct to the  firm or consortium undertaking the project. 
Financial  support is 37,5%  of  project costs,  such as salaries of direct personnel, 
material costs,  investment costs,  patents costs,  travel costs and  out  of  pocket 
costs for  third parties,  included an  additional amount  of  40%  of  the personnel 
costs for  indirect activities. 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they reach the target group). 
Yearly  fixed budgets per  technology  theme 
Programme  is published yearly 
Senter acts as executor 
Advisory  Board  judges project quality and  degree of  innovation 
Total  cost over the lifetime of the 
scheiile 
0,6.103  mln  gld 
Other budgetary iriforma  tion 
Expenditure per year 
100  mln  gld 
3 • 
Name  of Scheme:Technology  Promotion  Programme  (PBTSJ,  Netherlands 
II.  RESULTS 














For  small enterprises:  the  formulation of  a  good  project plan. 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief summary of res~lts of_the evaluation such as failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
4 I 
UNITED KINGDOM  I COUNTRY  United Kingdom 
Name  of Scheme:  Small  firms  Merit Awards  for Research and  Technology  (SMART) 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
'l'ype: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act.,  public document) 
Science & Technology  Act  1965 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheae: 
1986  until  1994 
Stated goals of the scheiile: 
Previous  Sche~~~es: 
Previous  SMART  progr. 
19861  19881  1989- I  91 
1)  To  stimulate small businesses to develop and  market new  science and  technology 
based products 
2)  To  encourage and  facilitate the  formation of viable and durable NTBFs 
3)  To  contribute to a  climate which  encourages  investment in highly innovative 
technologies by  individuals and  financial  institutions 
4}  To  attract private backing to meritorious but high risk -projects which  other 
wise would  have  remained dormant. 
Have  the goals been changed during the impl811lelltation of the scheme:  (describe ' 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process} 
No,  but after  '88 evalutation the maximum  size of  firms  was  reduced  from  199  to 
49,  the number  of  awards  was  raised from  140  to  180,  to reinstate  '86 values of 
the rewards,  maximum  awards  were  raised from  37,5.and  SO  Ek  to  45  and  60  Ek  for 
stage  I  and  II respectively.  .  .. 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
No,  but  links to other  SME  services provided by  DTI  to SME's 
Geographical coverage:  national 
Entity responsible for the budget:  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  (DTI) 
Entity responsible for implementation: 
DTI  (England);  Scottish office  (Scotland);  Welsh  office  (Wales);  Dept.  of  Economic 
Development  (N.  Ireland) Name  of 'scheme:  SMART  UK 
I.  b.  Target group 
flhat is the  target group: 
New,  and  early stage Technology  Based  New  Firms 
Specific require~~~ents for participation in this sche111e: 
-Size  {turnover,  e111ployees J  less than  50  employees 
-sectors,  branches  less than  £  10  Million turnover per year 
-technology  * 
-age/invest111ent stage 
-specific probleiiiS 
-geographical aspects  UK  citizens,  or foreign nationals'  intending to 
start a  new  business the in  UK  they win  SMART  I 
Smart  II applicants must  have  received  SMART  I 
award  to be eligible. 
-others 
Other selection criteria: 
- Business  Plan  (feasibility of  turning the project into a  success) 
- Additional  Accounts  (if in existence over  12  months) 
- Evidence of rights to intellectual property 
- Quality and  novely of  the product 
- The  need  for  SMART  support to continu  (additionality) 
- Qualification and  experience of  the people  involved 
- Significance of  the project and its potential commercial  benefit to the  UK 
Other pro111oted  activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
* Particularly welcomed  technologies: 




Environmental  technology 
Communications 
Instrumentation and  control 
New  Testing methods 
Separation techniques 
Tribology,  wear  and  corrosion 
Projects for the modernisation of traditional industry (e.g. textiles) are also welcome 
2 
.. .. 
Name  of Scheme  SMART  UK 
I.e. Organization and Implementation 
llhat ·is supported?  'rype of activities supported: 
Stage I: 
Stage II: 
feasibility studies  (limited to  150  individuals/small  firms) 
development  of pre-production prototypes  (limited to  75  out of  the 
150  stage  !~winners) 
•  llaxilllUIIJ  I  lllinilllUIIJ uounts per project or action and/ or  reilllbursellleiJt 
75%  of project costs  (max.  £45.000)  in stage I 
50%  of project costs  (max.  £60.000)  in stage II 
Maximum  per applicant  from  SMART  I  +  II  +  further applications: 
= 45  +  60  +  35  = £140.000 
Payment  in advance  1\3 of  the award. 
Projects are expected to be completed within  12  months. 
Type of support:  Non-repayable grant 
Organization and structure: 
1)  National  competition,  promoted/advertised nationally 
2)  Regional  (DTI  offices)/territorial appraisal of entries. 
Aliocation of  75%  of  the awards. 
3)  National allocation of  the  25%  reserve awards 
TOtal  cost over the lifeti111e of the 
scheiile 
SMART  I  +  II 
£34  Mln.  by  end of  1991 
£42  Mln.  from  1992  for  3  years  (pro-
jected) 
Other budgetary information 
Expenditure per year 
£12  Mln.  .in  1991 
£12.5  Mln.  in  1992 
3 Name  of Scheme :  SMART  UK 
II. RESULTS 















Other measuresments of results 
Observations 
The  SMART  scheme  has become  increas-
ingly well  known  among  technical 
entepreneurs and  financial advisers 
(eg.  banks). 
Some  observers have argued that the 
inability to obtain a  SMART  grant 
(which is budget constrained)  is seen 
adversely by  other potential financial 
sponsors of  a  NTBF. 
Stage I  applications and awards per size of company 
1988  1989  1990 
size  appl.  awards  (%  %)  appl.  awards  (%  %)  appl.  awards  (%  %) 
1  356  29  38  21  272  26  33  17  614  44  43  24 
2-5  289  44  31  31  309  53  38  35  431  57  31  32 
6-24  194  42  21  30  184  51  22  35  307  66  22  37 
25-49  57  22  6  16  61  20  7  13  63  13  4  7 
50-99  22  1  3  1  --
100+  12  2  1  2 
Number  of stage I  winners,  offered less than maximum  award: 
1986  6  (30%) 
1988  41  (29%) 
1989  33  (22%) 
1990  33  (18%) 
In general  50%  of  stage  I  winners  have also gained stage II award. 
4 • 
Name  of Scheme :  SMART  UK 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator:  DTI  Assessment  Unit  1990  (assessment paper no.  13  1991) 
Evaluation of results of  1986  and  1988  competition. 
- Main  conclusion:  scheme  should continue.  Goals  1-3  have  been achieved.  Attitudes 
of  financial  institutes to investments  in NTBFs  have  not changed  (i.e. 
risk/rewards generally seen as unattractive at NTBF  level.) 
- High  additionality:  many  projects could only proceed with  SMART  support. 
Additionality is stronger with stage I  ~han with stage II winners. 
- About  10%  of  1988  winners  established a  firm as result of  winning  the award . 
- Overall contribution to profits will outweigh the costs of  the  SMART  scheme 
(i.e.  good  value for money) 
- Award-winners  were  judged to have  highly innovative projects. 
- Advance  payment  was  much  appreciated by  firms,  mainly used to purchase equipment 
or hire  (research)  manpower. 
- Successive and  multiple applications were  allowed,  but evidence of displacement 
was  found  in companies  ,  especially where  stage I  awards  had  been  won  in 
succesive rounds  of  Smart.  Resources  were  being overstretched by  trying to 
complete one  project while getting another one  of  the ground  in the same  time. 
Failure rates of  1986  winners  (pilot competition,  20  awards) 
8  firms  ceased or are still seeking additional  finance. 
(2  of  those won  stage I  +  stage II award) 
8  firms  are in the stage of developing,  pre-market introduction 
(6  of  them  won  stage I  +  stage II award) 
4 are selling  (3  won  both stage I  and  stage II award). 
About  1\4 of  1986  and  1988  winners  changed  their technical objectives. 
) 
Evaluation of  scheme  administrat'ion: 
Differences appeared  in the way  DTI  regions appraised applications in the  1988 
competition.  In some  regions  the chance  to win  award  is better then in others. 
- Suggestion rises that regions  tend to use  SMART  as  a  support  scheme  instead of  a 
competition award,  with a  tendency  to assist incremental development. 
Regional  officers are not happy  with  25%  of  awards  being allocated by  national 
managers.  Evaluation team  advised to continue central  judgement  of  a  reserve of 
20%  of  the awards.  Allocation of  awards  to a  region should reflect that region's 
share of  awards  given in the previous year,  including the reserve. 
5 COUNTRY  United Kingdom 
Name  of Scheme:  Support  for  Products under Research  (SPUR) 
I.  DESCRIPTION  OF  SCHEME 
I.a. General  information 
Type: 
Reference to legal basis:  (white paper,  act,  public document) 
Science & Technology  Act  1965 
In operation since:  Life of the Scheme:  Previous Schemes: 
1991  until  1994 
Stated goals of the scheme: 
To  encourage a  larger number  of  smaller firms  to increase  R&D 
expenditure and  to develop new  products and processes to benefit the 
UK  economy 
Have  the goals been changed during the implementation of the scheme:  (describe 
changes  through evaluation and  learning process) 
Not  available;  new  scheme 
Relation with other programmes:  (is this scheme  part of  a  programme  or initiative) 
Designed as  an  additional grant to  SMART  awards  for  SMEs,  rather  than new  firms 
Geographical coverage:  (national,  regional) 
national  (UK)  excludes  N.  Ireland 
Entity responsible for the budget: 
Department  for Trade  and  Industry  (DTI) 
Entity responsib~e for implementation: 




Name  of Scheme:  SPUR  UK 
I.b. Target group 
What  is the target group: 
Small  and  medium  sized  enterprises:  1e  up  to 500  employees 
Specific requires~ents for participation in this sches~e: 
-Size  (turnover,  es~ployees) 






Other selectiOn criteria: 
Annual  Accounts  (x  2  years) 
Business Plan 
Introduction of  new  technology  into a  sector -
"  a  significant technological  advance  for  the 
industry or sector nationally" 
Project should be  for  a  minimum  of  6 months  and 
a  maximum  of  3  years duration. 
Project could not proceed without  financial 
tance provided by  SPUR. 
Other promoted activities:  (  examples:  consultancy in definition of  product, 
securing intellectual property rights,  business plans,  management  training,  etc.) 
2 Name  of Scheme  SPUR  UK 
I.e. Organization and  Implementation 
lfhat is supported? 
Type of activities supported: 
llaxiBJUIIl  I  •ini•UIIl a.aounts per project or action and/ or  reiBlburseBiellt: 
30%  of costs  (max.  grant £  150.000) 
Type of support:  . 
Non-repayable grant. 
Grant  is paid directly to successful applicants in arrears  (i.e.  retrospectively) 
Organization and structure:  (describe briefly how  the scheme  works,  the actors 
involved,  how  they  reach the target group). 
1)  Natio~al scheme 
2)  Local/Regional  Promotion & Advertising 
3)  Local  Appraisal 
4)  National  Allocation of  Funds 
Total  cost over the lifeti•e of the 
ScheBJe 
£  32  Mln.  over  3  years  1991-1993 
Other budgetary information 
Expenditure per year 
1991  - £  270.000 
1992  - £  5  Mln.  (estimated) 
3 Name  of Scheme :  SPUR  UK 
II. RESULTS 





1992  - 148 
Other 111easureiBents  of results (per 
year) 
Bottleneclcs 
III.  EVALUATION  OF  RESULTS 
Evaluator: 
Brief sUllllllary  of results of the evaluation such ·as  failure rate,  economic effects, 
etc: 
Too  early in scheme  to evaluate. 
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Luxembourg 18-19/03/1993 
List of participants 
Dr. W. Degrieck 
Assistant-Directeur 
IRSIA-IWONL 
6, De Crayerstraat 
B-1050 Bruxelles 
Telephone:  32-2-6432424 
Telefax:  32-2-6432432 




Telephone:  32-2-2230033 
Telefax:  32-2-2231181 
Mr J.C. Poree 
ANVAR 
7  4, rue Montoyer 
B-1040 Bruxelles 
Telephone:  32-2-5068862 
Telefax:  32-2-5068829 





Telephone:  32-2-2955264 
Telefax:  32-2-2962473 
Mr Jaime Ibanez 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
EEC Coordination Office 









Telephone:  32-2-2962445 
Telefax: 
Mr L. van Fravenhoven 
Financial Anaiyst 
G.I.M.V. 
37, Karel Oomsstraat 
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List of participants 





Telephone :  32-2-2953955 
Telefax :  32-2-2965987 




B-Bruxelles  . 
Telephone: ·  32-2-2965233 
Telefax:  32-2-2952154 





Telephone:  32-2-2962443 
Telefax:  32-2-2952154 




D-5300 Bonn 2 
Telephone: 
Telefax: 
Mr Udo Wupperfeld 
Fraunhofer Institut fiir Systemtechnik und lnnovationsforschung 
48, Breslauerstrasse 
D-7500 Karlsruhe 
Telephone:  49-721-6809187 
Telefax :  49-721-6809176 




Telephone:  49-69-74312271 
Telefax :  49-69-74313362 
D-0  Herr Reinhard Bacheller 
Referatsleiter Ref. 126 
Bundesministerium fiir Forschung und Technologie 
Forderung von FuE in der Wirtschaft 
30, Hannoversche Strasse 
D-0- 1040 Berlin (  AST Bln) 
Telephone:  49-30-39981-220 









'TBF \\  nrkshup 
Luxembourg 18-19/03/1993 
List of participants 
Dr. Hans Peter Lorenzen 
Referatsleiter Ref. 414 
Bundesministerium fiir Forschung und Technologie 
Innovationsforderung und Mikrosystemtechnik 
2,lieineDnaJUnstrasse 
D-W- 5300 Bonn 
Telephone:  49-228-59-3305 
Telefax:  49-228-593601 
Dr. K. liansen 
Deputy Director 





Mr Karsten Bergsoe 
National Agency of Industry and Trade 
137, Tagensweg 
DK-2200 Copenhagen 
Telephone:  45-31851066 
Telefax:  45-31817068 
Mr P. Cordsen 
Danish Innovation Centre 






Mr  Jose Maria Ivanez Girrieno 
Subdirector 
Oral. de Financiacion e lnversones 
Edif. Cuzco IV 
141, Paseo de la Castellana, 2* 
E- 28046 Madrid 
Telephone:  34-1-5829380 
Telefax:  34-1-
Mr Luis del Pozo 
CD11 
141, Paseo de Ia Castellana 
E-28046 MADRID 
Telephone: 
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List of participants 
Mr Roberto Algarra 
IMPIVA 
Financial Advisory Department Executive 
6, Plza. Ayuntamiento 
E-46002 Valencia 
Telephone:  34-6-3510100 
Telefax:  34-6-3514064 
Mr F. Gautier 
Adjoint director 
PROMOTECH - Centre Europeen d'Entreprise et d'lnnovation 
6, allee Pelletier-Doisy, P.T. Nancy-Brabois 
F-54603 Villers-les-Nancy Cedex 
Telephone: 
Telefax: 
Mr Patrick Engelbach 
ANCE -Agence Nationale pour la creation d'entreprises 
142, rue du Bac 
F-75007 PARIS 
Telephone :  33-1-44395746 
Telefax: 
Mr Robert Chabbal 
Ministere de la Recherche & de l'Espace 
21, rue Descartes 
F-75005 PARIS 
Telephone:  33-1-46343814 
Telefax:  33-1-46343636 
Mrs Isabelle Duret 
Centrale Management 
13, av. Morane-Saulnier Batiment Bleriot 
F-78140 Velizy Villacoublay 
Telephone :  33-1-30672300 
Telefax:  33-1-30672339 
Mr Dimitris Deniozos 
Director 
General Secretariat of Research and Technology 
14, Messogion Avenue 
GR-11510 Athens 
Telephone:  30-1-7710693 
Telefax:  30-1-7713810 
G R  Mr G. Anestopoulos 
General Secretariat of Research and Technology 
14, Messogion Avenue 
G R-11510 Athens 
Telephone:  30-1-17713772 











Mr A. Cagli 
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Luxembourg 18-19/03/1993 
List of participants 
Ministerio dell' Industria 
DGPI-Div.ill 
2, Via Molise 
I- 187 Rome 
Telephone:  39-6-4  7052583 
Telefax: 
Mr A. Quintiliani 
ENEA 
125, ·Viale Regina Margherita 
I-00198 Roma-
Telephone:  39-~-85282752 
Telefax:  39-6-85285854 
MrG. Mooney 
Technology Transfer Executive 
The Irish Science & Technology Agency· EOLAS 
Glasnevin 
IR-Dublin 9 
Telephone:  353-1-370101 
Telefax:  353-1-379082 
Mr Ray Kerr 
Evaluator of EDP 
Department of Industry & Commerce 
Kildare Street 
IR-Dublin 2 
Telephone:  353-1-614444 
Telefax: 
MrS. O'Reagain 
Company Development Manager 
Irish Development Agency 
Wilton House, Wilton Place 
_  IR-Dublin 2 
Telephone:  353-1-602244  -
Telefax:  353-1-603703 
Herr Gerhard Braeunling 
GD XIII-D-4 
Kommission der Europaischen Gemeinschaften 
Jean Monnet Gebaude 
L- 2920 Luxembourg 
Telephone:  352-4301-34532 
Telefax:  352-4301-34544 
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List of participants 
Mr Daniel Janssens 
Commission des Communautes Europeennes 
DGXID./D/4 
L-2920 Luxembourg 
Telephone:  352-4301-34407 
Telefax:  352-4301-34544 





Telephone:  352-430136292 
Telefax:  352-4301436322 
Mr J. VanderMeer 
BEl 
100, Boulevard Konrad Adenauer 
L-2950 Luxembourg 
Telephone:  + 352-43792464 
Telefax:  +352-437704 
Mr Robin Miege 
Commission des Communautes Europeennes 
Batiment Jean Monnet I B4/99 
L-2920 Luxembourg 
Telephone:  352-430134180 
Telefax:  352-430134544 
Dr. JJ. van Dijk 
Dire9tor Financing of Enterprises 
Financing Directorate 
post  bus 20201 
NL- 2500 EE Den Haag 
Telephone:  31-70-3428028 
Telefax: 
Mr A.G.H. Bastiaans 
Deputy Director Fin. Directorate 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
6, Emmapark 
NL-2595 ET Den Haag 
Telephone:  31-70-3797117 
Telefax:  31-70-3797527 
Mr BJ.M. Giesen 
Deputy Director 
SENTER 
43, Grote Marketstraat 
NL- 2511 BH Den Haag 
Telephone:  31-70-3610310 












Mr C. Selman 
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TN9- Centre for Technology and Policy Studies 
501, Laan van Westenenk 
P.O. Box541 
NL-7300 AM Apeldoom 
Telephone:  31-55-493492 
Telefax:  31-55-421458 
Mr Gustavo Fahrenkrog 
TNO • Centre for Technology and Policy Studies 
501, Laan van Westenenk 
P.O. Box541 
NL-7300 AM Apeldoom 
Telephone:  31-55-493492 
Telefax:  31-55-421458 
Mr P. Boekholt 
TNO • Centre for Technology and Policy Studies 
501, Laan van W  estenenk 
P.O. Box541 
NL-7300 AM Apeldoom 
Telephone:  31-55-493492 
Telefax:  31-55-421458 
Mr Jorge Alves 
Agencia de Inova~o 
31-4, Pr Duque de Saldanha 
P-1200 Lisboa 
Telephone: 
Telefax:  351-1-540926 
Dr. David Hughes 
Head Industrial Research 
Scottish Enterprise 
120, Bothwell Street 
UK-Glasgow G2 75P 
Telephone:  44-41-248-2700 
Telefax:  44-41-2282882 
Dr. Gordon Murray 
Warwick University 
UK-Coventry CV4 7AL 
Telephone:  44-203-524306 
Telefax:  44-203-523719 
Ms Linda O'Connor 
Head of RTPIB. DTI. 
151, Buckingham Palace Road 3 I 190 Green 
UK-London SWlW 9SS 
Telephone:  44-71-2151704 
Telefax:  44-71-2151986 
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US  Mr Richard Bradshaw 
Senior Vice President 
North Atlantic Research, INC. 
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US-Washington DC 20009  USA 
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Quoae lbese references m your rep!)', piale 
SPRINT /ElMS POLICY EXCHANGE WORKSHOP N° 1 
ON PUBLIC MEASURES SUPPORnNG NEW TECHNOLOGY BASED FIRMS 
Programme 
March 18 
Chairman : A. Strub 
9.30 h  Welcome and Introduction  A. Strub 
DGXIII-D 
9.45 h  Session I:  ·setting the Scene 
( 1)  The nature and relevance of NTBF  s : their 
position and economic relevance in Europe  G. Murray 
Warwick Univ./UK 
(2)  Public policies to support NTBFs in Europe:  G. Fahrenkrog 
an overview of basic appr~aches and types of  TNO-STB/NL 
schemes 
(3)  Comments  G. Braunling 
DG Xlii·D 
11.00 h  Coffee Break 
11.30 h  Session ll  : Indirect Schemes 
t4)  .~ 2uaran  tee scheme : 
The Garantieregeling PPM  A.G.M. 
Bastiaans 
MEA/NL 
(5)  An equity participation scheme : The BJTU  H.P. Lorenzen 
scheme  BMFT/~ 
(6)  Comments  W. Stevens 
EVCA 
13.00 h  Lunch 
IUtament Jean Monnet . Plateau  o,.~u  K.irchber~ L-zno  I.~Ucmbour~. Telephone: darcctline 430ll-'S32. sccrctanal430l 33204. rax 430134544 Chairman : D. Janssens 
14.30 h  Session III : Direct and Specific Schemes 
(7)  The UK Grant schemes :  SMART  /SPUR  B. Parsons 
DTI/UK 
(8)  The Spanish loan scheme  LPozo 
CDTI/E 
(9)  Comments  P. Cordsen 
DTI/DK  ~ 
15.45  Session IV : Direct Integrated Approach  • 
(10)  ANV AR : the national integrated approach to  J.C. Poree 
NTBFs  ANVAR/F 
(11)  The development perspective : the Entreprise  S. O'Reagain 
Development Programme in Ireland  IDA/IRL 
(12)  Comments  G. Fahrenkrog 
1NO-STB/NL 
17.00 h  Session V : .fiscal Approach 
(13)  The Innovation company-law in Belgium  W. Degriek 
IRSIA/B 
(14)  The Italian Tax Scheme  A. Cagli 
M.O.I./1 
(15)  Comments:  Ph. Pelle 
DGXV/B/1, 
18.00 h  Closure of the Session 
18.30 h  Dinner (Salon Vert) 
Invited speaker :  ! 
(16)  Forming a US technology policy: congressional 
R. Bradshaw  , 
and administrative interaction 
Science and Technology 
Policy Advisor for the 
Clinton Presidential 
Campaign ~larch 19 
Chairman : G. Briunling 
9.00 h  Session VI : Issues of Design. ~1anagement 
and Evaluation of NTBF Support Schemes : 
Problems and Penpectives 
(17)  How is the target group defined ? 
What are effective means of 
programme marketing ? 
Introduction :  BJ.M. Giesen 
~· 
SENlER/NL 
(18)  How to cope with the failures of NTBFs ? 
Introduction·:  G. Murray 
Warwick Univ./UK 
(19)  What are th~  positive and negative effects 
of governmental support ?  . 
Introduction:  R. Chabbal 
MRE/F 
(20)  How best do public and private resources cooperate 
in support programmes 
Introduction :  R. Bacheller 
BMFT/D 
(21)  Whv and how to evaluate schemes ? 
Introduction :  R.Kerr 
DIC/IRL 
..  \ 
11.00 h  Coffee break 
11.30 h  Session VII : Community Action and Support Schemes 
.-
(1:)  Overview on current Community support  R. Miege 
schentes in favour in NTBF  DGXID-D 




(1-1)  Venture Consort and Eurotech Capital  C. Lambert 
DG XVIll/1 
(15)  The BRITE/EURAM feasibility Awards  I. Saragossi 
DG Xli/C/3 
(16)  SPRINT ~F  support measures  D. Janssens 
DG XIII/D/4 
(~7)  Comments:  D. Deniozos 
M.I.E.T./GR 
13.00 h  Lunch Chairman : R..  ~liege 
14.30 h  Session VIII : Policy Perspectives : 
Tour de Table : 
Future developments of 
Member States Support for NTBF 
General Discussion: 
Trends in Policy developments at Community, 
National and regional level 
Introductory Statements : 
(28)  Community perspectives  A. Strub 
(29)  Perspectives of Member States  R. Chabbal 
(30)  Regional perspectives  J.M. Ivanez 
16.15 h  Concluding remarks 
16.30 b  End of  Workshop 
••• 
Participants :  Representatives from  the Commission and from  the Member States responsible 
for policy developmenL programme manageme~t. and programme monitoring and 
evaluation for NTBF support schemes. 
Participation by invitation. 
Translation-:  Simultaneous translation from  English.  French. German. Italian and Spanish into 
English. French and G~rman. 
Documents :  All participations will receive the results of a survey on programmes to support new 
technology based firms in the Member States, prepared by TNO. 
Venue :  1)  Workshop 
Commission of the European Communities 
Jean Monnet Building  · 
L-2920 Luxembourg 
Room M5 
2)  Dinner 
Jean Monnet Buildine 
Salon Vert  -





EIM:S'  broad  aims  are  to  collect  and  disseminate  information  on  innovation  and 
technology transfer, and to organise a permanent and interactive system for producing and 
using this knowledge.  ' 
More precisely, ElMS aims at: 
+  Monitoring of  innovation and diffusion in Europe and evaluation of  support measures 
+  Strengthening  of the exchange  of experience  between the  member  states  and  the 
Commission in the field of  innovation policy and technology transfer 
+  Providing all interested parties with information, analysis and research on the factors 
shaping, promoting and inhibiting innovation at the company level across Europe 
+  Reflecting the increasing need for reliable information as a foundation for formulating 
innovation policies in the phase of the major changes in the innovation environment 
and especially the characteristics and different types of  innovation within S:MEs. 
ElMS activities are organised in the six main areas: 
1.  Evaluation 
2.  Innovation in firms 
3.  Innovation and technology transfer supporting infrastructures 
4.  Regional aspects of  innovation (capabilities, infrastructures and strategies) 
5.  Innovation financing 
6.  Innovation policy. 
e-aims/ed/jm.doc Further ElMS publications 
1.  An integrated Approach to European Innovation and Technology Diffusion 
Policy: a Maastricht Memorandum, L  Soete and A. Arundel, 1993 
2.  The Community Innovation Survey: Status and Penpectives, 1994 
3.  Innovation Activities and Industrial Structure: Industry and R&D in a 
Comparative Context, T. Sandven and K. Smith, 1993 
4.  Investment, Innovation and Competitiveness: Sectoral Performance within the 
Triad, A. Wyckoff, 1993 
S.  Patterns of  Innovation in Italian Industry, 
G. SirDii, R. Evanglista~ M. Pianta, 1993 
6.  Innovation Structures and Performance in Nordic Manufacturing Industry, 
A. Kristensen, 1993  · 
7.  Public Measures Supporting New Technology Based Firms: Proceedings of  the· 
SPRINT/ElMS Policy Workshop, P. Boekbolt, and G. Fahrenkrog, 1994  · 
8.  Policies to Support·Tacit Knowledge Transfer. Proceeding of the SPRINT/ElMS 
Policy -Workshop, Luxembourg 25-26 May1993, G. Fahrenkrog, P. Boekbolt, J. 
Howells, V. Mangematin, and G. Schutte. 
9.  Surveys of  Regional Innovation? A' Feasibility Study for Europe, N. Alderman 
and M. Wood, 1994 
The reports can be ordered from 
J. Malvil or M. Schmit 
Tel.:  (+352) -4301 32625 or (+352) 4301 33945 
Fax:  (+352) -4301  34544 
. d-00315J 
• 